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User: TRlNA

Case CV-2006-0005807-M Current Judge Thomas J Ryan
Henry Ogden, eta1 vs Dennis C Gr~ffith,eta1

Henry Ogden, Michelle Hurst vs Dennis C Griffith, Bonn~eM Porter
Date

Code

User

511112007

AFFD

DORLA

Affidavit of Dennis Griffith in opposition to
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and in
support of defendants' motion for summary
judgment

MEMO

DORLA

Memorandum in opposition to plaintiffs' motion for James C. Morfitt
summary judgment and in support of defendants'
motion for summary judgment

MOTN

DORLA

Defendants' Motion for summary judgment

James C. Morfitt

NOTC

DORLA

Notice of hearing

James C. Morfitt

AFFD

TRlNA

Affidavit of Ron R. Shepherd

James C. Morfitt

CONT

TRlNA

Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Gregory M. Culet
held on 06/08/2007 01:30 PM: Continued
Plaintiffs Motion

HRSC

TRlNA

Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary
Judgment 0711312007 01:30 PM) Plaintiffs
Motion

Renae J. Hoff

AFFD

TRlNA

Affidavit of Daniel Godoy

Renae J. Hoff

MISC

TRlNA

Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs'
Renae J. Hoff
Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition
to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

AFFD

TRlNA

Affidavit of Shelli D. Stewart in Support of Reply
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for
Summary Judgment and in Opposition to
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

Renae J. Hoff

Affidavit of Carrie Redovian in Support of
Pliantiffs' Reply Memorandum
Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants
Motion for Summary Judgment

Renae J. Hoff

AFFD
MlSC

Judae
James C. Morfitt

James C. Morfitt

AFFD

TRlNA

Affidavit of Ron R. Shepard

James C. Morfitt

MlSC

TR l NA

Judge Morfitt took the file for review

James C. Morfitt

HRHD

TR l NA

CHJG

TRlNA

Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment James C. Morfitt
held on 0711312007 01:30 PM: Hearing Held
Plaintiff's Motion
Thomas J. Ryan
Change Assigned Judge

MlSC

TR l NA

Memorandum Decision and Orders on Cross
Motions for Summary Judgment( Both Motion's
for Summary Judgment Denied)

James C. Morfitt

MlSC

TRlNA

Request for Trial Setting

Thomas J. Ryan

MlSC

TRlNA

Response to Request for Trial Setting

Thomas J. Ryan

FSTC

TRl NA

File Sent To Caldweii- for setting of trial to
Caroline for Judge Ryan's Calendar

Thomas J. Ryan

STlP

TRlNA

Stipulation pretrial and trial dates

Thomas J. Ryan

ORDR

TRlNA

Order Setting Case for Trial and Pretrial

Thomas J. Ryan

HRSC

TRlNA

Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference
0111112008 09:00 AM)
-,

Thomas J. Ryan
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Case CV-2006-0005807-M Current Judge Thomas J. Ryan
Henry Ogden, etal. vs Dennis C Griffith, etal.

Henry Ogden, Michelle Wurst vs. Dennis C Griffith, Bonnie M Porter
Date

Code

10/2412007

HRSC

User

Judge
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 03/05/2008 09:OO Thomas J. Ryan
AM) 3-day jury trial

NOTC

TRlNA

Notice of Service of a Discovery Document

Thomas J. Ryan

MlSC

TRlNA

Plaintiffs' Expert Disclosure

Thomas J. Ryan

ST1P

TRl NA

Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning

Thomas J. Ryan

MOSJ

LENA

Motion For Summary Judgment

Thomas J. Ryan

MEMO

LENA

Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment

Thomas J. Ryan

AFFD

LENA

Affidavit of Shelli D. Stewart in Support of
Memorandum in Support of Plaitniffs Motion for
Sumamry Judgment

Thomas J. Ryan

NOHG

LENA

Notice Of Hearing

Thomas J. Ryan

HRSC

LENA

Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary
Judgment 02/08/2008 01:30 PM)

Gregory M. Culet

NOTC

TRlNA

Notice of Service of Discovery Responses

Thomas J. Ryan

MISC

TR INA

Plaintiffs Witness and Exhibit lists

Thomas J. Ryan

MlSC

JAM1E

Witness / Exhibit List

Thomas J. Ryan

MlSC

TRlNA

Witness-Exhibit List

Thomas J. Ryan

ORDR

TRl NA

Order Referring Case to Mediation

Thomas J. Ryan

FSTC

TRlNA

File Sent To Caldwell for Judge Ryan-Motion for
Summary Judgment to be heard in Caldwell
2/8/08 at 2:30 p.m.

Thomas J. Ryan

HRSC

TRlNA

Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary
Judgment 02/08/2008 02:30 AM) changed to
Caldwell

Thomas J. Ryan

HRSC

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 03/05/2008 09:OO Thomas J. Ryan
AM) 3-day

MlSC

Amended Notice of Hearing for 2/8/08 at 2:30
p.m.

Thomas J. Ryan

FSTC

TRlNA

File Sent To Caldwell

Thomas J. Ryan

CONT

TRlNA

Continued (Motion for Summary Judgment
02/08/2008 02:30 PM) changed to Caldwell

Thomas J. Ryan

CONT

TRlNA

Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Thomas J. Ryan
held on 02/08/2008 01:30 PM: Continued
Changed to Caldwell

MlSC

TRlNA

Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Second
Motion for Summary Judgment

Thomas J. Ryan

MOTN

TRlNA

Motion to Strike

Thomas J. Ryan

MlSC

TRlNA

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike

Thomas J. Ryan

MlSC

TRlNA

Exparte Motion to Shorten Time- Order sent to
Judge Ryan for signature with Judge Grober 214

Thomas J. Ryan

MlSC

TRlNA

Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs'
Motion for Summary Judgment

Thomas J. Ryan
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User: TRINA

Case CV-2006-0005807-M Current Judge Thomas J Ryan
Henry Ogden, etal. vs. Dennis C Griffith, eta1

Henry Ogden, Michelle Hurst vs. Dennis C CiirifTith, Bonnie M Porter
Date

Code

User

Judge

MEMO

Memorandum in Opposition to defendant's Motion Thomas J. Ryan
to Strike

AFFD

Affidavit of Shelli D. Stewart in Support of
Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion to
Strike

Thomas J. Ryan

MlSC

TRlNA

Supplemental Memorandum in Support of
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment

Thomas J. Ryan

MISC

TR l NA

Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment

Thomas J. Ryan

MlSC

TRlNA

Memorandum Decision and Order of Plaintiffs'
Motion for Summary Judgment - copies faxed to
Attorney's along with cover sheet from Wendy

Thomas J. Ryan

MOTN

TRINA

Motion for Reconsideration of Memorandum and Thomas J. Ryan
Decision Re: Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment

HRSC

TRlNA

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/29/2008 10:OO
AM) Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration of
Memorandum and Decision

Thomas J. Ryan

MlSC

TRlNA

Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion
for Reconsideration of Memorandum and
Decision Re: Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment

Thomas J. Ryan

CONT

TRlNA

Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 03/05/2008
09:OO AM: Continued 3-day

Thomas J. Ryan

HRSC

TRlNA

Thomas J. Ryan

MEMO

TRl NA

Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial 03/06/2008
09:30 AM)
Memorandum of Stipulated Facts

HRVC

TRlNA

MOTN

TRlNA

AFFD

TRlNA

Affidavit of Ron R. Shepherd in Support of Motion Thomas J. Ryan
for Leave to Withdraw

NOTC

TRINA

Notice of Hearing

Thomas J. Ryan

HRSC

TRl NA

Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Withdraw
0411112008 01:30 PM)

Dennis E. Goff

MOTN

TRlNA

Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement

Thomas J. Ryan

AFFD

TRlNA

Affidavit of Kevin E. Dinius in Support of Motion
Enforce Settlement Agreement

Thomas J. Ryan

NOTC

TRlNA

Notice of Hearing

Thomas J. Ryan

HRSC

TRl NA

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/17/2008 01:30
PM) Plaintiffs Motion to Enforce Settlement
Agreement

Thomas J. Ryan

CONT

TRl NA

Hearing result for Motion to Withdraw held on
0411 112008 01:30 PM: Continued

Dennis E. Goff

HRSC

TRI NA

Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Withdraw
04/25/2008 10:30 AM) Attorn2y for Defendants

Thomas J. Ryan

Thomas J. Ryan

Hearing result for Court Trial held on 03/06/2008 Thomas J. Ryan
09:30 AM: Hearing Vacated
Motion for Leave to W~thdraw
Thomas J. Ryan
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User: TRlNA

Case CV-2006-0005807-M Current Judge Thomas J. Ryan
Henry Ogden, etal. vs Dennls C Grrffith, etal.

Henry Ogden, M~chelleWurst vs Denn~sC Griffith, Bonn~eM Porter
Date

Code

User

MISC

TR lNA

Second Amended Notice of Hearing

Thomas J. Ryan

CONT

TRlNA

Hearing result for Motion to Withdraw held on
04/25/2008 10:30 AM: Continued Attorney for
Defendants

Thomas J. Ryan

Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Withdraw
0411712008 01:30 PM)

Thomas J. Ryan

Memorandum Decision Re: PlaintiWs Motion to
Reconsider
Order Allowing Withdrawal of Counsel

Thomas J. Ryan

Thomas J. Ryan

HRSC

Judae

Thomas J. Ryan

ORDR

TRlNA

HRHD

TRlNA

Hearing result for Motion to W~thdrawheld on
04/17/2008 01:30 PM: Hearing Held

MOTN

TRlNA

Motion for Summary JudgmentlMotion to Enforce Thomas J. Ryan
Settlement Agreement
Affidavit of Kevin D.Dinius in Support of Motion Thomas J. Ryan
for Summary Judgment Motion to Enforce
Settlement Agreement

AFFD

NOTC

HRSC

MISC

TRlNA

AFFD

TR l NA

APER
APER

TRlNA

NOTC

Notice of Hearing ( contacted Atty. for new Notice Thomas J. Ryan
to correct to Owyhee County Courthouse in
Murphy not Caldwell)
Thomas J. Ryan
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary
Judgment 05/30/2008 11:00 AM) and Motion to
Enforce Settlement Agreement
Thomas J. Ryan
Amended notice of hearing
Affidavit Re:Service of Order Allowing Withdrawal
of Counsel
Defendant: Griffith, Dennis C Appearance R.
Wade Curtis
Defendant: Porter, Bonnie M Appearance R.
Wade Curtis
Notice of Appearance Following Withdrawal of
Counsel

Thomas J. Ryan
Thomas J. Ryan
Thomas J. Ryan
Thomas J. Ryan

MOTN

TRlNA

Motion to Continue Hearing

Thomas J. Ryan

ORDR

TR l NA

Order Continuing Summary Judgment Hearing

Thomas J. Ryan

CO NT

TRlNA

HRSC

TRlNA

ORDR

Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Thomas J. Ryan
held on 05/30/2008 11:00 AM: Continued and
Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement
Thomas J. Ryan
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary
Judgment 0611012008 01:30 PM)
Thomas J. Ryan
Order Continuing Summary Judgment Hearing

ORDR

Order Resetting Summary Judgment Hearing

CONT

Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Thomas J. Ryan
held on 06/10/2008 01:30 PM: Continued
Thomas J. Ryan
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary
Judgment 06/05/2008 01:30 PM)
Thomas J. Ryan
Notice of Substitution of C y n s e l

HRSC
NOTC

TRlNA

Thomas J. Ryan
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User: TRlNA

Case CV-2006-0005807-M Current Judge Thomas J Ryan
Henry Ogden, etal. vs. Denn~sC Griffith, etal.

Henry Ogden, Michelle Hurst vs. Dennis C Griffith, Bonnie M Porter
Date

Code

User

5/23/2008

MlSC

TRINA

Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce Settlement
Agreement

Thomas J. Ryan

AFFD

TRINA

Affidavit of Bonnie M. Porter

Thomas J. Ryan

AFFD

TRINA

Affidavit of Dennis Griffith

Thomas J. Ryan

CONT

TR lNA

Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Thomas J. Ryan
held on 0610512008 01:30 PM: Continued

5/28/2008

MISC

Judge

Second Order Setting Summary Judgment
Hearing

Thomas J. Ryan

5/29/2008

HRSC

TRlNA

Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary
Judgment 06/26/2008 09:OO AM)

Thomas J. Ryan

5/30/2008

MlSC

TRlNA

Subpoena Duces Tecurn to Ronald Shepherd

Thomas J. Ryan

NOTC

TRINA

Notice of Taking Audio Visual Deposition of
Ronald Shepherd

Thomas J. Ryan

MlSC

TRINA

Subpoena Duces Tecum to Bruce Hendricks

Thomas J. Ryan

NOTC

TR INA

Notice of Taking Audio Visual Deposition of Bruce Thomas J. Ryan
Hendricks

MISC

TR lNA

Subpoena Duces Tecum to Brenda Seegar

Thomas J. Ryan

NOTC

TRlNA

Notice of Taking Audio Visual Deposition of
Brenda Seegar

Thomas J. Ryan

MlSC

TR lNA

Subpoena to Brenda Seegar

Thomas J. Ryan

MlSC

TRl NA

Subpoena to Bruce Hendricks

Thomas J. Ryan

MISC

TRlNA

Subpoena to Ronald Shepherd

Thomas J. Ryan

NOTC

TRlNA

Notice of Intent to Present Evidence and to
Produce Testimony

Thomas J. Ryan

6/5/2008

NOTC

TRINA

Notice of Intent to Cross Examine

Thomas J. Ryan

6/6/2008

NOTC

TRlNA

Notice of Intent to Cross Examine

Thomas J. Ryan

61912008

NOTC

TRlNA

Notice of Intent to Present Evidence and to
Produce Testimony

Thomas J. Ryan

611612008

NOTC

TRlNA

Notice of Intent to Cross Examine

Thomas J. Ryan

612312008

STlP

TRINA

Thomas J. Ryan

CONT

TRlNA

Stipulation to Continue Hearing to 9:30 a.m.
instead of 9:00 a.m. 6-26
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment
held on 06/26/2008 09:OO AM: Continued
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary
Judgment 06/26/2008 09:30 AM)
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment
held on 0612612008 09:30 AM: Hearing Held

HRSC
6/26/2008

HRHD

7/2112008

MlSC

TRlNA

8/7/2008

MlSC

TRlNA

8/22/2008

MOTN

TRlNA

Thomas J. Ryan
Thomas J. Ryan
Thomas J. Ryan

Defendants' Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Thomas J. Ryan
Law
Thomas J. Ryan
Finding of Fact & Conclusions of Law Upon
Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce Settlement
Thomas J. Ryan
Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs
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User: TRINA

Case CV-2006-0005807-M Current Judge. Thomas J. Ryan
Henry Ogden, eta1 vs Dennis C Gntfith, eta1

Henry Ogden, Michelle Hurst vs. Dennis C Griffith, Bonnie M Porter
Judge

Date

Code

User

812212008

MEMO

TR INA

Memorandum In Support of Motion for Attorney
Fees and Costs

Thomas J. Ryan

MEMO

TR lNA

Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys Fees and
Affidavit of Attorney

Thomas J. Ryan

MlSC

TRlNA

Substitution of Attorney

Thomas J. Ryan

APER

TRlNA

Defendant: Griffith, Dennis C Appearance Allen
B. Ellis

Thomas J. Ryan

9/4/2008

HRSC

TRlNA

Thomas J. Ryan
Hearing Scheduled (Telephonic Conference
09/09/2008 01:30 PM) Court will initiate the call.
Plaintiffs proposed Judgment

9/9/2008

HRHD

TR lNA

Hearing result for Telephonic Conference held on Thomas J. Ryan
09/09/2008 01:30 PM: Hearing Held Court will
initiate the call. Plaintiffs proposed Judgment

JDMT

TRINA

Judgment

Thomas J. Ryan

MISC

TRlNA

Certificate of Service

Thomas J. Ryan

MOTN

TRlNA

Motion to Disallow Costs and Fees

Thomas J. Ryan

NOTC

TRlNA

Notice of Hearing

Thomas J. Ryan

HRSC

TRlNA

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 0911212008 10:11
AM) Motion to Vacate Judgment and Motion to
Disallow Costs and Fees

Thomas J. Ryan

TRlNA

Thomas J. Ryan
Miscellaneous Payment: For Comparing And
Conforming A Prepared Record, Per Page Paid
by: Morrow, Dinius Attys at Law Receipt number:
0045280 Dated: 911512008 Amount: $1.50
(Check)
Miscellaneous Payment: For Certifying The Same Thomas J. Ryan
Additional Fee For Certificate And Seal Paid by:
Morrow, Dinius Attys at Law Receipt number:
0045280 Dated: 911512008 Amount: $2.00
(Check)
Thomas J. Ryan
Motion to Vacate Judgment

9/2/2008

911212008

911512008

MOTN

TRI NA

MEMO

TRlNA

Memorandum in Support of Motions to Vacate
Judgment and Disallow Attorney FeeslCosts

Thomas J. Ryan

HRSC

TRlNA

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 09/26/2008 10:30
AM) Motion to Vacate Judgment and Motion to
Disallow Costs and Fees

Thomas J. Ryan

9/22/2008

MlSC

TRl NA

Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendants Motion to Vacate Judgment and
Disallow Attorney FeesICosts

Thomas J. Ryan

9/24/2008

MlSC

TRl NA

Thomas J. Ryan

AFFD

TRl NA

Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Vacate
Judgment and Motion to Disallow Attorney Fees
and Costs
Affidavit of Allen B. Ellis

HRHD

TRl NA

9/26/2008

Thomas J. Ryan

Thomas J. Ryan
Hearing result for Motion held on 09/26/2008
10:30 AM: Hearing Held Motion to Vacate
Judgment and Motion to Disallow Costs and Fees
r:
/

-

Date 2/26/2009

Third Judicial District Court Owyhee County

Time 01 42 PM
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User: TRlMA

Case CV-2006-0005807-M Current Judge Thomas J. Ryan
Henry Ogden, eta! vs. Dennis C Gnffith, etal.

Henry Ogden, M~chelleHurst vs Clenn~sC Griffith, Bonnie M Porter
Date

Code

User

9/29/2008

MlSC

TRlNA

Supplemental Brief in Support of Motion to
Vacate Judgment

Thomas J. Ryan

101612008

MlSC

TRI NA

Plaintiffs Supplemental Brief in Opposition to
Defendantswotion to Vacate Judgment and
Disallow Attorney Feeslcosts

Thomas J. Ryan

1011412008

CONT

TRl NA

Hearing result for Motion held on 09/12/2008
Thomas J. Ryan
10:l IAM: Continued Motion to Vacate
Judgment and Motion to Disallow Costs and Fees
( to be held by Briefs)

11/6/2008

MEMO

TRl NA

Thomas J. Ryan

1111212008

NOTC

TRl NA

Memorandum Decision Upon Rule 59(e) Motion
to Vacate Judgment and Motion for Fees and
Costs
Notice of Hearing

HRSC

TRlNA

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 1212312008 10:30
AM) Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration

Thomas J. Ryan

MOTN

TRl NA

Motion for Reconsideration

Thomas J. Ryan

MEMO

TR INA

Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Reconsideration

Thomas J. Ryan

NOTC

TRl NA

Notice of Appeal

Thomas J. Ryan

BNDC

TRl NA

Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 46078 Dated
1211112008 for 86.00) - Supreme Court fee

Thomas J. Ryan

BNDC

TRl NA

Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 46079 Dated
1211112008 for 200.00)- Reporters Transcript

Thomas J. Ryan

BNDC

TRlNA

Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 46080 Dated
1211112008 for 200.00) - Clerk's Record

Thomas J. Ryan

TRl NA

Filing: T - Civil Appeals To The Supreme Court
Thomas J. Ryan
($86.00 for the Supreme Court to be receipted via
Misc. Payments. The $15.00 County District
Court fee to be inserted here.) Paid by: Ellis,
Allen B. (attorney for GriBth, Dennis C) Receipt
number: 0046081 Dated: 1211112008 Amount:
$15.00 (Check) For: Griffith, Dennis C
(defendant)
Thomas J. Ryan
Appealed To The Supreme Court

1211112008

Judge

Thomas J. Ryan

APSC

TRlNA

1211212008

MlSC

TRlNA

Plaintiffs Memorandum in Oppostion to
Defendants Motion for Reconsideration

1211512008

BNDT

TRl NA

BNDT

TRlNA

MISC

TRl NA

Thomas J. Ryan
Bond Transferred To County: (Transaction
number 33703 dated 1211512008 amount 86.00)
Idaho Supreme Court
Bond Transferred To County: (Transaction
Thomas J. Ryan
number 33704 dated 12/15/2008 amount 200.00)
Amended Notice of Appeal
Thomas J. Ryan

NOTA

TRlNA

NOTICE OF APPEAL-filed by Kevin E. Dinius

1211612008

Thomas J. Ryan

Thomas J. Ryan

#*t*

tiv"$:

-

Date: 112612009
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Time 01 42 PM
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User: TRlNA

Case CV-2006-0005807-M Current Judge Thomas J. Ryan
Henry Ogden, etal. vs. Denn~sC Grtffith, etal.

Henry Ogden, M~chelleHurst vs. Dennis C Griffith, Bonnie M Porter
Date

1212212008

112312009

Code

User

Judge

TRl NA

Filing: T - Civil Appeals To The Supreme Court
Thomas J. Ryan
($86.00 for the Supreme Court to be receipted via
Misc. Payments. The $15.00 County District
Court fee to be inserted here.) Paid by: Morrow
and Dinius Receipt number: 0046129 Dated:
1211612008 Amount: $15.00 (Check) For: Ogden,
Henry (plaintiff)

CONT

LENA

Hearing result for Motion held on 12/23/2008
10:30 AM: Continued Defendant's Motion for
Reconsideration

Thomas J. Ryan

HRSC

LENA

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/23/2009 10:30
AM) Motion for Reconsideration

Thomas J. Ryan

NOHG

LENA

Amended Notice Of Hearing

Thomas J. Ryan

HRHD

TRlNA

Hearing result for Motion held on 01/23/2009
10:30 AM: Hearing Held Motion for
Reconsideration

Thomas J. Ryan

DCHH

TRlNA

District Court Hearing Held
Thomas J. Ryan
Court Reporter: Kim Saunders
Number of Transcript Pages for this less than 100
pages estimated:

Kevin E. Dinius
Dennis P. Wilkinson
WHITE PETERSON, P.A.
5700 East F r d l i n Road, Suite 200
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901
Telephone: (208) 466-9272
Facsimile:
(208) 466-4405
ISB No.
5974,6023
kedehitepeterson.corn
dwilkinson@whitepeterson.corn
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE

HENRY OGDEN, an unmarried man; and,
MICHELLE HURST, an unmarried woman,
Plaintiffs,
-vs-

)
)

COMPLAINT
and DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

DENNIS C. GRIFFITH, an unmarried man;
and, BONNIE M. PORTER, an unmarried
woman,

)
)

Fee Category: A-1
Filing Fee: $88.00

Defendants.
COMES NOW, Plaintiffs Henry Ogden and Michelle Hurst, by and through their
attorneys of record, the law firm of White Peterson, P.A., and for cause of action against the
above-named Defendants hereby complain and allege as follows:

COMPLAINT and DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 1
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PARTIES
1.

At all relevant times herein mentioned, Plaintiffs Henry Ogden and Michelle
were and are residents of the State of Georgia, residing in

Hurst (hereinafter '"Plaintiffs"),
Atlanta, Georgia.

2.

At all relevm times herein mentioned, Defendants DENNIS C. GRIFFITH and

BONNIE M. PORTER (hereinafier "Defendants") were and are residents of the State of Idaho,
residing in Owyhee County, Idaho.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE
3.

The Defendants to this action reside in Owyhee County, Idaho, making

jurisdiction proper in this court.
4.

The subject property at issue in this action is located in Owyhee County, Idaho,

making jurisdiction proper in this court.

5.

Venue is appropriate pursuant to Idaho Code 5 5-404.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
6.

On or about October 12, 2006, the Plaintiffs entered into a Real Estate Purchase

and Sale Agreement (hereinafter "Contract") with Defendants to purchase real property located
at 2517 Succer Creek Rd., Hornedale, Owyhee County, Idaho ("subject property") , for the sum
of $500,000.00. A true and correct copy of the Contract is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
7.

Pursuant to the Contract, the Plaintiffs were required to provide the Defendants

with $1,000.00 in earnest money. On or about October 13, 2006, the Plaintiffs tendered a check
to the Defendants for $1,000.00.

8.

Pursuant to the Contract, the closing was to be no later than November 30, 2006

at Pioneer Title in Nampa, Idaho.
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9.

In November 2006, the Plaintiffs arranged for and obtained the necessary

financing to purchase the property.
10.

The Defendants executed Addendum ##3to the Contract, dated November 27,

2006, which extended the closing date to "on or before 12-08-06." Defendant Dennis Griffith
signed Addendum #3 on December 1,2006, and Defendant Bonnie M. Porter signed Addendum

ki3 on December 4, 2006. A true and correct copy of Addendum tr"3 is altached hereto as Exhibit

B.
11.

On December 5,2006, the Defendants informed Pioneer Title that Defendants had

not received funds from the sale of the subject property, Defendants considered Plaintiffs in
breach of the Contract and Defendants were no longer willing to sell the subject property to
Plaintiffs.
12.

On December 6, 2006, the Defendants retrieved the original warranty deed from

Pioneer Title. A true and correct copy of the warranty deed is attached hereto as Exhibit C.

13.

On December 6, 2006, Plaintiffs made demand for Defendants to honor the

Contract and addendurns and proceed with the sale of the subject property.
14.

Defendants have failed and refused to proceed with the sale of the subject

property.
15.

Plaintiffs have performed all conditions and covenants required of them by the

Contract.
16.

Plaintiffs remain ready, willing, and able to perform under the Contract, but the

Defendants refuse to sell the subject property to Plaintiffs.

COMPLAINT and DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 3
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COUNT ONE
Breach of Contract
17.

P l a i ~ i f f sreallege and incorporate the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as

if they were fully set forth herein.
18.

The Contract is a valid and enforceable Contract between the Plaintiffs and the

Defendants.
13. Plaintiffs have performed all their conditions and covenants required under the

Contract, or Defendants have waived andlor are estopped from claiming that the Plaintiffs are in
breach of the Contract.

20.

Defendants breached the Contract by purporting to cancel the Contract and

refusing to perform their obligations under the Contract.
21.

As a direct result of the breach of the Contract by the Defendants, Plaintiffs have

suffered damages, the exact amount to be proven at trial.

COUNT TWO
Injunction
22.

Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as

if they were fully set forth herein.

23.

The Contract represents a valid and binding agreement between the Plaintiffs and

the Defendants.

24.

By virtue of their binding Contract with the Plaintiffs, Defendants should be

precluded from selling or attempting to sell the subject property or any part of the property to
anyone other than the Plaintiffs.

25.

Plaintiffs' rights to purchase the subject property are prior and superior to the

rights of any other party with respect to such purchase.

COMPLAINT and DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 4
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26.

Should the Defendants proceed to sell or transfer the subject property to any third

party; Plaintiffs will suffer immediate, great, and ineparable h m .

27.

Monetary damages, alone, would be inadequate to prevent irreparable harm to the

Plaintiffs, and Plaintiffs have no other adequate remedy at law to prevent such h a m andor to
recover for the harm it will suffer as the result of such sale.

28.

Unless otherwise restrained, Defendants may attempt to proceed to sell or transfer

the real estate to a third party, resulting in the foregoing h a m to the Plaintiffs.

29.

Plaintiffs are entitled to preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, enjoining

and restraining Defendants andlor their agents or real estate broker from selling the real estate or
any part of the property to anyone other than the Plaintiffs.

COUNT THlREE
Specific Performance
30.

Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as

if they were fully set forth herein.

31.

Pursuant to the Contract, Defendants are obligated to sell the subject property to

the Plaintiffs, in accordance with the terms and conditions provided therein.

32.

Pursuant to the Contract, Plaintiffs are entitled to purchase the subject property

from the Defendants, in accordance with the terms and conditions provided therein.

33.

The Contract involves unique property; and therefore, damages alone will not

provide Plaintiffs with an adequate remedy at law upon the event of a breach.

34.

Plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment or order specifically requiring the Defendants

to sell the subject property in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in the Contract.

-
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COUNT FOUR
Declarafary Judgmerzt
35.

Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as

if they were fully set forth herein.

36.

The parties are persons interested under wrillen instruments, whose rights, status,

and/or other legal relations are affected thereby, and who are entitled to a detemination of any
question of construction or validity arising under the instments, and to obtain a declaration of
rights, status or other legal relations there under.

37.

An actual, justifiable controversy exists between Plaintiffs and Defendants with

respect to the validity and enforceability of the Contract vis-ti-vis Idaho law or any other
Contract or agreement between Defendants and other parties concerning the sale and purchase of
the subject property.

38.

Entry of a judgment or decree by the court with respect to said controversy would

terminate the controversy between the parties.

39.

Plaintiffs are entitled to entry of a judgment or decree declaring that: (a) the

Contract is a valid, binding, and enforceable Contract requiring Defendants to sell the subject
property to the Plaintiffs in accordance with the terms provided herein; (b) Plaintiffs' rights to
purchase the subject property under the Contract are prior and superior to the rights of any other
parties with respect to the purchase of the real estate or any part of the property; (c) Defendants
are not Contractually or legally obligated to sell the real estate or any part of the property to any
party other than the Plaintiffs; (d) Plaintiffs have not breached the Contract; and (e) Defendants
have breached the Contract.

COMPLAINT and DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 6
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COUNT FIVE
Breach ofthe Implied Covenant o j Good Faith and Fair Dealing
40.

Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as

if they were fully set forth herein.
41.

The Contract contains an implied covenmt of good faith and fair dealing.

42.

Defendants breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by

purposing to cancel the Contract, and presumably attempting to sell the subject property to

someone other that the Plaintiffs.
43.

Defendants did not perform their obligations under the Contract in good faith, and

breached the implied covenant of good faith, and fair dealing by nullifying and/or significantly
impairing the benefit of the Contract owing to the Plaintiffs.
44.

As a result of the Defendants' breach of the implied covenant of good faith and

fair dealing, the Plaintiffs have suffered damages, the exact amount to be proven at trial.

ATTOWEY FEES
As a result of the Defendants' actions as set forth above, Plaintiffs have been required to
retain the law firm of White Peterson, P.A., to prosecute this action and has incurred and will
continue to incur costs and attorney fees for which the Plaintiffs are entitled to a separate award
pursuant to Idaho Code

$9

12-120 and 12-121, and Rule 54(e)(l) of the Idaho Rules of Civil

Procedure as well as any other applicable statute or rule, in an amount to be determined by the
Court, or, if judgment is rendered by default, in the amount of $7,500.00.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Plaintiffs hereby request a jury trial pursuant to 1.R.C.P 38.

COMPLAINT and DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 7

PRAYER FOR WLIIEF
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs pray for judgment against the Defendants as follows:
I.

As to the First Count, an order and accompanying judgment finding that the

Contract is a valid and binding Contract, that the Defendants breached the Contract, and that
Defendants are liable for the breach of the Contract and owe damages to the Plaintiffs, the exact
m o u n t to be proven at trial;

2.

As to the Second Count, for a judgment or order permanently enjoining and

restraining Defendants and/or their agents from selling the subject property or any part of the
property to any party other than the Plaintiffs;

3.

As to the Third Count, for a judgment or order specifically requiring and

compelling the Defendants to promptly follow through with the terms of the Contract and sell the
subject property to the Plaintiffs as agreed upon;

4.

,

As to the Fourth Count, for a judgment or decree declaring that: (a) the Contract

is a valid, binding, and enforceable Contract requiring Defendants to sell the subject property to
the Plaintiffs in accordance with the terms provided herein; (b) Plaintiffs' rights to purchase the
property under the Contract are prior and superior to the rights of any other parties with respect
to the purchase of the subject property or any part of the property; (c) Defendants are not
Contractually or legally obligated to sell the subject property or any part of the property to any
party other than the Plaintiffs; (d) Plaintiffs have not breached the Contract; and (e) Defendants
have breached the Contract.
5.

As to the Fifth Count, an order and accompanying judgment finding that the

Contract is a valid and binding Contract, that such Contract contains an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, that Defendants breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair

COMPLAINT and DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 8
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dealing contained in the Contract, that Defendmts are Liable for breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing contained in the Contract, and that Defendants owe Plaintiffs
damages, the exact amount to be proven at trial.

6.

For costs incurred in the prosecution of this action.

7.

For an award of reasonable altorneysVees incurred in the prosecution of this

matter, the exact amount to be proven at trial or othewise in this case.
8.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable.

DATED this

rL"1
day of December, 2006.
W I T E PETERSON, P.A.

-.
By:
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

cm\W:\WorMO\Ogden, Henyipdon-Discoveq\Complaint.doc
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EXHIBIT A

RE-21 R E A L ESTATE PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT
THIS IS A LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACT READ THE ENTIRE DOCUMENT INCLUDING ANY ATACHMENTS IF YOU
HAVE ANY QUESTIONS. CONSULT YOUR AITORNEY AND/OR ACCOUNTANT BEFORE SIGNING
2
3

ID#

RUMAX ADVANTAGE
-

LISTING AGENCY
Ltsttng Agent

PETE M C A R T H U R

SELLING AGENCY
6

9
'0
11

12
'3

1011212006

DATE

Selltng Agent

Office Phone #

E-Ma11

R U M A X ADVANTAGE

STACEY BUDELL

E-Mall-

Office Phone #

&&wok

Fax #

staceybQ
remax.net

1. BUYER:
H E N R Y OGDEN AND MICHELLE HURST
(Hereinafter called
"BUYER") agrees to purchase, and the undersigned SELLER agrees to sell the followlng descrtbed real estate heretnaffer referred to as "PREMISES"
COMMONLY KNOWN AS
2517 SUCCER CREEK
Clty HOMEDALE
OWYHEE
County. ID. Zip
legally descrtbed as thheNw 114 of the SW 114 of S 17 T3N, R5W
Boise Meridian, Owyhee County P a r c e l I and I1the E 240' of N240' of EW 114 of SW 114 of S17 T3N R5W
OR Legal Descrlptlon Altached as addendum #
(Addendum must accompany origtnal offer.)

14

i5

2, -$

PURCHASEPRICEFlve Hundred Thousand and Zero1100
payable upon the following TERMS AND CONDITIONS ( not lncludlng clostng costs )

$6

-

DOL LARS,

17

3. F I N A N C I A L TERMS: Note: A+C+D+E must a d d u p t o total purchase price.
$

One Thousand a n d ZeroilOO
(A). EARNEST MONEY BUYER hereby deposlts
DOLLARS as
Earnest Money evidenced by
cash Epersonal check qcashier's check IL] note (due date)
other
and a recetpt IS hereby acknowledged Earnest Money to be deposited
tn trust account Oupon receipt, or
upon acceptance by all parttes and shall be held by
L~stlngBroker q Selllng Broker
both
for the benefit of the parttes hereto The responsible Broker shall be
other
Don V Y . k m

a

(B). ALL CASH OFFER:

aNO a YES If this is an all cash offer do not complete lines 32 through 61, fill blanks with

" 0 (ZERO.)
IF CASH OFFER. BUYER'S OBLIGATION TO CLOSE SHALL NOT BE SUBJECT TO ANY FINANCIAL CONTINGENCY.

10
business days from the date of acceptance of this agreement by all patties, evidence of
BUYER agrees to provide SELLER within
sufficient funds and/or proceeds necessary to close transaction. Acceptable documentation includes, but is not limited to, a copy of a recent bank or
financial statement or contract(s) for the sale of BUYER'S current residence or other property to be sold.

$ma

(C). NRN LOAN PROCEEDS: This Agreement is contingent upon BUYER obtaining the following financing:

q FIRST LOAN of $
not including mortgage insurance,through q FHA. q VA. OCONVENTIONAL.
0IHFA.
q RURAL DEVELOPMENT. 0 OTHER
with mterest not to exceed
% for a period of
year@) at: 0 Fixed Rate
q Other
plus origination fee i f any. SELLER shall pay no more than
point(s)
BUYER shall pay no more than-point(s)
Any reduction in points shall first accrue to the benefil of the 0 BUYER q SELLER q Divided Equally
NIA.
0 SECOND LOAN of $
with interest not to exceed
% for a period of
year(s) at:
Fixed Rate
q Other
BUYER shall pay no more than
point(s plus origination fee if any. SELLER shall pay no more than
point(s). Any
reduction in points shall first accrue to h e benefit of the q BUYER
SELLER 0 Divided Equally 0NIA.
LOAN APPLICATI0N:BUYER q has applied q shall apply for such loanjs) within b u s i n e s s day(s) of SELLER'S acceptance. Within

a

a

b

business days of final acceptance of all parties. BUYER agrees to furnish SELLER with a written confirmation showing lender approval of
credit report, income verification, debt ratios in a manner acceptable to the SELLER(S) and subject only to satisfactory appraisal and final lender
underwriting. If such written confirmation is not received by SELLER(S) within the strict time allotted. SELLER(S) may at their option cancel this
agreement by notifying BUYER(S) in writing of such cancellation within -business
day(s) after written confirmation was required. If SELLER does
not cancel within the strict time period specified as set forth herein. SELLER shall be deemed to have accepted such written confirmation of lender approval
and shall be deemed to have elected to proceed with the transaction. SELLER'S approval shall not be unreasonably withheld. If an appraisal is required
b y lender, the property must appraise at not less than purchase price or BUYER'S Earnest Money may be returned at BUYER'S request. BUYER
may also apply for a loan with different conditions and costs and close transaction provided all other terms and conditions o f this Agreement are
fulfilled, and the new loan does not increase the costs or requirementsto the SELLER
FHA IVA: If applicable, it is expressly agreed that notwithstanding any other provisions of this contract. BUYER shall not be obligated to complete the
purchase of the property described herein or to incur any penalty or forfeiture of Eamest Money deposits or otherwise unless BUYER has been given in
accordance with HUOIFHA or VA requirements a written statement by the Federal Housing Commissioner, Veterans Administration or a Direct
Endonement lender setting foith the appraised value of the property of not less than the sates price as stated in the contract. SELLER agrees to pay fees
required by FHA or VA.
$

a
a

(D). ADDITIONAL FINANCIAL TERMS:
Additional financial terms are specified under the heading "OTHER TERMS AND/OR CONDITIONS" (Section 4).
Additional financial terms are contained in a FINANCING ADDENDUM of same date, attached hereto, signed by both parties.
Line E below is the total of the Purchase Price minus Lines A. C, and D. Only use numbers in these lines.

$&@,Qf&QO

(E). APPROXIMATE FUNDS D U E FROM BUYERS A T CLOSING (Not including cfosing costs): Cash at closing
to be paid by BUYER at closing in GOOD FUNDS, includes: cash, electronic transfer funds, certified check or cashier's check. NOTE: I f any
of above loans being Assumed or taken "subject to", any net differences between the approximate balances and the actual balance of said loanfs)
shall be adjusted at dosing of escrow in:
Cash mother:

BUYER'S Initials (

)(

SELLER'S Initials (

) Date-

s)(
) Date

Thts brm 1s pnnled and dtstnbuled by Ihe ldaho Assmalton of REALTORS@,Inc Thts form has been deegned fcx and ts pmvtded only for use by real eslale profess~onalswho are members of the
NaltonatAssoaabon of R E A L T O R S USE BY ANY OTHER PERSON IS PROHIBITEO Copynghl Idaho Assmalton of REALTORS@ Inc All rfghlsreserved
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HOMEDALE--

PROFERTY ADDRESS:

ID#:

3.4

--

4. OTHER TERMS ANDiOR CONDITIONS: This Agreement is made subject t o the following special terms, considerations andlor contingencies
which must be satisfied rior to closln

SELLERS SHALL HA& A R E A S O ~
NOT TO EXCEED 180 DAYS.

5. ITEMS INCLUDED & EXCLUDED IN THIS SALE All exlsttng fixlures and fittrngs that are attached to the property are INCLUDED IN THE PURCHASE
PRICE (unless excluded below), and shall be transferred free of isens These include, but are not limited to, all attached floor coverlngs, attached televlslon
antennae, satelllfe dlsh and recelvlng equ~pment,attached flumbing, bathraom and lrflhtlng fixtures, window screens, screen doors, storm wmdows, storm doors.
all wtndow coverlngs, garage door opener(s) and transmttter(s), exterlor trees, plants or shrubbery, water heatlng apparatus and fixtures, attached fireplace
equlprnent, awnmgs, ventllatlng, cooling and heatlng systems, all ranges ovens bull1 ~ndishwashers, fuel tanks and lnlgatton fixtures and equlprnent, all water
systems. wells spnngs, water, water rfghts,d~tchesand dftchrights. lf any, that are appurlenant thereto that are now on or used In connection with the premtses
and shall be Included In the sale unless othewlse prov~dedheretn BUYER should satisfy h~mselflherself
that the condltton of the Included Items IS acceptable It
1s agreed that any Itern Included In thls sectton 1s of nominal value less than $100

.

ADDITIONAL ITEMS SPECIFICALLY INCLUDED IN THIS SALE:
n L & 3 k t c n n o N EQUIPMENT INCLUDING B U T NOT LtMrTEo T o A L L P

p

r

s

(B). ITEMS SPECIFICALLY EXCLUDED I N THIS SALE: SELLERS PERSONAL PROPERTY
6 . TITLE CONVEYANCE: Titk of SELLER is to be conveyed by warranty deed, unless otherwise provided, and is to be marketable and insurable except for
rights resewed in federal patents, state or railroad deeds, building or use restrictions, building and zoning regulations and ordinances of any governmental unit.
and rights of way and easements established or of record. Liens, encumbrances or defects to be discharged by SELLER may be paid out of purchase money at
date of closing. No liens, encumbrances or defects which are to be discharged or assumed by BUYER or to which title is taken subject to, exist unless otherwise
specified in this Agreement.

7. TITLE INSURANCE; There may be types of title insurance coverages available other than those listed below and parties to this
agreement are advised t o talk t o a title company about any other coverages available that w i l l g i v e the BUYER additional coverage.

0

(A). PRELIMINARY TITLE COMMITMENT: Prior to closing the transaction, SELLER or
BUYER shall furnish to BWER a preliminary commitment of a
title insurance policy showing the condition of the title to said premises. BUYER shall have L b u s i n e s s day(s) from receipt of the preliminary commitment or
not fewer than twenty-four (24) hours prior to closing, within which to object in writing to the condition of the title as set forth in the preliminary commitment. If
BUYER does not so object. BUYER shall be deemed to have accepted the conditions of the title. It is agreed that if the title of said premises is not marketable.
5 business day(s) after notice containing a written statement of defect is delivered to SELLER. BUYER'S Earnest Money
or cannot be made so within
deposit will be returned to BUYER and SELLER shall pay for the cost of title insurance cancellation fee, escrow and legal fees, if any.

(B). TITLE COMPANY. The parties a me that
F R A N K L I ~RD. NAMPA
located at

PIONEER
Title Company
shall provide the title policy and preliminary report of commitment.

(C). STANDARD COVERAGE OWNER'S POLICY: SELLER shall within a reasonable time after closing furnish to BUYER a title insurance policy in the
amount of the purchase price of the premises showing marketableand insurable title subject to the liens, encumbrances and defects elsewhere set out in this
Agreement to be discharged or assumed by BUYER unless othewise provided herein. The risk assumed by the title company in the standard coverage
policy i s limited to matters of public record. BUYER shall receive a ILTAfALTA Owner's Policy ofTitle Insurance. A title company, at BUYER'Srequest, can
provide information about the availability, desirability, coverage and cost of various title insurance coverages and endorsements. If BUYER desires title
coverage other than that required by this paragraph. BWER shall instruct Closing Agency in writing and pay any increase in cost unless otherwise provided
herein.

(D). EXTENDED COVERAGE LENDER'S POLICY (Mortgagee policy): The lender may require that BUYER ( B o w e r ) furnish an Extended Coverage
~ender'sPolicy. This extended coverage lender's policy considers matters of public record and additionally insures against certain matters not shown in the
public record. This extended coverage lender's policy is solely for the benefit of the lender and only protects the lender.
8. MECHANIC'S LIENS - G E N E R A L CONTRACTOR DISCLOSURE STATEMENT NOTICE: BUYER and SELLER are hereby notified that.
subject to ldaho Code 545.525 et seq.. a "General Contractor" must provide a Disclosure Statement to a homeowner that describes certain rights afforded
to the homeowner (e.g. lien waivers, general liability insurance, extended policies of title insurance, surety bonds, and sub-contractor information). The
Disclosure Statement must be given to a homeowner prior to the General Contractor entering into any contract in an amount exceeding $2.000 with a
homeowner for construction, alteration, repair, or other improvements to real property, or with a residential real property purchaser for the purchase and
sale of newly constructed property. Such disclosure is the responsibility of the General Contractor and it is not the duty of your agent to obtain this
information on your behalf. You are advised to consult with any General Contractor subject to ldaho Code 545-525 ef seq. regarding the General
Contractor Disclosure Statement.
BUYER'S Initials (
This form

)(

) Date

SELLER'S Initials (

/

is piinled and distributed by the ldaho Associalion of REALTORS@, Inc. This form has been designed fw and is providedonly for use by real eslale pfofess~onalswho are members of the
Nalional Asswialion of REALTORS@.
USE BY ANY OTHER PERSON IS PROHIBITEO.
Copyrighl ldaho Associalion of REACTORSO. Inc. All rights reserved.
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2517 SUCCER
CREEK
--

PROPERIY ADDRESS:

9. INSPECTION:
(A). BUYER chooses

HOMEDALE

ID#:

tf

@ lo have lnspectron not to have tnspectton If BUYER chooses not to have tnspection sktp sectton 9C BUYER shall
have the r~ghtto conduct tnspecttons. ~nvest~galtons,
tests, surveys and other studtes at BUYER'S expense BUYER shall, wlthln
10 buslness
day(s) of acceptance, complete these tnspecttons and glve to SELLER wrttten nottce of dtsapproved of Items BUYER 1s strongly advlsed lo exerclse
these r~ghtsandto make BUYER'S own selectton of professionals wlth appropriate qualtfications to conduct lnspectlons of the enttre property
(8).FHA INSPECTION REQUIREMENT, If applicable: "For Your Protection: Get a Home Inspection", HUD 92564-CN must be signed on or
before execution o f this agreement.
(C). SATISFACTIONIREMOVAL OF INSPECTION CONTiNGENCIES:
1). If BUYER does not within the strtct ttme per~odspecified glve to SELLER wrltlen notlce of disapproved Items. BUYER shall eonclustvely
be deemed to have (a) completed all Inspections. tnvesttgattons, revtew of appltcable documents and dtsclosures. (b) elected to proceed with the
transaction and (c) assumed all Itablltty, responstbtltty and expense for repalrs or corrections other than for ttems whtch SELLER has otherw~seagreed In
wrttlng to repair or correct
2) If BUYER does wlthtn the stnct tlme perrod speclfied gtve to SELLER wrttten nottce of dtsapproved ,terns. BUYER shall provtde t o
SELLER perttnent section@) of wrttten tnspectton reports SELLER shall have
10
bustness day@) tn whtch to respond tn wrtting.The
SELLER, atthelr optlon may cocrect the Items as speclfied by the BUYERS tn thetr letter or may elect not to do so If the SELLER agrees to correct the
tterns askedfor tn the BUYERS letter, then both parties agree that they will contlnue with the transactton and proceed to clostng Thts will remove the
BUYER'S inspectton conttngency

3). If the SELLER elects not to correct the disapproved items, or does not respond in writing within the strict time period specified, then the
BUYER(S) have the option of either continuing the transaction without the SELLER being responsible for correcting these deficiencies or giving the
5 business days that they will not continue with the transaction and will receive their Eamest Money back.
SELLER written notice within
4). If BUYER does not give such written notice of cancellation within the strict time periods specified. BUYER shall conclusively be deemed
to have elected to proceed with the transaction without repairs or corrections other than for items which SELLER has otherwise agreed in writing to
repair or correct. SELLER shall make the property available for all Inspections. BUYER shall keep the property free and clear of liens: indemnify and
hold SELLER harmless from all liability, claims, demands, damages and costs; and repair any damages arising from the inspections. No inspections
may be made by any governmental building or zoning inspector or government employee without the prior consent of SELLER unless required by local
law.

10. LEAD PAINT DISCLOSURE: The subject property h(l is C ] is not defined as "Target Housing" regarding lead-based paint or lead-based paint
hazards. If yes. BUYER hereby acknowledges the following: ( a ) BUYER has been provided an EPA approved lead-based paint hazard information
pamphlet. "Protect Your Family From Lead in Your Home". ( b ) receipt of SELLER'S Disclosure of Information and Acknowledgment Form and have
been provided with all records, test reports or other information, if any, related to the presence of lead-based paint hazards on said property. ( c ) that
this contract is contingent upon BUYERS right to have the property tested for lead-based paint hazards to be completed no later than
or the contingency will terminate. ( d )that BUYER hereby h(l waives C ] does not waive this right, ( e ) that if test results show
unacceptable amounts of lead-based paint on the premises. BUYER has the right to cancel the contract subject to the option of the SELLER (to be given
in writing) to elect to remove the lead-based paint and correct the problem which must be accomplished before closing, ( f ) that if the contract is
canceled under this clause. BUYER'S earnest money deposit will be returned to BUYER.

11. SQUARE FOOTAGE VERIFICATION: BUYER IS AWARE THAT ANY REFERENCE TO THE SQUARE FOOTAGE OF THE REAL PROPERTY OR
IMPROVEMENTS IS APPROXIMATE. IF SQUARE FOOTAGE IS MATERIAL TO THE BUYER, IT MUST BE VERIFIED DURING THE INSPECTION PERIOD.
12. SELLER'S PROPERTY DISCLOSURE FORM: If required by Title 55. Chapter 25 ldaho Code SELLER shall within ten (10) days after execution
of this Agreement provide to BUYER "SELLER'S Property Disclosure Form* or other acceptable form. BUYER has received the "SELLER'S Property
Disclosure Form" or other acceptable form prior to signing this Agreement:
Yes [XJ No C ] MIA

C]

13. COVENANTS, CONDITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS (CCB R'S): BUYER is responsible to obtain and review a copy of the CC& R's (if
applicable). BUYER has reviewed CC& R's. a y e s

[XJ No

14. SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNER'S ASSOCIATION: BUYER is aware that membership in a Home Owner's Association may be required and
BUYER agrees to abide by the Articles of Incorporation, By-Laws and rules and regulations of the Association. BUYER is further aware that the
Property may be subject to assessments levied by the Association described in full in the Declaration of Covenants. Conditions and Restrictions.
Yes
No @ NIA Association feesldues are $
BUYER has reviewed Homeowner's Association Documents:
per
YEAR
BUYER
SELLER @ NIA to pay Homeowner's Association SET UP FEE of $ Q
andlor property
at dosing.
TRANSFER FEES of $3

a

a

C]

C]

a

15. "NOT APPLICABLE DEFINED:" The letters "nla." "NIA," "n.a.," and "N.A." as used herein are abbreviations of the term *not applicable." Where
this agreement uses the term "not applicable* or an abbreviation thereof, it shall be evidence that the parties have contemplated certain facts or
conditions and have determined that such facts or conditions do not apply to the agreement or transaction herein.

('h
-&)(m
-/:<--/>A

BUYER'S Initials (
)(
)Date
SELLER'S Initials
o l e t aD
This form ts printed and dtslribuled by the ldaho Association of REAiTORSQ.Inc. This form has been designed for and is provided only for use by real estate piofessmnatswho are members ofthe
NationalAssociation of REALTORS@.USE BY ANY OTHER PERSON IS PROHIBITED. Copyrighl ldaho Associationof REALTORS@.Inc. AU rights resecved.
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PrZOPERTY ADDRESS:

CEK

HOMEDALE

ID#:

143 96514-

16. COSTS PAID BY: Costs In addltton to those listed below may be ~ncurredby BUYER and SELLER unless otherwise agreed herein, or provided by
law or required by lender, or o ~ e r w ~ stated
se
heretn The below costs wlll be pald as lndlcated Some costs are subject to loan program requirements
of lender required repair costs only.
SELLER agrees to pay up to
BUYER or SELLER has the optlon to pay any lender requtred repalr costs tn excess of Urts amount

$a

17. OCCUPANCY: BUYER @does o d o e s not intend to occupy property as BUYER'S primary residence
$8. FINAL WALK THROUGH: The SELLER grants BUYER and any representative of BUYER reasonable access to conduct a final walk
5 calendar day(s) prior to dose of escrow. NOT AS A CONTINGENCY OF THE SALE, but
through inspection of the premises approximately
for purposes of satisfying BUYER that any repairs agreed to in writing by BUYER and SELLER have been completed and premises are in
substantially the same condition as on acceptance date of this contract. SELLER shall make premises available for the final walk through and
agrees to accept the responsibility and expense for making sure all the utilities are turned on for the walk through except for phone and cable. If
BUYER does not conduct a final walk through. BUYER specifically releases the SELLER and Broker(s) of any liability.
19. RISK OF LOSS: Prior t o closing of this sale, all risk of loss shall remain with SELLER. I n addition, should the premises be materially
damaged b y fire or other destructive cause prior to closing, this agreement shall be void at the option of the BUYER.
20. CLOSING: On or before the closing date. BUYER and SELLER shall deposit with the closing agency all funds and instruments necessary to
complete this transaction. Closing means the date o n which all documents are either recorded or accepted by an escrow agent and the sale
proceeds are available to SELLER. The closing shall be no later than (Date)
NOVEMBER 30,2006
The parties agree that the CLOSING AGENCY for this transaction shall be
PIONEER TITLE
located at
If a long-term escrow / collection is involved, then the long-term escrow holder shall be

a

P.M.

upon dosing or D d a t e
time
DA.M.
Property taxes and water assessments (using the last available assessment as a basis), rents, interest and reserves, liens, encumbrances or obligations
CLOSING
assumed and utilities shall be pro-rated as of

21. POSSESSION: BUYER shall be entitled to possession

22. SALES PRICE INFORMATION: SELLER and BUYER hereby grant permission to the brokers and either pa* to this Agreement, to disclose
sale data from this transaction, including selling price and property address to the local Association / Board of REALTORS, multiple listing service, its
members, its members' prospects, appraisers and other professional users of real estate sales data. The parties to this Agreement acknowledge that
sales price information compiled as a result of this Agreement may be provided to the County Assessor Oftice by either party or by either party's Broker.

23. FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION: Facsimile or electronic transmission of any signed original document, and retransmission of any signed facsimile
or electronic transmission shall be the same as delivery of an original. At the request of either party or the Closing Agency, the parties will confirm
facsimile and electronic transmitted signatures by signing an original document.

-

BUYER'S Initials (
265

266
267
268
269

270

)(

) Date

SELLER'S Initials (

>~g)(

) ate

'/?-& -

This form is printed and distributedby the ldaho Associalion of REALTORS@,Inc. This form has been designed for and is provdedonly for use by real eslale professionals who are members of the
National Associalion of REALTORS@.USE BY ANY OTHER PERSON IS PROHIBITEO.
Copyright Idaho Assmiation of REM.TORSBU, lnc. All rights resewed.
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PROPERIY ADDRESS:

A
-

HOMEDALE - -

14196514

ID#:

24. SINGULAR AND PLURAL terms each tnclude the other, when approprtate

25. B U S I N E S S D A Y S & HOURS A bustness day ts here~ndefined as Monday through Frtday, 8 00 A M to 5 00 P M tn the local ttme zone
where the subject real property I$ physically located A bustness day shall not include any Saturday or Sunday, nor shall a business day Include
any regal holtday rewgntzed by the slate of ldaho as found in ldaho Code 5 73-108 The time tn whtch any act requtred under thts agreement 1s to
be performed shall be computed by excluding the date of executron and tncluding the last day The first day shall be the day after the date of
executton If the last day 15 a legal holiday, then the tlme for performance shall be the next subsequent bus~nessday
26. S E V E W B I L I T Y In the case that any one or more of the provistons conta~nedIn this Agreement, or any appltcatlon thereof, shall be ~nvaltd,
Illegal or unenforceable In any respect, the valtdlty, legality or enforceahiltty of the remaining provisions shall not tn any way be affected or Impaired
thereby

27. ATTORNEY'S FEES: If etther party tntttates or defends any arbttratton or legal actton or proceedtngs whtch are tn any way connected wlth this
Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover from the non prevailrng party reasonable costs and attorney's fees. includtng such costs and
fees on appeal

28. DEFAULT: If BUYER defaults m the performance of thts Agreement, SELLER has the optton of ( 1 ) accepting the Earnest Money as ltquldated
damages o r (2) pursulng any other lawful right andlor remedy to whtch SELLER may be entitled If SELLER elects to proceed under (1). SELLER shall
make demand upon the holder of the Earnest Money, upon whtch demand sald holder shall pay from the Earnest Money the costs incurred by
SELLERS Broker on behalf of SELLER and BUYER related to the transactlon. ~ncluding,wlthoul Itmltation, the costs of title Insurance, escrow fees,
appratsal, credtt report fees, inspection fees and attorney's fees, and said holder shdll pay any balance of the Earnest Money, one-half to SELLER and
one-half to SELLER'S Broker, provtded that the amount to be pald to SELLER'S Broker shall not exceed the Broker's agreed to commtsslon SELLER
and BUYER spec~ficallyacknowledge and agree that if SELLER elects to accept the Earnest Money as ltquldated damages, such shall be SELLER'S
sole and exclustve remedy, and such shall not be considered a penalty or forfeiture If SELLER elects to proceed under (Z), the holder of the Earnest
Money shall be entttled to pay the costs tncurred by SELLER'S Broker on behalf of SELLER and BUYER related to the transactton. tncludlng, wlthout
Itmttatton, the costs of brokerage fee, tttle Insurance, escrow fees, appratsal, credtt report fees, inspection fees and attorney's fees, with any balance of
the Earnest Money to be held pendlng resolutton of the matter
If SELLER defaults, having approved satd sale and falls to consummate the same as heretn agreed. BUYER'S Eamest Money depostt shall
be returned to htmlher and SELLER shall pay for the costs of tctle Insurance, escrow fees, appratsals, credlt report fees, Inspectton fees, brokerage fees
and attorney's fees, tf any Thts shall not be considered as a walver by BUYER of any other lawful rlght or remedy to whtch BUYER may be entitled

29. E A R N E S T MONEY DlSPUTE I INTERPLEADER: Notwithstandingany termination of this contract, BUYER and SELLER agree that in the event
of any controversy regarding the Earnest Money and things of value held by Broker or closing agency, unless mutual written instructions are received by
the holder of the Earnest Money and things of value. Broker or closing agency shall not be required to take any action but may await any proceeding, or
at Broker's or ciosing agency's option and sole discretion. may interplead all parties and deposit any monies or things of value into a court of competent
jurisdiction and shall recover court costs and reasonable attorney's fees.

30. COUNTERPARTS: This Agreement may be executed in counterparts. Executing an agreement in counterparts shall mean the signature of
two identical copies of the same agreement. Each identical copy of an agreement signed in counterparts is deemed to be an original, and all
identical copies shall together constitute one and the same instrument.

31. REPRESENTATION CONFIRMATION: Check one (1) box in Section 1 and one (1) box in section 2 below to confirm that in this transaction, the
brokerage(s) involved had the following relationship(s)with the BUYER(S) and SELLER(S)
Section 1:
A. The brokerage working with the BUYER(S) is acting as an AGENT for the BUYER@).

@ 0. The brokerage working with the BUYER(S) is acting as a LIMITED DUAL AGENT for the

BUYER(S), without an ASSIGNED AGENT.

0C. The brokerage working with the BUYER(S) is acting as a LIMITED DUAL AGENT for the BUYER(S) and has an ASSIGNED AGENT
acting solely o n behalf of the BUYER(S).

0D. The brokerage working with the BUYER(S) is acting as a NONAGENT for the BUYER(S).
Section 2

0A The brokerage working with the SELLER(S) is acting as an AGENT for the SELLER($).
@ B. The brokerage working with the SELLER(S) is acting as a LIMITED DUAL AGENT for the SELLER(S), without an ASSIGNED AGENT.
C. The brokerage working with the SELLER(S) i s acting as a LIMITED DUAL AGENT for the SELLER(S) and has an ASSIGNED AGENT
acting solely o n behalf of the SELLER(S).

D. The brokerage working with the SELLER(S) is acting as a NONAGENT for the SELLER(S).
Each party signing this document cwiirms hat he has received, read and understood the Agency Disclosure Brochure adopted or approved by the ldaho real estate commission and
has consented to the relationshipconfirmed above. In addition, each party confirms that the brokerage'sagency office policy was made available for inspection and review. EACH
PARTY UNDERSTANDS THAT HE IS A "CUSTOMER'AND IS NOT REPRESENTED BY A BROKERAGE UNLESS THERE IS A SIGNED WRITTEN AGREEMENT FOR AGENCY
REPRESENTATION.
BUYER'S Initials (

)(

) Date

SELLER'S Initials (

)(

) ate

/fl

'.yr2 - -L&
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--

WOMEDALE
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32. ENTIRE AGREEMENT: This Agreement contains the enttre Agreement of the part~esrespect~ngthe matters herem sef forth and supersedes all
prtor Agreements between the parttes respecttng such matters No warrantres, nctudtng, without Itmitatton, any warranty of habltabtltty, agreements or
representations not expressly set forth heretn shall be b~ndtngupon e~therparty
33. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE IN THIS AGREEMENT.
34. AUTHORITY OF SIGNATORY: If BUYER or SELLER 1s a corporatton, partnership, trust, estate, or other entlty, the person execut~ngthts
agreement on ~ t sbehalf warrants hls or her authortty to do so and to bind BUYER or SELLER

1017 2106
IS made subject to the acceptance of SELLER on or before (Date)at (Local Tlme
In whtch property IS located)
5-00 C ] A M @ P M If SELLER does not accept this Agreement w~thinthe tlme specified, the enttre Earnest
Money shall be refunded to BUYER on demand
35. ACCEPTANCE BUYER'S offer

36. BUYER'S SIGNATURES:

0SEE ATTACHED BUYER'S ADDENDUMtS):
BUYER Signature
Date

-

-Tlme

(Speclfy number of BUYER addendum(s) attached )

-C~AMBPM

Cell #

Address

Ckty

E-Mall Address

Fax It

BUYER Signature

BUYER (Print Name)

Date

Time

OA.M.

OP M.

HANK OGD_EN

BUYER (Print Name}
Phone It-

MICHELLE HURST

Phone #

Address

City

E-Mail Address

Fax #

ZIP

State

Cell #

Zip

State

37. SELLER'S SIGNATURES:
On this date, lNVe hereby approve and accept the transaction set forth in the above Agreement and agree to carry out all the terms thereof on
the part of the SELLER

0SIGNATURE(S) SUBJECT TO ATTACHED COUNTER OFFER
0SIGNATURE(S) SUBJECT TO ATTACHU) ADDENDUM(S) #
SELLER (Print Name)

li!Q/v;iv"i 5

Phone #
Address

City

E-Mail Address

f-

f-jJ;E(

Cell#
State

Zip

Fax #

.................................
SELLER (Print Name)
Cell #

Phone #
Address

City

E-MailAddress

Fax #

State

Zip

CONTRACTOR REGISTRATION # (if applicable)
This fmis pnnled and distributed by the ldaho Association of REALTORS@, tnc. This form has been designed for and 1s prov~dedonly lor use by real estate professionalswho are members of the
National Assodation of REALTORS.USE BY ANY OTHER PERSON IS PROHIBITED.
Copyright ldaho Association of RWTORS, tnc. All rights resewed
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RE-11 ADDENDUM #

(1,2,3,
etc.)

3

e

'%zzzz?

THIS ISA LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACT REX3 THE ENTIRE DOCUMENT INCLUDING ANY ATTACHMENTS IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS
CONSULT YOUR AmORNEY AND/OR ACCOUNTANT BEFORE SIGNING

This is an AttDENDUM to the Purchase and Sale Agreement.
("Addendum" means that the infmal~onbetcwv is added matezial for the qreement {such as llsts or d e . 5 ~ ~ 1
to change correct or reuse the q r m m t {such as madtfrcahon, addit~onor deletion of a tm])

PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT DATED: l@-nz-o6
ADDRES: 2517
Succer-C r e e k RD
-

----

m = a --m 53mRFr

10#. 1slssslr

-

---

---

---

- --

A
-

SEUR(S): 5 . C . GRIFFITH
- AND BONNIE M . PORTER-----

-

The undersrgned parties hemy agree as follows;

--

I . To e x t e n d t h e c l o s ~ n gCo on o r b e f o r e 12-08-06

32
33
34
35

--

To the extent the terms of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any pmvisions of the Purchase and Sale Agreement induding all prior
Addendums o
f Counter Offers, these terms shall control. All other terms of the Purchase and Safe Agreement including all prior
Addendums or Counter Offers not modified by this ADDENDUM shall remain the same. Upon its execution by both parties, this
agreement is made an integral part of the aforementioned Agreement

38
37

BUYER:

Date:

38

BUYER:

Date:

$9

SELLER:

mte:

/2- /--0 6

'0

SELLER

me:

/

-

d,-OsC-i>&
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EXHIBIT C

5680 East Frankl~nRoad, Su~ce150 !Nampa, Idaho
83687 / (208) 465 6655

WARRANTY DEE11

2006 130~17

I-ol Value Recelved Ron~veM Poner, an tinmanled woman and Dennis C Grlffith, an i i n ~ n a ~ r ~man
ed
i x ~ e ~ n a f rrefentd
e~
to 3s G~anror,does he~ebygrant balgam, sell, uaimni and convey unto
) l e n ~ \Ogden, an unmarr~edman and M~chelleR Hurst an ilnmail~edwoman
her c ~ n a h e ~

refelled

Gran~ee

as

10

-

5

------

whose

CIIITP~I

addipss

-

the follow~ngd e s c ~ ~ b eplemlses,
d
to-w~t
SEE EXHIBIT iiATTACHED HERETO A N D MADE A PART HEREOF

t h appu~xenancesunto the sard Grantee, h ~ hs e ~ r s
To HAVE A N D TO HOLD the satd piemises, ~ i ~ the11
and assigns foreve! And rhe satd Glantor does hereby covenant to and wlth the sald G~antee,that Grantor
15 rlie ownel In fee snnple of s a ~ d
plemlses, that s a ~ dptennses ale free from ail encumbrances except cutrent
year5 raves lebles, and assessments, and except U S Patefit resetvattons, resti Ictions, easements of record
l e the premises, and that Granror w ~ l lwatianr and defend the same from all cla1n1s
and easements v ~ s ~ b upon
whatsoever
Dated: November 30, 2006

Stare of IDAI-I0
SS.
County of CANY ON
i.iL

LC

&

2006, before me, the unqg;ugp$; a N o l a y Public, in and for raid State, personally
day of
On this
appeared
identified ro me on the basis of satisfactory
Dennis C. Griffith
dence, to be the person(s) whose name is/are &\& t e t t l t & $ & i n instrument and acknowledged to me that
a s h e l t h e y execured the same,
~ ~ / , o ~ Af k ,
: :
a
: :
-*-

%Fm$"jor

*\

HAND AND OFFICIAL

(SEAL)

Restd~ngat:
C ; ~ l m b i o nExpiras: 3/10/09
Commission Expires:

STATE O F IDAHO COUNTY O F CANYON
On this 4th day of December in the year o f 2 0 0 6 , before me, the t~ndersipned,a Notary Pt~blicin and for
said State, pel-sonally appeared Bonnie M. Porter known or identified to !vie to be the person(s) whose
namefs) islare subscribed to the within instrument. and acknowledged to me that helshelthey executed the

I
My commission expires: 3/10/09

A parcel of land bettig tho Northwest Quarter of the Southwest Quartet, S e e t ~ o n17,
Townshtp 3 North, Range 5 West, B.kl , Owyhee County, Idalto, and more partrcularly
described as follows.

BEGINNING A r A 5/8" iron pln rnarlc~ngthe No1 thwest cot iler of the Northwest Q u a r t e r of
the Southwest Quarter, S e c t ~ o n17, T3N, R5W, B M , Owyhee C o t ~ ~ ~Idalto,
t y , satd Iron p111
being the R E A L POINT OF BFGlNNINC and more part~cularlyd e s e r ~ b e das follows.
thence
South 89"?8'35" t. s5t l,336 39 leet along the N o r t h e ~ l yboundary of the 5a1d No1 thwest
Quarter of the South%restQuarter, S c c t ~ o n17, to a brsss cap rnarli~ngthe Northeast corner
of the Northwest Quarter of the S o u t h ~ l e s tQuarter, s a d S e c f ~ o n17, thence l e a v ~ n gs a ~ d
Northerly b o u n d a ~v
S o u t l ~0°58'JO" West 1,30' 49 feet along the Essteily boundary to .r 5/8" !roll p111
r n a r k ~ n gthe Southeast cor11e1of the Northwest Qua1 ter oftlte Southwest Quarter, s a ~ d
Seetrort 17, thence leavrllg the sdrd Eastrrib boundar? of s a ~ dNorthivest Quarter of the
Southwest Quartel
North 89"JS'OI" West 1,331 29 feet along IheSoutherlv boundarv of the s a ~ dNorthwest
Q ~ t s t t e rof the Soutlt\vest Q u . t ~ t r r ,to n 5/S" !lo11 p ~ mark~rtg
~ t
the Soutltwest corner of the
bald Northwest Q u a r t e r of the Southwest Qu'krter, satd Sectlon 17, thence leavlng satd
Southerly boundar)
North 0'45'07''

E ~ S 1,314.98
I
feet to the POINT O F BEGINNING
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RON R. S H E P H E m
HAMILTON, MlCHAELSON & HILTY, LLP
Attorneys at Law
1303 12th Avenue Road
PO Box 65
Nampa, ID 53653-0065
(208) 367-4479 Telephone
(208) 467-3058 Facsimile
ISB Y o . 6593
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A.M.~PM.

Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF O W H E E

1
HENRY OGDEN, an unmarried man; and,
MICHELLE HIRST, an unmarried woman,
Plaintiffs,

)

1
1
)

1
1

VS.

DENNIS C. GIUFFITH, an unmarried man; and
BONNIE M. PORTER, an unmarried woman,

Case No. CV06-5807M

)
)

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE
Fee Category: I. 1.a
Fee: $58.00

1
)

Defendants.

1

TO: THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT, and to KEVIN E. DINIUS, attorney
of record for the Plaintiffs, HENRY OGDEN and MICHELLE HURST:
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that RON R. SHEPHERD, of the firm of
HAMILTON, MICHAELSON & HILTY, LLP, has been retained by, and hereby appears for
DENNIS C. GRIFFITH and BONNE M. PORTER, Defendants above named in the above

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE - Page 1

entitled action, and that all future conespondence and pleadings are to be directed to the
undersiped at the address s t forth above.
DATED this

4 day of December, 2006.
7)
HAMETON, MIGHA&SON & HILTY, LLP

s

I

\

RON R. SHEPHERD
Attorneys for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on the
day of December, 2006, I caused a true copy of the
foregoing Notice of Appearance to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to
the following:

KEVIN E. DB\3IUS
White Peterson, P.A.
5700 E. Franklin Road, Ste. 200
Nampa, Idaho 83687

( ) U.S. Postage, Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered

p-$Facsimile
(
Other

>

Legal Assistant

NOTICE OF APPF A R A k T r F ;

- P , , ~3

FILED
-A . M . W ! f l .
JAN Q 4 2007

ROK R. SHEPHERD
HAMILTON, MICWAE1,SON & WILTY, LI,P
Attorneys at Law
1 303 12th Avenue Road
PO Box 65
Nampa, ID 83653-0065
(208) 467-4479 Telephone
(208) 467-3058 Facsimile
IS13 No. 6593
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF O W H E E

HENRY OGDEN, an unmarried man; and,
MICHELLE WURST, an unmarried woman,
Plaintiffs,

1
1
1
)
)

1
)

VS.

DENNIS G. GRIFFITH, an unmarried man; and
BONNIE M. PORTER, an unmarried woman,
Defendants.

Case No. CV06- 5 807M

)
)

ANSWER AND DEMAND
FOR JURY TRIAL

1
1
1

The above named Defendants, DENNIS C. GRIFFITH and BONNIE M. PORTER,
through their undersigned counsel of record, hereby submit the following Answer to the
Complaint previously filed and served in this action. The Defendants admit, deny, and allege as
follows:

3'

u

ANSWER AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAI, - P a w 1

FIRST DEFENSE

I.
The Defendants deny each and every allegation of the Complaint that is not specifically
admitted herein.

II.
The Defendants admit the allegations contained in paragraphs 2-8,12,13,14 and 42
(inclusive where separated by

"

-

"1.
111.

The Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 15, 18-21, 23-29, 3 1-34, 3639 and 42-44 (inclusive where separated by"

- ").

IV.
Defendant lack sufficient knowledge to admit or deny the allegations contained in
paragraphs 1 and 9, and on that basis deny the same.

v.
Answering paragraph 10, Defendants recognize their signature on the Addendum #3 and
acknowledge they could have affixed their signature to such Addendum. Defendants were
provided several documents while at Pioneer Title to which they fixed their signature but do not
have an independent recollection of signing the Addendum. Defendants deny the validity and
enforceability of Addendum #3 whether Defendants signed it or not.

ANSWER AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

- Page 2

2 .;

VI.
Ar~sweringparagraph 16, Defendants lack sufficient knowledge to admit or deny whether

Plaintiffs remain ready, willing and able to perfom under the Contract, and on that basis deny
the same. Defendants deny that a Contract exists between the parties. Defendants admit that
Defendants refuse to sell the subject property to Plaintiffs.

VII.
SECOND DEFENSE
Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

VIII.
THIRD DEFENSE
Plaintiffs failed to perform all of their conditions and covenants of the Contract prior to
November 30,2006 as required under the Contract. As such, the Contract is no longer valid,
and Defendants are excused from performing under the Contract.

IX.
FOURTH DEFENSE
Plaintiffs' causes of action are barred under the equitable doctrines of laches, waiver and
estoppel.

X.
FIFTH DEFENSE
Plaintiffs' causes of action andlor prayers for relief are barred under the doctrine of
unclean hands andor in pari delicto.

XI.
SIXTH DEFENSE
Addendurn if3 was procured through fraud in that Plaintiffs and or Plaintiffs' agents
falsely represented to Defendants that Plaintiffs had fillfilled all conditioned precedent to
Defendants performartce of the Contract.

Based upon such false information Defendants

proceeded to sign closing documents in order to avoid being in breach of the Contract.
Addendum #3 to the Contract was presented to Defendants without Defendants being specifically
advised of the Addendum and while Defendants were provided multiple other documents to sign
at closing. Plaintiffs and/or Plaintiffs' agents knew prior to November 30'" that Defendants did
not want to extend the closing date and yet Plaintiffs' andlor Plaintiffs' agents conspired to
fraudulently procure a signed extension from Defendants after the original Contract had already
expired and was no longer valid.

XI1 .
SEVENTH DEFENSE
Defendants signed Addendum #3 under duress. Defendants did not want to extend the
Contract, but did so due to the wrongful act or conduct of Plaintiffs or Plaintiffs' agents.
Plaintiffs or Plaintiffs' agents advised Defendants that Defendants were in breach of the Contract
as of December 1, 2006, because Plaintiffs had performed all conditions precedent to Defendant
performance on or before the original closing date of November 30, 2006. This was not true. In
light of Plaintiffs' or Plaintiffs' agents' misrepresentations and other misconduct, Defendants felt
they had no means of relief other than to follow through with the sale of the property.

XI11.
EIGHTH DEFENSE
Defendants\ignatures

on Addendum #3 were the product of undue influence from

Plaintiffs' and/or Plaintiffs' agents, Defendants were compelled to sign the addendum by deceit
of Plaintiffs and/or Plaintiffs' agents.

But for the deceit of Plaintiffs andior Plaintiffs' agents,

Defendants would not have signed Addendum #3.

XIV.
NINTH DEFENSE
Addendum #3 is invalid and unenforceable for failure of consideration.
XV.

TENTH DEFENSE
Defendants strongly assert they did not intend to sign Addendum #3 or otherwise extend
the underlying Contract beyond November 30, 2--6.

Nevertheless, even if Defendants'

signatures on Addendum #3 are found to be valid, such signatures constitute a mere offer to
extend the Contract, which offer was not accepted by Plaintiffs until, if at all, aRer Defendants
revoked such offer.

ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
Defendants have been required to retain the law firm of Hamilton, Michaelson, and Hilty,

LLP, to defend this action. Defendants are entitled to an award of costs and attorney fees
pursuant to the paragraph 27 of the Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement between the parties
as well as I.R.C.P. 54(d) and 54(e), Idaho Code $9 10-1210, 12-101, 12-120, 12-121, 12-123, and

any other contractual provision, statute, rule or regulatiorl providing for an award of attorney fees
and/or costs in this action.
P M Y E R FOR RELIEF
W H E m F O m , Defendants pray judgment against the Plaintiffs as follows:
For the Plaintiffs' Complaint to be dismissed and for Plaintiffs to take nothing

1.

thereunder;
2.

For Defendants to be awarded their reasonable costs and attorney fees incurred

herein; and
3.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems reasonable.
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Defendants hereby respectfully request, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 38, a jury trial on all issues
triable of right by jury.
AMENDMENTS/COUNTERCLAIMS/THIm PARTY COMPLAINT
Defendants hereby expressly reserve their right to amend this Answer and lor to file a
counterclaim or Third Party Complaint.
DATED this

day aii)ecember. 2006.
HAMILTON, MICHAELSON & HILTY, LLP

RON R. SHEPHEFUIAttorneys for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

a@

1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of December, 2006, 1 caused a true copy
of the foregoing Answer and Demand for Jury Trial to be served by the method indicated below,
and addressed to the following:
Kevin Dinius
Wl~itePeterson, P.A.
5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
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HENRY OGDEN, an m a r r i e d man;and, )
MICHELLE HURST, an unmarried
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woman,
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Plaintiffs,
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1
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1

-vsDENNIS C. GRIFFITH, an unmarried
man; and, B O W E M. PORTER,
an unmari.ied woman,
Defendants.
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1

MEMORANDUM DECISlON
AND ORDER ON CROSSMORONS FOR S U N M m Y
SUDGMENT

)

1
1
)

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on cross-motions for
summary judgment on July 13,2007. Plaintiffs appeared through their counsel of record,
Kevin D.Dinius and Shelli D.Stewart. Defendants appeared in person and through their
attorney of record, Ron R. Shepherd.
The Court having heard and carefully considered the arguments of counsel, the
affidavits and briefs filed in support of and in opposition to the cross-motions for

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON CROSS-MORONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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1

summary judgment together with the file md record in this case, and good cause

appearing, the Court finds and concludes as follows.

This s t i o n arises fiom a Real Estate Pwchase and Sale Agreement wherein the
Plaintiffs agreed to purchase and the Dekndmts agreed to sell a parcel of real property
situated in Owyhee County, Idaho, for the sum of $500,000. Plaintiffs assert causes of
action for breach of contract, injunction and specific performance. Defendants have
answered denying Plaintiffs' claims and asserting various affirmative defenses. Both
parties seek the award of attorney fees together with their costs.
S T A N D A m S FOR SUMMARY WDGMENT
Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, depositions, admissions,
and afidavits on file show that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c); City of Idaho

Falls v. Home lndern. Co , 126 Idaho 604, 606 f 1995). At all times,

the

burden of

proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests upon the moving party. G di

M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 5 14,517 (1991).
In considera~onof the motion, the court must liberally construe the

facts

and

inferences contained in the existing record in favor of the party opposing the motion.

Born v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 541 (1 991).' To withstand a motion for summary
judgment, the non-moving party's case must be anchored in something more solid than

'

Both parties have requested a jury trial in this case. Thus, the limited exception to the
application of this rule where the matter is submitted on cross-motions for summary judgment
predicated upon common evidentiary facts and where the matter is to be tried to the court without
a jury does not apply. See Riverside Development Co. v. Richie, 103 Idaho 5 15, 5 19 (1 982).
mMORAI\TP)UM DECISION ANID ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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speculation. EAtf~rdsv Conchemco Inc , 1 11 Idaho 55 1, 853 (Ct, App. 1986). A mere

seixxtilla of evidence 1s not enough to create a genuine issue. Id. The party opposing the
motion for summary judgment may not merely rest on the allegations contained in the
pleadtngs, rather, evidence by way of affidavit or deposition must be produced to

contradict the sssertions of the moving party. Ambruse

v.

Buhl Sch Disf. #412, 126

Idaho 58 I , 854 (Ct. App. 1995).
The existence of disputed facts will not defeat summary judgment when a party
fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to his

case, and on which he will bear the burden of proof at trial. Garzee v. Barkley, 121 Idaho
771, 774 (Ct, App. f 992). Facts in dispute cease to be "material" facts when the party

having the burden of proof at trial fails to establish a prima facie case. In such cases,
there can be "no genuine issues o f material fact," because a complete failure of proof
concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all
other facts immaterial. Id. at 774 citing Celotex Corp. v. Cafretr,477 U.S. 317, 322-23
(1986). This rule facilitates the dismissal of factually unsupported claims prior to trial.

Id. at 774. Summary judgment dismissing a claim is appropriate when the party having
the burden of proof fails to submit evidence to establish an essential element of the claim.

See Nelson v. City of Rupert, 128 Idaho 199,202 (1996).
FTNDXX\IGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Plaintiffs' Motion for S u m w Judgment
The Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement (hereailer "the agreement")

provided that the transaction was to close on or before November 30, 2006, and further
provided that time was of the essence. Plaintiffs' predicate their motion for summary

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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judgment upon Addendum No. 3 to the ngreetllent extending the closing date until
December 8, 2006, and assert that they were ready, willing and able to perfom on or
before December 8, 2006.

Addendum No. 3 contains a typewitten date of November

27,2006 and was signed by Defendant Bonnie Poner on December 4,2006. Addendm

No. 3 bears what is purportedly the signature of Defendant Dennis Griffith with a date of
December 1, 2006.

Addendum No. 3 was not signed by either Plaint~ff.

Botlt

Defendants appeared at the title company on the dates opposite their names on
Addendm No. 3 and signed the closing papers including a warranty deed conveying the
property to the Plaintiffs

Thereafter, on December 6 , 2006, and before Plaintiffs

executed the closing documents, Defendants notified the title company that the sale
would not take place and requested that the warranty deed be returned to them. The title
company complied and this action followed.
At his deposition, which is before the Court by afiidavit, Mr. Griffirh denied that
the signature on Addendum No. 3 was his signature. The closing agent testified at her
deposition that Mr. Griffith did sign Addendum No. 3 on the date indicated. As noted
above, the Court is required to liberally construe the facts and iderences contained in the
record in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.

The Court's function on

summary judgment is thus different fiom those cases where the Court is the fact finder
and determines the weight and credibility of the witnesses and the inferences to be drawn
there from. Applying the standards for summary judgment to the record before the Court
on Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, the Court finds and concludes that there is a
genuine issue of material fact as to the signature of Mr. Griffith, which precludes
summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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4

Defendants assert that they are entitled to summary judgment on a number of
theories, including: breach of contract by the Plaintifi by failing to close on or before
November 30, 2006 as provided in the ageement; lack of consideration; md, lack of
mutuality of obligation for the reason that Addendum No. 3 was not signed by the
Plaintifls.
Idaho's Statute of Frauds provides that an agreement for the sale of real property

is invalid, absent a note or memorandum signed by the party to be charged. I.C.

9-

505(4); Wolske Bros,Inc. v. Hudspeth Sawmill Co, 116 Idaho 714,715 (Ct. App. 1989).

For land sale contracts, the minimum requirements are typically the parties involved, the
subject matter thereof, the price or consideration, a description of the property and all the
essential terms of the agreement. Lawrence v. Jones, 124 Xdaho 748,750-5 1 (Ct. App.
1993).
A written contract for the sale of real estate may be modified by a subsequent
oral agreement. Prairie Development Co. v Leiberg, 15 Idaho 379, 391 (1908). To
establish a subsequent oral agreement modifiing a written contract for the sdc: of real
estate, the evidence must be clear and satisfactory. Id. An oral extension of time to
perform a written purchase agreement does not violate the statute of frauds, if no other
material terms change, and if the extension agreement is made before the underlying
written contract expires. Kelly v. Hodges, 1 19 Idaho 872, 875 (Ct. App. 1991).

Consideration includes action by the promisee which is bargained for and given in
exchange for the promise Lettunich v. Key Bank Nut. Ass In., 14 1 Idaho 362,368 (2005).

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR
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Constderation may also consist of a detriment to the promisee or a benefit to the
promissor. Id
Waiver is the intentional xelinquishent of a k n o w right. It is a voluntary act
and implies election by a party to dispense with something of value or to forego some

right or advantage which he might at his opt~onhave demanded or insisted upon. Crouch
v. Bischofi 78 Idaho 364, 368 (1.956). The existence of waiver ordinarily is a question of

fact. Riverside Development, 103 Idaho at 518. An intent to waive a right may be
estabiished by conduct. Id. at 520.
Applying that standard for summary judgment to the record before the Court, as
discussed above, the Court further finds and concludes that there are genuine issues of

material fact, which preclude smmary judgment in favor of the Defendants.
Therefore,

ORDER

XT IS HEREBY ORDEREiD, and this does ORDER, that Plaintiffs' Motion for
Summary Judgment be, and is hereby DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDEWID, and this does ORDER, that Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment be, and is hereby DENIED.

DATED:

AUG 10 2007

M E M O W D U M DECISION AND ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR
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CERTIMCATE OF SERVICE
I WEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Menorandm
Decision and Order on Cross-Motions for Swrnmary Judgment were mailed to the
fof lowing persons this
day of August 2007.
Kevin E. Dinius
ShelIi B. Stewart
WHITE PEERSON, P.A.
5700 E. Franklin Rd., Suite 200
Nampa, ID 83687-790 1

Ron R. Shepherd
HAMILTON, MCHAELSON & WILTY, LLP
P 0.Box 65
Nampa, ID 83653-0065

Charlotte Sherbm,
Clerk of the District Court

Deputy Clerk
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CHAQLOm-EWERBURN, CLERK

Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTNCT C O m T OF TEE TlXRR J U D I C N DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHU, IN ANXI FOR THE GOWTY OF OWYEEE

)

HENRY OGDEN, an m a r r i e d
Man and M I C E L L E WRST,
An w m e d woman,

1
)

1
1

CASE NO.

)

ORDER WFER[UNG CASE

1

TO fclEDlATION

CV 06-005807M

)

DENNIS 6.GRIFFITH, an
Unmarried man and BONNUE M.
PORTER, an unmarried woman,
Defendants.

1
1
)

1
1

1.

This civil case is referred to mediation pursuant to Z.R.C.P. 16(k).

2.

The parties shall consult with each other and shall within thirty (30) days of the

date of this Order select a person to act as mediator and report their selection to the court.

3.

The initial mediation session shall take place as soon as possible or within thrrty

(30) days of the selection or appointment of the mediator. Plainti@s counsel shall co-ordinate

h c ~~1ecuoz-i of the

mcdiator and the ~ l c h c d u loi ~
f mediatian.
~

ed parties or their agents with MI au&ority to sede, together with the

4.

aaomeys responsible for handling the lrial in this case are ordered to be present for the entire
mediation conference pursuant to 1.K.C.P. 16(k)( 10) unIess oxherwise ;t:excust;dby ~utdiatoror
the Court upon a showing of good cause.

5.

W i h seven (7) days following the last mediation session, rhe mediator or the

parties shall advise the court, with a copy to the parties, onty as to whether the case has, in
whole or in part, settled. If the case is settled by mediation, within twenty-eight (28) days of a

mediated final settlement, plaintiff shall dismiss the underlying action with or \jr,ithoutprejurlice

as the parties agree.
6.

The mediator selected or appointed shall be compensated at his or her regular

fees and expenses, which shall be clearly set forth in the infomation and materials provided to
the parties. Unless other arrangements are made among the parties or ordered by the court, the
interested parties shall be responsible for a prorate share of the mediator's fees and expenses. If a
mcdiator is not paid, the court, upon motion o f the mediator may order payment.

/

Thomas J. Ryan
District Judge

ORDER

1

STATE OF IDAHO,
C O m T Y OF C M O N

>1 ss

I E E B Y CERTEY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was
fonvafded to the followiag:

Ron R. Shepherd
M L T O N , MG
Attorneys at 1,aw

1303 12' Avenue R o d
P. 0. Box 65
Nampa, 1D 83653-0065

Kevin E. Dinius
WTTE PETERSON, P.A.
5700 E. Franklin Road, Ste 200
Nmpa, ID 83687
Either by depositing the same in the U.S. mail, first class postage prepaicl, or by personal
service.

DATED this

1 IrL

day of January, 2008.
CHARU3l-E SHERBURM
tClerk of the District Couft

S(f21l'a (,&')l%&b
by Deputy Clerk of the Court

ORDER

E-4 THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, n\r AND FOR THE COWTY OF O W H E E

1

HENRY OCDEN, an w m i e d man: and )
MICHELLE HURST, an unmarried woman, )
Plaintiffs,

1
1
)

-vs-

1
1
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JWGMENT

DENNIS C. GRXFFXTH, an unmarried man; )
and BONNIE M. PORTER, an unmarried )
woman,
)
)
Defendants.
)

The above-entitred matter came on regularly for hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for
S m r n q Judgment on February 8, 2008. Plaintiffs appeared through. their counsel of record,

Kevin Dinius. Defendants appeared though their counsel of record, Ron Shepherd.
The Court having heard and carehlly considered the arguments of counsel, the affidavits

and briefs fijed in support of and in opposition to the notion together with the file and record in
this case, and good cause appearing, the Court finds and concludes as follows
MEMOMNDUM DECISXON AND ORDER
ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 7, 2008, Plaintiffs filed their second Motion for Summaw Judgment together
with a supporting aEdavit and a supporting memorandum agGnst the defindants for all claims

in the Complaint coruisting of breach of contract anrl b r e d of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing and seeking m injunction, specific performance, and declaratory judgment.
On January 28, 2008. Defendants filed their Memormdum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Second
Motion for S u m a r y Judgment. Plaintiffs filed their Reply Memorandum on February 1, 2008.
Following the hearing on February 8,2008, both parties filed Supplement& Memorandms.
This action arises &om a Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreerner~t,hereinafter the
"Contract", wherein the Plainti% agreed to purchase and the Defendants agreed to sell a parcel
of reai property situated in Owyhee County, Idaho, for the sum of $500,000. On summary
judgment, Plaintiffs assert that closing on the property was extended fi+onNovember 30, 2006

until December 8, 2006 and that they were prepared to Eund the loan on December 7, 2006.
Defendants contend that closing was not extended to December 8, 2006 and therefore, they
pulled the w m m t y deed from the title company on December 6, 2006 for Plaintiffs' failure to
time1y close on November 30,2006.

RELEVANT FACTS SET FORTH IN
TEE PLEAJDINGS & AF'FIDAVXTS
The basic facts in this case are not in dispute. On October 13, 2006, the parties entered
into the Contract which contained the following provisions in part:
20. CLOSING: On or before the closing date, BUYER and SELLER shall
deposit with the closing agency all h d s and instruments necessary to complete
this transaction. Closing means the date on which all documents are either
recorded or accepted by an escrow agent and the sale proceeds are available
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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to SELLER, The closing shall be no later that NOVEMBER 30,2006.

***

33. TIME XS OF THE ESSENCE IN THIS AGEUEEMENT.
Closing did not occur on November 30, 2006. Thereseer on December 1, 2006, Defendant
Griffith signed the closing doctiments, including Addendm No. 3 which provides in relevmt
pact:
The undersigned parties hereby agree as followsI . To extend the closing to on or before 12-08-06.

To the extent the terms of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any
provisions of the Purcfrase and Sale Agreement including all prior Addendurns or
Counter Offers, these terns shall control. All other terms of the Purchase and
Sale Agreement including all prior Addendwns or Counter Offers not modified by
this ADDEmUM shall remain the same. Upon its execution by both parties, this
agreement is made an integral part of the aforementioned Agreement.
Previously, there was a disputed issue of material fact on whether the signature on Addendum
No. 3 was the genuine signature of Defendant Griffith. The Court ruled at the hearing on this
motion that there was no longer an issue of material fact and that the signature in question was

that of the defendmt. Defendant Griffith signed Addendum No. 3 on December 1, 2006 and
1)efendant Porter signed it on December 4,2006. Neither of the Plaintiffs' signatures appears on
the document. On December 6 , 2006, Defendants retrieved the original warranty deed from

Pioneer Title.
Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed suit asserting claims of breach of contract, and breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and seeking an injunction, specific performance,
and declaratory judgment.

Defendants raised multiple defenses including duress, undue

influence, and expiration of the contract and Addendum No. 3. Plaintiffs responded by asserting
that Defendants waived thek right to enforce the closing date of the contract by signing

Addendum No. 3.
M E M O W D U M DECISION AND ORDER
ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

STANDArn OF rnVXEVV

Summary judment is appropriate where the pleadings, depositions, admissions arid
affidavits on file show that there are no geriuine issues of material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to judment as a matter of law. 1.R.C.P. 56(c); Cify oj-Idaho fills v Home Indemnip
Co , 126 Idaho 604, 606 (1995). At all times, the burden of proving the absence of a genuine

issue of xnateriai fact rests upon the moving party. G & M F'arnzs v Funk Iri-rigarion Co., 119
Idaho 514,517 (1991).

In consideration of the motion, the court must liberally construe the facts and inferences
contained in the existing record in favor of the party opposing the motion. Born v. Sudweeks,
1 19 Xdaho 539, 54 f ( 2 991). To withstand a motion for s m a r y judgment, the non-moving

party's case must be anchored in something more solid than speculation. A mere scintilla of

evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue. Edwarh v. C o ~ c h e m c ok c . , 111 Idaho 851
(Ct. App. 1986). The party opposing the motion for sumnary judgment may not merely rest on

the allegations contained in the pleadings; rather, evidence by way of affidavit or deposition
must be produced to contradict the assertions of the moving party. 1R.C.P 56(e); Ambrose

I?

Buhl School Disz. #412, 126 Idaho 581 (Ct. App. 1995).
LAW
Breach of Contract
A breach of contract is non-performance of any contractual duty of immediate
performance. Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration, hc., X 34 Xdaho 738, 746-747 (2000). It is a
failure, without legal excuse, to perform any promise, which forms the whole or part of a
contract. Id. The burden of proving the existence of a contract and fact of its breach is upon the
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plaintiff, and once those facts are established, the defendmt has burden of pleading and proving
uffimative defenses, which Iegdly excuse performance. Id

When the latlguage of a contract is clear and unmbiguous, its interpretation and legal
effect are questions of law. Infermountain Eye and Laser Centers, P.L L C. v. Miller. 142 idaho
218, 222-223 (2005). An unmbiguous contract will be given its plain meaning. Id

The

p u p a e of inte~retinga contract is to determine the intent of the contracting parties at the time
the contract was entered. Id In determining the intent of the parties, this Court must view the
contract as a whole. Id. If a contract is found mbiguous, its interpretation is a question of fact.

Id. M e t h e r a conbact is mbiguous is a question of law. Id.
It is well settled that where no time for performance is established in the agreement, the
law implies that perfommce must occur within a reasonable time. Ujdur- v. Bzonapson, 126

Xdabo 6,9 (Ct. App., 1.994). However, a different rule applies to the parties' contract where time
is deemed, expressly or implicitly, to be "of the essence." Id. Thus, where the pa-ties make time
of the essence in setting a deadline for payment, strict compliance with such deadliiie is required.

Id.
General principles of contract law require that a contract modification, like the formation

of any contract, must be supported by vaIid consideration. Great Plains Equipment, lnc. v.
Northwest Pipeline Corp., 132 Idaho 754,769 (1999). It is well established that a promise to do,
or the doing of, what one is already bound by contract to do, is not valid consideration. Id.
Conversely, the doing by one of the parties of something that he is not legally bound to do
constitutes consideration for the other's promise to modify the terms of the original agreement.

Id.
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Waiver and Duress
A waiver is the intentional relinquis;imeit of a know right. Crouch v. Bi,rchufl 78 Idaho

364,368 (1956). It is a voluntary act and implies election by a party to dispense with somed~ing
of value or to forego some right or advantage wtri~hhe might at his option have demanded and
insisted upon. Id The existence of waiver ordinarily is a question of fact, and if there is m y
substantial evidence in the record to support a waiver it is for the trier of fact to determine
whether the evidence establishes such a waiver. Riversrde Development Cu, v Ritehie, 703
Idaho 5 15,5 18 (1982). Waiver is foremost a question of intent; and in order to establish waiver,
the intention to waive must dearly appear. id. at 120. Intent to waive a right may, however, be
established by conduct. Id.
To be voidable on the grounds of duress, an agreement must not only be obtained be
means of pressure brought to bear, but the agreement itseIf must. be unjust, unconscionable, or
illegal. The defense of duress cannot be predicated upon demands which are lawful, or the threat
to do that which the demanding party has a legal right to do. Generaily, the dernand by one party
must be tvronghl or unlawful, and the other party must have no means of immediate relief from
the actual or thxeatened duress other than by compliance with the demand. The aRnnative
defense of duress may be established only by clear and convincing evidence. Liebelt v. Liebelt,

f 18 Idaho 845,848 (Ct.App. 1990).
In this case, the Contract between the parties is unambiguous. The closing date was to
occur no fater than November 30,2006. A "time is of the essence" clause was also contained
within the Contract. It is undisputed that neither party performed before November 30,2006 and
therefore, the contract expired by its own terms.
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One day after the closing deadline on December 1, 2006, Defendant Criffittl signed
Addendm No. 3 with Defendant Porter's signature following his on Decernber 4, 2006.
Addendm No. 3 is also unmbiguous and required the execution by both. parties in order to
become an integrd part of the Contract. The Plrrintiffs did not sign Addendum No. 3 and
therefore, i t never became part of the Contract by its own terns.
However, the Plaintiffs raise the issue of waiver by asserting that the Defendants waived
their rights to claim that pawent was due on November 30 by signing Addendum No. 3.

Plaintiffs further argue that Defendants waived their nght to claim that Plaintiffs breached the
Contract by failing to make the funds available on November 30. Plaintiffs assert that when they
obtained the necessary funding on December 7, that they did so in reliance on the Defmdants'

alleged waiver.

Xf there is any substantial evidence in the record to support a waiver, it is for the trjer of
fact to determine whether the evidence establishes such a waiver. In this case, Defendant
GriRith testified at his deposition that he told his agent that he did not want to sign an extension,
that he told the closing agent he was not going to sign an extension, and that the closing agent
did not explain my of the documents. (Dennis C. GriEth, January 19, 2007, pages 70 and 88).
Defendant Griffith stated in his affidavit that when approached by his agent about signing an
Addendum to extend the closing, Defendant Griffitth advised him that under no circumstances
would he agree to delay or extend the closing. (05/11/07,

prior to December 5& or 6" was he

aware of

7 16).

He also stated that at no time

or advised that a document extending the closing

was included in the closing documents. (05'1 1/07,

18).

Defendant Grifith's agent, Pete McArthur, testified in his deposition that the Defendants
never said that they wanted to sign an extension. (Pete McArtbur, April 20, 2007, page 39).
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
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Cmie Redoviarl front Pioneer Title testified that she did advise Defendant C~iffith &at
Addendm No. 3 would extend the closing to December 8, 2006 and that she did not force him
to sign any documents. ( C h e Redovian, Aprif 10. 2007, pages 38 and 46).
The Defendants argue that PlaintiEs' c i a of waiver fails because the signatures were
obtained under duress.

Specifically that agent McArlfiur tkreatened a lawsujt against the

Defendants if they failed to sign Addendum #3. PlaintiEs respond by claiming that there is not

an actionable claim of duress because the alleged threats were not wrongful or unlawful.
However, there appears to be a material dispute of fact in this regard. If Mckrthw threatened to
sue Griffith md Porter if they did not sign the time extension in Addendum #3, he would not

have had a good faith basis to make that theat. The Contract was clear and unambiguous that
the transaction was to close on or before November 30, 2006 and that time was of the essence.
Consequently, if it can be proven that Defendants' signatures on Addendum #3 was the result of
duress, the claim of waiver fails.
Plaintiffs further argue that even if the signatures of the Defendants were made under
duress, this defense cannot be used against the Plaintiffs because there me no facts in the record
that the Plaintiffs in my way caused the duress. Any duress caused was by the Defendants own

agent, M c ~ r t f ~ uand
r , that should not be visited upon the Plaintiffs. However, the remedy sought

by the Plaintiffs in this case is specific performance. This argument is more specifically
discussed below in the Court's discussion of the equitable remedy of specific performance.
This Gou~tfinds that there is substantial, but conflicting, evidence in the record to support

the claim of waiver and that it is for the trier of fact to determine whether the evidence
establishes such a waiver.
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Breach of the wied

Govenaxlt of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

The implied covenant of good faith and fajr dealing is a covenant implied by law in the

parties' contract. In'ul?o Power Co. v. Cogeneration, lnc , 134 Idaho 738, 750 (2000). It arises
only regarding terms agreed to by the parties. Tayior v Brow??irag,129 Idaho 483,490 (1996)
(citing Idaho First N a i f Bank v Bliss Valley Foods, 121 Idaho 266,288 (199 1)). The covenant
requires that the parties perfom, in good faith, the obligations imposed by their agreement.
tefrzrfiichv. Key Bank k t . Assr#, 141 Idaho 362,368 (2005).

As neither party has specifically addfessed this claim, the Court will not address it at this
time.

Specific Perfommce

Specific pedormmce is an extraordinary remedy developed by courts of equity to
provide relief when the Iegal remedies are inadequate. Hancock v. Dusenberry, 1 I0 Idaho 147,

152 (Ct. App., 1986). In contracts for the sale or lease of land, courts presume that the aggrieved
party does not have an adequate remedy at law and is entitled to specific performance. Id, This
presumption rests on the premise that a specific tract o f land is unique and impossible of
duplication, Id. This presumption, however, can be overcome by a showing that the tract of land
in a given case is not unique. Wood v. Simonson, 108 Idaho 699, 702 (Ct. App., 1985). Wide
discretion is afforded the trial court to determine whether damages is an adequate remedy in
contracts concerning sale of real property, and specific per.fonnance is never a matter of absolute
right. Id.

In this case, there has been no assertion that the land involved is not unique. Based on
the presumption that a specific tract of land is unique and impossible of duplication and noting
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&at it is within cbe discretion of the Court to determine whether d m a g e s are an adequate
remedy, the Court finds that if Plaintrffs are able to prove waver, that the remedy of specific

pexfommce is appropriate.
Conversety, if the Defendants are successful in proving that their signatures were
obtained under duress, even if that duress was caused by their agent, this Court belieses that it
would be inequitable to allow the Plaintiffs to demand specific p e r f a m m e . A more adequate

remedy is monetary damages against the party or parties causing duress.
Therefore,

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, and this does ORDER, that the PlaintiffsWotion for
S

m

q Judgment is DENIED.

1

DATED:

0%'

Thomas J. Ryan
District ~ u d &
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GERTIFICAE OF SERVICE

1 HEREBY CERTIFY &at a true and comct copy of the foregoing Memorandum
laintiffs7 Motion fur Summary Jrldgnent is forwarded to the folJawing
ay of F e b m y , 2008.

d b bkw- q + ~ i

Kevin B. Dinius
Shelli D. Stewart
White Peterson, P.A.
5700 East Fr;mkXin Road, Suite 200
Nanrpa, ID 83687-7901

Ron R-Shepherd
Hamilton, Michaelson & Wlty, LLP
P.O. Box 65
Nampa, ID 83653-0065

3~5-d

q b ? -~

Charlotte Sherbwn
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

Deputy Clerk
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RON R. SHEPHEm
ISB No. 6593
HAMILTON, MICHAELSON & HILTY, LLP
Attorneys at Law
1303 12th Avenue Road
PO Box 65
Warnpa, ID 83653-0065
(206) 467-4479 Telephone
(208) 467-3058 Facsimile
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTFUCT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
HENRY OGDEN, an unmarried man and,
MICHELLE HURST, an unmarried woman,
Plaintiffs,

)
)
)
)

Case No. GV 06-5807M
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO
WITHDRAW

1

VS.

)

DENNIS C. GRIFFITH, an unmarried man; 1
and BONNIE M. PORTER, an unmarried )
)
woman,

1

Defendants.
HAMILTON, MICHAELSON & HILTY, LLP, attorneys of record for the above-named
Defendants, DENNIS C. GRIFFITH and BONNIE M. PORTER, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 1 l(b)(2),
hereby move for the entry of an order permitting HAMILTON, MICHAELSON & HILTY, LLP
to withdraw as counsel of record for the above named Defendants. Defendants' last known
address is:
25 17 Succor Creek Rd.
Hornedale, Idaho 83628

This motion is supported by the affidavits, pleadings and evidence of record, together
with the Affidavit of Ron R. Shepherd in Support of Notion for Leave to Withdraw.
This motion is also based upon the papers, pleadings and records on file herein.
DATED this

day of March, 2008.
HAMILTON, MICHAELSON & HILTY, LLP

RON R. S H E P H E D
Artorneys for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

ay of March, 2008, 1 caused a true copy of the
I hereby certify that on the
foregoing MOTION FOR LEAVE TO WITHDRAW to be served by the method indicated
below, and addressed to the following:
Kevin E. Dinius
Shelli D. Stewart
WHITE PETERSON, P.A.
5700 E. Franklin Road, Ste. 200
Nampa, Idaho 83687
Dennis Griffith
Bonnie Porter
25 17 Succor Creek Rd.
Hornedale, Idaho 83628

(p

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage, Prepaid

Delivered
(
Facsimile
( ) Other

(
(
(
(

)
)
)
)

Mail, Postage Prepaid
Certified MaillRetum Receipt
Hand Delivered
Facsimile
Other
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Kevin F Dinit14

Sheili D. Steulm
WHITE PETERSON, P.A.

5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200
Narnpa, Idaho 836&7-7901
Telephone:

1208) 466-3272

Facsimile:
lSB No.

(208) 466-4405
5974,7459
ked@whifepefersnncowl

ssre~~urr@rvhitepeferson.
corn
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL, DlSTRlGT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN A N T I FOR THE COLNTY OF O W E E

H m R Y OGDEN, an unmarried man; and,
MICHELLE HURST, an unmarried wornm,

)
)

)

CASE NO. CV 2006-5807"M

1
)
)

DENNIS C. GRIFFITH, an unmarried man;
and, BONNIE M. PORTER, an unmmicd
woman,
Defendants.

MOTION TO ENFORCE
SETTLEmN'I' AGHEKMKN'I'

)
)
)

1

COME NOW, Plaintiffs HENRY OGDEN and MICHELLE HURST, by and through
their cnt~nxelnf record, the law firm of White Peterson, P.A., and hereby file this ibf~iotionto
Erijbrce Serilemeni Agreemen1

seeking an order requiring The Defendants to comply with the

settlement agreement entered into by and between the parties on March 5, 2008.

MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT. 1
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Plainti@$ agreed to release all claims against Defendants in exchange for $40,000.00. See
Ron Shepherd March 5 , 2008 letter, attached as Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Kevin E. Dinius in
Support of Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement j"Dinius Aff."). Defendants a p e d to

execute a promissory note and deed of trust against the subject real property to secure the
$40,000 00 obligation. Id
After some revisions by both parties, on M ~ c h26, 2008, Defendants' counsel
transmitted the final proposed deed of trust and promissory note to Plaintifs' counsel in which
Defendants agreed to pay the $40,000.00, plus 6% interest per annum, on October 1, 2008. See
Ron Shepherd March 26, 2008 ernail, Exhibit B to the Dinius Ail?. Plaintiflskounsel approved

the final proposed promissory note and deed of trust. See Kevin Dinius March 26, 2008 email,

Exhibit C to the Dinius Afi.
I-lowcvcr, to datc, Dcfcndzrllts havc faifcd and rcfuscd to cxccutc tfic proillissoiy note and
deed of trust.
Plaintiff respectfully moves this Court for an Order as follows:
1.

Far enforcement o f the: Settlement Agreement; and,

2.

For Plaintiffs' costs and attorney fees expended in pursuing this motion.

O U T , ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED.

DATED this 3rdday of April, 2008.

WHITE PETERSON. P.A.
By:
fhelli D. Stewart
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVlCE
I hereby crsrtilji that on this 3rdday o f April, 2008,I causcd to be served a huc and cortect

copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below to the following:
Run Shcphtrd
HAMll TON, MTCHAET4SON Rr HlLTY
1303 1 2 'Ave.
~ Rd.

Nmpa, ID 83653-0065

a
El

a

US Mail
Ovcs~~ight
Mail

Hand Delivery
Facsimile No. 467-3058

-

cmN:\Work\O\Ogdcn. Hcnry 22396lNon-Discovery\Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreemcnt.doc

MOTION ?T) ENFORCE SETTI.EMF"NT AGRFFMFNT - 3
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Kevin E. Uinius
Sl-tetliD. Stewart

W I T E PETERSON, P.A.
5700 East FranMin Road, Suite 200
Narnpa, Idaho 83687-790 1
Tolephnne-

(308) 466-9777

Facsimile:

(208) 466-4405
5974,7453
ked@-cvhrrepererson.corn
-s.srewarr@~vhi~epererson.
corn
1Sl3 No.

Artorneys for Plaintiffs
n\T THE T)T.STRTCT CT)I.IRT OF THF THIRD .-(1.TnfClAT.DTSTRTCT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE

HENRY OGDEN, an unmarried man; and,

MlCHEtLE HURST, an unmarried woman,

1
)
)

Plaintiffs,

D'ENNTS C. GRIFFITH, an unmarried man;
and, BONNIE M. PORTER, an unmarried
woman,

1

CASE NO. CV 2006-5807*M

)

Ati%lJIAVI'I' 0
1
F
'
KEVIN E.DINIU'S

)
)

IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
ENFORCE SETTLEMENT
AGIUEEMENT

)

1
)

Defendants.

1

STATE OF IDAHO )
: SS.

County of Canyon

)

KEVIN E. DINIUS, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as fofollows:
1.

I am one of the attorneys of record for the Plaintiffs in the above-entitled action,

AFFIDAVIT OF KEVIN E. DINIUS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT

AGREEMENT - I
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and m&c this Affidavit on the basis of my own persod knowledge a & o r belief.
2.

Attached hereto a3 Exhibit

"X'iis

n truc and corrcct copy o f Ron Shcphcrd's

March 5, 2008 letter setting folth the terms of the agreement entered into by the parries and their

respective attorneys.

3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a true and correct copy of Ron Shepherd's

March 26, 2008 ernail with the anached final proposed dsed of t m t and prominsory notc.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "C" is a true 8nd correct copy of my March 26, 2008

4.

email approving the final proposed deed of trust and promissory note.

5.

To date, Defendants have failed and refused to execute the promissory note and

deed of trust.

FURTHER, YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUtiHT.

DATED this 3" day of April, 2008.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 3'd day of April, 2008.

AFFIDAVIT OF KBVW E. DINIUS IN SUPPORT OF MOTlON TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT 2
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GERTIFIGakTE OF SERVICE
1 hereby certify that on this 31d day of April, 2008,l cawed ra be served a me and correct
cnpy o f the foregoing document by the method indicated below to the following:

Ron Shepherd
HAMILTON, MICHAELSON 8r HILTY
1303 12" Ave. Rd.
Nampa, ID 83653-0065

IT3
IT3

US Mail
Overnight Mail

Hand Delivery

-

Fa~sirnilc No. 467-3056

cmiW:\Work\O\Ogden, Henry 2239Won-DiscovcryLZfftdavit of KED rc Motion to Enforce Senlement Agreement.doc

AFFIDAVIT OF KEVlN E. DiNIUS IN SUPPORT OF MOTlON TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT 3
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U O N O EL'lY, LLP

A ~ O ~ E AT
Y S
LAW

1303 - I Z ' A E ~ R O A D
P.O. BOX 65
NAMPA, DAkiV 83653-0065

March 5,2008

Mr- Kevin Dinius
XvZIITE FlZIER3OP.r
5700 E.F
m Iid. Ste. 200
Nampa, Idaho 83687
Re:

Ogii~w'Hw~k
v. Cfr~fltfJPor-ter

Dear Kevin:

7312s letter 'wiU

our a d setthmnt agreement reached today in the above-referend

matter.

We agreed t-o sat* this matter for payment fiom my clicats to your clients in the ax~~ount
of
%4Q.000.00, which ~ O W Tconsists of repayment of tbe $14000.00 ~ 8 W 3 tmoney, plus
$30,000.00 t o w d your &eatsT costs and fees incurmi in the above-mfermoad fitigSrtiarz

Payment will be made by my clieats sxwutmg a promissory note secured by tt deed of aust
agaimt &e sub- real groper&. The tams of the promimry note are chat my clients will be
oblieted f~ pay $40,000.00 to your clients, plus six pwcmt (6%) interest thereoa, within six (6)
months k r n the daze the d o c ~ are
a W
~ id
Upon exeaxtion of Nth promissory mte and deed of tm$your clients will dismiss tbe
abov~efercacedmatter with pzdudice and wirh all partits baring their own costs and
aaomeys' fern. Additionaily, this 1sw firm has agreed to subordinate its attorney fee Iien on the
subject proparty so as to put your clients' deed of&ad o f this law firm's lien. AU pards
understand W bare -isa fkst murrgage on the subje&property, and that such first;mortgage
rer&n in place ahead of your clients' deed of trust.
'Ihe release of Iis pendens is a c i a l because my clients need to obtain a loan, secured by tbe
subject property, ia order YO pay your clients off. My olisntr canuot obtain such loan with the
13s pendess of record,

FILE
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Mr. Kwh BMm
& ~ k 5,2008
Paga 2
I\

Finally, hplied in the m e m a t is that all pardes wit1 wt in good Mth to execute all 6 0 w e n ~ s
and i
?s necassq to give &W to &is $8d&netat
~emenz.
Plsase coam me i
diately if you bdieve this letter snimta the essential t e r n of om
s d a e n t wment, 1 will pnspm a pmrnissoxy note, deed of trust a d s u b o r w o n
sgrmrn~etwithia the week unless 1 hear o-str:
&mYOU -diatelg.
I wodd request
you pparr: a ~
~ of lise pend8fls
?
md pmvide that to me, ts aswell as a sripddon and prop&
orda for d i e s a l .

Please oonwczt m e with any cpsrium you m y have.

SON & BIL'IY, LLP

91 18
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From:

Ron Shepherd /RonS@iZNAMPAtAW.COM]

Sent:
To:
Cc:

Wednesday, March 26,2008 9:59 AM

Subject:
Attachmanb:

10,

K e v ~ nE Din~us
Aaron Seable
OgdeniHurst v Griffittl and Poner
PROMNOTE - final docx: Deed of Trus - final.docx

Kevin:

A~rachedare the OGT dud Prorrt. Nuke we dis~uhsrrf.If tile r1tct.1wilf, yuur dpprovdl I will gel illy ~ l i e ~ ~t li gj t ~ d l u r ~ t
thereon.

Thanks,
Ron
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property may be reasonably necessary, the specific enumerations herein not excluding the
general.

2.

To appear in and defend any action or proceeding pworting to affect

the %curiry hereof or the fighrs or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; and to pay dl costs

and expenses, including cost of evidence of title and artorney's fees in a reasonabfe sum, in
any such action or proceeding in which Beneficiarp or Trustee may appear.

3.
Ta pay, at least re11 day:, befurt; delir~yucacyall t w c s and trsscssmcncs
affecting said property, when due, all encumbrances, charges and liens, with interest, on
said property or any part thereof, which appear to bc prior or supcrior hcrcto; all costs, fccs
and expenses of this Tmst.
4.
Should Orantor fail to make any payment or to do any act as herein
provided, then Beneficiary or Trustee, but without obligation so to do and without notice to

or demand upon Grantor and without releasing Grantor from any obligation hereof, may:
make or do the s m e in such manner and to such extent as either may deem necessary to
protect the security hereof, Benefieiwy or Trustee being authorized to enter upon said
property fctr such purposes; appear in ~tnddefend any action or proceeding purporting to

affect the security hereof or the rights or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; pay, purchase,
contest or compromise any encumbrance. charge or lien which in the judgment of either
appears to be prior or superior hereto; and, in exercising any such potvers, or in enforcing
this Deed of Trust by judicial foreclosure, pay necessary expenses, employ counsel and
pay his reasonable fees.

B. TT IS MUTUALLY AGREED THAT:
1. By accepting payment of any sum secured hereby after its due date,
'Beneficiary does not waive the right either to require prompt payment when due of all
other sums so secured or to declm default for f i l w e so to pay.
At any time or from time to tune, wlthout liability therefore and
without notice, upon written request of Beneficiary and presentation of this Deed and said
note for endorsement, and without affecting the personal liabiliry of any person for
payment of the indebtedness secured hereby, Trustee may: reconvey all or any part of said
property; consent to the making of any map or plat thereof; join in granting any easement
thereon; or join in any extension agreement or any agreement subordinating the lien or
2.

chmgc hcrcuf.

3. Upon written rcqucst of Dcncficiary stating that all suius sccurcd
hereby have been paid, and upon surrender of this Deed and said note to Trustee for
cancelintion and retention and upon payment of its fees, Trustee shall reconvey, without
warranty, the pro erty then held hereunder. The recitals in any reconveyance executed
under this deed o nust o f any matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness

f
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thereof. The grantee in such reconveyaslce may be described as "the person or persons
legally entitled thereto."
Upoil default by Oriulrur i e ytly1ric;ri~uf wly iudc;bt~dncsssecured

4.

hereby or in perfomance of any agreement heretmder, all sums secured hereby shall
imrncdiatcly bccornc duc and payable at the option of thc Bcncficiary. In thc cvc~ttof
default, Beneficiary shall execute or cause the Trustee to execute a written notice of such
default and of his election to cause to be sold thc hcrcin dcscribcd propcrty to satisfy the
obligations hereof, and shall cause such notice to be recorded in the office of the recorder
of each county wherein said real property or some part thereof is situated.

Notice of sale having been given as then required by law, and not less than the time then
required by law having efapsed, Trustee, triithout demand on Grantor, shali sell said
property at the time and place fixed hy it in said notice of sale, either as a whole or in
separate parcels and in such order as it may determine, at public auction to the highest
bidder for cash in lawful money of the United States, payable at time o f gale. T n ~ ~ t e<hall
a
deliver to the purchaser its deed conveying the property so sold, but without any covenant
or warranty express or implied. The recitals in such deed of any matters or facts shall be
conclusive proof of the truthfulness thereof. Any person, including Grantor, Trustee, or
Beneficiary, may purchase at such sale.
After deductin all costs, fees and expenses of Trustee and of this Trust, including cost of
evidence of tit e and reasonable counsel fees in connection with sale, Trustee shall apply
the proceeds of sale to payment o f all sums expended under the terms hereof, not then
repaid, with accrued interest at eight per cent per annum; all other sums then secured
hereby; and the remainder, if any, to the person or persons legally entided thereto.

k

5. This Deed applies to, inures to the benefit of, and binds all parties
liereto, their heirs, legatees, devisees, administrators, executors, successors and assigns.
The term Beneficiary shall mean the holder and owner of rhe note secured hereby; or, if the
note has been pledged, the pledgee thereof. In this Deed, whenever the context so requires,
the masculine gender includes the feminine and/or neuter, and the singular number
it~cludcstllc yltuaf .

6 . If L o r any part of the property secured hci-cby is sold or tsixisfcrcd by
Grantor without Beneficiary's prior written consent, Beneficiary may, at Beneficiary's
option, declare all the s w n s due under thc promissory notc sccurcd by this Dccd of Trust to
be immediately due and payable. If Beneficiary exercises the option to accelerate,
Beneficiary shjtl mail Grantor notice of ao~ocelerutionwhich shall provide a period of not
less than 30 days from the date the notice is mailed within which Grantor may pay the
suns declared due. If Grantor fails to pay such sums prior to the expiration of such period,
Beneficiary may, without further notice or demand on Grantor, invoke any remedies
permitted hy thic Deed o f Tnlcr, the Promissory Note, and by law. 8.
Trustee is not
obligated to notify any party hereto of pending sale under any other Deed of Trust or of

-
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any action or proceeding in which Grmtor, Beneficiary or Trustee shall be a party unless
brought by Trustee.

7. In the event of dissolution or resignation of the Trustee, the Beneficiary
may subst~tutea trustee or trustees to execute the trust hereby created and when any such
subsrirution has been filed for record in the office of the Recorder of the county in which
the propeny herein described is situated, it shall be conclusive evidence of the appointment
of such trustee or trustees, and such new trustee or trustees shall succeed to all of the
powers and duties ol the uus tcc or kustces named herein.
Rcyucst is lxercby madc that a copy of m y Notice of Dcfault md a copy of atly Notice of

Sale hereunder be mailed to the Grantor at his address hereinbefore set forth.

BONNIE M. PORTER
25 17 Succor Creek Rd.

DENNIS C. GRIFFITH
25 17 Succor Greek Rd.
Wornedale, Idaho 83628

Homedale, Idaho 83628

STATE OF IDAHO

1
) ss.

County of

'
I

..

On this
day of March, 2008, before me the undersigned, a Notary Public in
and for said Sfate personally appeared DENNIS C. GRIFFlTH, knom or identified to me
to he the person whose. name ic s~thscriherltn the within insrn~rnent,and acknnwledgeA tn

me that he executed the same.

IN WlWESS wE-EWOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official
scal thc day and year in this ccrtificatc first above written.

NOTARY PUBLIC F O R IDAHO

Residence:

My Co~i~missiolz
Expires:

-
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STATE OF IDAHO

)
) 9s.

County of

)

On this
day o f March, 2008, before me: the ui~ctr;rsig~ied,
a Notaly Public in
and for said State personally appeared BONNIE N. PORTER, known or identified to me
to be the person whose name is subscrittcld tu tlie withill iilstiu~~ent,
and acknowlcdgcd to
me that she executed the same

IN WITNESS WHEEOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official
scal the day and year in this certificate first above written.

NOTARY PUBLIC FOR IDAHO
Residence:

My Commission Expires:

-
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$40,000.00

April 1,2008

FOR VALUE FECEIVED, DENNIS C. GHFFITH, an u n m ~ e man,
d
and BONNIE C.
PORTER, an umarried woman, whose address is of 2517 Succor Creek Road, Homedale,
Owyhee County, Idaho, promise to pay to the order of HENRY OCDEN, asl u m i e d man, and

MICHELLE HURST, an m a r r i e d woman, of Atlanta, Fulton County, Georgia, the principal
sum of FORTY THOUSAND AND NOllOO DOLLARS ($40,000.00), with interest thereon at

six percent (6.0%) per m u m from April 1,2008, until paid in hll.
Principal and interest to be paid as follows:
All remaining principal and accrued interest shall be due and payable in full on October

1,2008.
If, however, the maker of t h s Note does not pay on or before said maturity date, the
Holder may charge interest at the above mentioned rate for so long as the balance remains

unpaid.

ln the event oi default hereunder, andlor in the performance of Grantor's obligations
under Deed of Trust given to secure payment ot: this Note, time being af the essence hereof, the
holder of this Note may without notice or demand declare the entire prlnclpal s u m then unpaid,
a)yr;tlicr with accruccl inlerest ihttreon, immediately due and payable.
In the cvcllt of commcnceinefit of suit to enlurcc: payment of this Note, the undersigned
t such action may adjudge
agrees to pay such additional sum as attorney's fccs as thc C o ~ t iil
reasonable.

This Note shall be governed as to validity, interpretation, construction, effect and in all
other recpectq hy the laws and decisions of the State of Idaho.

-
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Principal and interest on this Notc are payable in such currency of the United States of
Arnerica as at the time of paymenr is legal tender for the payment of public and private debts.

Advance or other additional payments rnay he made nn this Note

~t

any time. Each

payment shztll be applied first to the payment of accrued interest, and second to the payment of
principal.

This Notc is stcwzd b y a Deed oCTrust of even dare herewith.
Should the propefty described in the Deed of Trust securing this Note be sold or

conveyed by the Maker herein, their heirs or assigns, prior to the maturity of this Note, then the

entire sum of principal and interest shall become immediately due and payable.

DENNIS C. G'RIFFITH

BONNIE M. PORTER
DUE: Ocrober 1 , 2008

-
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Kevin E Oinius
Wednesday, March 26,2008 10 36 AM
'Ron Shepherd'
C~ndyMackey
RE: OgdenJHurst v Gr~ffithand Porter

From;
Sent:
To:

CG:
Subject:

Ron: These will work. Once your d~ents'execute the note and deed of trust, please get me copies. Also, ptease provide
me the original subordrnation agreement.
Thanks.
Kevin E. Dinius
WHITE PETERSON, P.A.
5700 F Franklin R d . Ste 3bt200

Narnpa, ID 83687-7901
208 666 9272 (Telephone)

208.466.4405 (Facsimile)
Confidentiality Notice: This email message may contain confidential and privileged information exempt from disclosure
under applicable taw. If you have received this message by rnisrake, please notify us immediately by replying t o this
message or telephoning us, and do not review, disclose, copv, or distribute this message. Thank ycrlt.
. . - - -.

- -.. .--~,-......-....-.--------.-.----.---..-...
From: Ron Shepherd [mailto:RonS@NAMPW,COM]
Sent: Wednesday, March 26, 2008 10:22 AM
To: Kevin E. Dinius
Subject: RE: Ogden/Hurst v. Griffith and Porter
&&"

-

-.-----

-

-

.-,,.

~

They are in word, you just need to update your software. O Here they are in the old Word format.

-

------

-

* - -

..

-

-

-

-

Fram: Kevin E. Dinius [mailto;ked@WHZTEP~RSONNcom]
Sent: Wednesday, March 26,2008 10:18 AM
To: Ron Shepherd
Subject: RE: Ogdcn/Hurst v. Griffith and Porter
Please sena them To me In word

- I cannot open the attachments

Kevin E. Uinius
WHITE PETERSON, P.A.
5700 E. Franklin Rd., Ste. #ZOO
Nampa. ID 83687-7901
208.466.9272(Telephone)
208.466.4405 (Facsimile)
Confidentiality Notice: This ernail message may contain confidential and privile~edinformation exempt from disclosure

under applicable law. If you have received this message by mistake, please notify us immediately by replying to this
message or relephonlng us, and do nor revlew, disclose, copy, or dlsrrlbute thls message. Thank you.
. . ..
...... "."
.
^~-~^..--~~^~^.I
....-... .
From: Ron Shepherd [mailto:RonS@NAMPALAW,COM]
Sent: Wednesday, March 26, 2008 9:59 AM
To: Kevin E. Dinius
^._.__^____l_l-^.^_

-,-..-I.,

--

-

.
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FILED
-n.m~ P M .

IN THE DISTmCT C O m T OF THE T
I
T
T
m JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF D M O , TT\J AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
HENRY OGDEN, an m ~ e man,
d
and MICHELLE HURST, an
unmarried woman,

1
)

1
)
)

VS.

CASE NO. CV 2006-05807-

MEMORANDUM DECISION RE:
PLANTIFF'S MOTIOfl

DENNIS C. GRTFFITI-I, an
unmarried man, and
BONNLE M. PORER, an unmarried
woman,
Defendants.

On February 25, 2008, this Court filed its Memorandum Decision upon plaintiffs' second

motion for summaty judgment. Shortly hereafter, the plajntiEs filed a motion to reconsider
~r q q m r t ~ dhy affidavit- containing further deposition testimony of defendant Griffith . On March

4, 2008, thc partics caused a Memorandum of Stip~tlatedFacts to be filed. The Court has takcn
into consideration the motion to reconsider, the briefs in support and opposition thereto as well

as the supporting affidavits, deposition testimony and stipulated facts and hereby clarifies its
decision as follows:

Waiver and Dtgess

In this case, the Contract between the parties is wmbiguous. The closing date was to
occur no Iater than Novcrnber 30, 2006. A "time is of the essence" clause was also contained

within the Contxact. Jt is undisputed that neitt~erparty perfomed before November 30,2006 and
therefore, the conlract cxpircd by its own terns.

One day after the closing deadline on December I, 2006, Defendant Griffith signed

Addendum No. 3 wit11 Defendant Porter's ssignatwe following his on December 4, 2006.

Addendum No 3 is also unambiguous and required the execution by both pparties in order to
become an integral part of the Contract. The Plaintiffs did not sign Addendum No. 3 and
therefore, it never became part of the Contract by its own terms.

However, the Plaintiffs raise the issue of waiver by asserting that the Defendants waived
thcir rights to claim that payxuellt was due u11 Nvvember 30 by signing Addendum No. 3.
Plaintiff$ further argue that Defendants waived their right to claim that Plaintiffs breached the

Contract by failing to make the funds available on November 30. Plaintiffs assert that when they
obtained the necessasy funding on December 7, that they did so in reliance on the Defendants'
alleged waiver.
A waiver is the intentional relinquishent of a known right. Crouch v. Bischog 78 Ida110

364,368 (1956). i t is a voluntary act and implies election by a party to dispense wit11 something
of value

01-

trj fo~eguSVUIG; right

ur advantage which he might at his option have demanded and

insisted upon. id. The existence of waiver ordinarily is a question of fact, and if there is any
substantial evidence in the record to support a waiver it i s for the trier of fact to determine
whether the evidence establishes such a waiver. Riverside De~~elopmenl
Co. v. Ritcl?r'e, 103 Idaho

5 15, 5 15 (1 982). Waiver i s foremost a question of intent; and in order to establish waiver, the

intention to waive must clearly appear. Id at 120. Intent to waive a right nay, however, be
established by conduct. Id.

En this case, Griffith had become concerned that he w s selling the propem at too low of
a price prior to thc November 30 closing. His concerns were the result of consulttl~ionshe had
with three diEerent real estate agents. (See Stipulatcd Fact No. 7). Dcfcndant Porter was told

by agent McArthur on November 27, 2006 that thc plaintlfls wanted to cnter into Addendum #3

as they could not make the money for the subject property available by November 30. (Scc
Stipulated Fact Nos. I 1 and 12). Porter was advised and did consult attorney Ed Schiiler about

Addendum #3. [See Stipulated Fact No. 14). GrifEtb dso knew about the request for an

extension at least as of the morning of November 30.

(See Deposition of Dennis Cmfitb, pg.

70, lines19 - 21 and pg. 71, lines 4 - 5). Later on November 30, Grif'fith consulted with anoll~er
real estate agent and with his nttornliy Ron Shepherd. (Scc Stipulatcd Facts Nos. 18 and 19).

The next day, Cr.iEth signed Addendm #3. Based upon the above facts, the court concludes
that Cirifiith eitl~erknew what his options were regarding the signing of the extension by vixtue of
the legal advice he and Porter had obtained, or he should have known. For this reason, the Court

finds that waiver has been established by his conduct of signing. The same is true of defendant
Porter upon her act of signing on December 4,2006.

The Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' claim of waiver fails because the signatures were
nhtairxed under dtwess.

Specifically that agent McA&w

thrcatcncd n lawsuit against tllc

Defendants if they failed to sign Addendum f 3 . Plaintiffs respond by claimkg that there is not

an acrionabfe claim of duress because the alleged tltreats were not wrongfit1 or unlawful.
FTowevcr, &the appears to be a material dispute of fact in this regard. If McAnhur threatened to
sue Griffith and Porter if they did not sign the time extension in Addendum W3, he would not

hate had a good

basis to m&c that threat The Conb-act was clear and unambiguous that

tbc &ansaction was to closc on or before Novcmber 30, 2006 m d that time was of the essence
Consequently, if it can be proven that Defendants' signatures on Addendun #3 was the result of
duress, the claim of waiver f;tiis.
To bc voidable on the grounds of durcsa, an agmement r~-tustnot oidy be obtair~crlby

means of pressure brouat to bear, hut the agreement ~tselfmust be unjust, unconscionable, or
illegal. The defensc of duress cannot bc predicated upon demands whch are Iawf3uI, or the threat
ro do that which the demanding party has a legal ngl~tto do. Generally, the demand by one party

must be wrongkl or unla*l,

and the other party must have no rneans of immediate relief from

the actval or threatcncd duress other than by compliance with the demand. The affirmative
defense of duress may be established only by clear and convincing evidence. Liebelt v. Liebelt,
1 1 8 Tdahn 845,X4X (Ct App. 1990)

This Court finds that there is substantial, but conflicting, evidence in the record to support
the claim of duress and that it is for the trier of fact to determine whether the cvidence establishes
that the signatures on Addcrlclurrl M3 were made under duress.

specific Performance

Specific performance is an extraordinary remedy developed by courts of equity to provide

relief when the legal remedies are inadequate. Hancock v D?~.c~nbevry,
1 10 Idaho 147, 152 (Ct.
App., 1986). In contracts for the sale or lease of land, courts presume that the aggrieved party

does not have an adequate remedy at law and is entitled to specific performance. Id

This

presumption rests on the premise that n spccific tract of land is uniy~teard impossjble of

duplication. Id. This presumption, however, can be overcome by a showing that the tract of land

CAI. li.OI.4

in a given

case i s not
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unique. W o d v ,Srrnov2son, 108 Idaho G99, 702 (Gt. App., 1985). Widc

discretion is al't'orded the trial court, to deternine whether damages is an adequate remedy in

contracts concerning sale of real property, and specific performance is never a matter of absolute
right. fd
In this casc. thcrc has been no assertion that the land involved is not unique. Based on the

prcswption that a specific tract of land is unique and impossible of duplication and ~ ~ o t i nthat
g it
i s within the discretion of the Court to determine whether damages are an adequate remedy, the

Court finds that if Plaintiffs arc able to provc waivcr, that the remedy of specific performance i s
appropriate.
Conversely, if the Defendants are successfbl in proving that their signatures were
obtained under duress, even if that duress was caused by their agent, this Corn believes that it
would be inequitable to allow the Pln~ntifl'sto demand specific pedormanoe. A more adcquatc

remedy is monetary damages against thc pat-ty or parties causing duress.
n~erefore,the Court's previous Order dcnying Plaintiffs Motion for Summar~jJudgment
stands. This Mcmormdum Decision merely clarifies the earlier dccision with conside~ationof
the new material submitted by the parties.

DATED:

$]q,

0%

District Court

8EIR7

1 HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum
Derjsinn a r d r)rder on Pta~nti-ffs'Motion for Srimmarv Judmet~tis fonvarded to the following
persons on this 1 7% day of April. 2008.
Kevin E. Dinius
Shelli D. Stewart
White Peterson, P.A.
5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200

Nampa. ID 83657-7901

Ron R. Shepherd
Hamilton, Michaelson cR: Hilty. LT,P
P.O. Box 65
Nampa, ID 83653-0065

Charlotte Sherburn
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COUTiT

Deputy Clerk

PAGE

RON R SHEPHEW
ISB No. 6593
FXAMILTON, MICHAELSON & EHLTU, CLP
Atton~eysat Law
1 3 03 12th Avenue Road

PO Box 65
Wampa, ID 83653-0065
(208) 4 6 7 4 7 9 Telephone
(208) 467-3058 kacsimile
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THJ3 D I S W C T COURT OF THE THIRD J U D I C M DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN ANI) FOR TM3 COUNTY OF O W H E E
HENRY OGDEN, an unmarried man and,
MICHELLE HURST?an unmarried woman,
Plaintiffs,

)

Case No. CV 06-5807M

)
)
)

ORDER ALL0 WING
W1THDRAWA.L OF COUNSEL

VS.

DENNIS C. CRIFFITXJ, an t~marriedman; )
and BONNIE N- PORTER, an unmarried 1
1
woman,

1

Defendants.
THJS MATTER came on regularly for hearing in the above-entided court at 1:30 p.m.,
on the /+day

of

kfr:\

2008, upon the Motion for Leave

ro Withdraw heretofore filed. and

served in this action by Ron R. Shepherd of the law firm oEHamilton, Michaelson & Nlty, LLP,

attorney for the Defendants, Dennis C. Grifith md Bonnie M.Porter (hereinahr "Defendants").

02/04

PAGE

The Court, having reviewed the records and pleadings on file in this action and having
determined that due and proper service of notice of the motion has been given in the manner

provided by law, and good cause appeiu-ing for tire granting of said motion:
NOW. TF-XEEFOU, I T IS OmERED and this does hereby O m E R that the law firm
of Ilmilton, Michocfson & Hilty, LL,P be pemitted to withdratv as counsel for the T'lefenifants

effective immediately and;
I T IS FURTBER 0ICI)ERED that within twenty (20) days from the date hmeof, the

Defendants appoint another altorney or attorneys to appear for them, or in the alternative, appear
in person by filing a written noticc with the court stating how they will proceed without an

attorney. No further proceedings can be had in this action which will affect the rights of the

Defendants for a period of twenty (20) days fiom the date of this order.
IN THE EVENT OF THE FAXLURIE OF THE DEFENDANTS TO SO APPEAR

AND ADVISE THE COURT WITHIN TWENTY (20) DAYS, SUCH FAILURE SHALL

BE SUFFICIENT GROUNDS FOR THE ENTRY OF AN ORDER ENTERING
DEFAULT AGAINST THE DEFEIVDANTS UPON TRE COMPLAINT FTLEI) HJ3REXN
BY TIm PLAINTWFS, AND GRANTING THE WLXEF SOUGHT IN THE

COMPLAINT AS AGAINST SAID OEFEND-LINTSWITHOUT FURTEER NOTICE TO

THE SAID DEFENDANTS.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Ron R. Shepherd, Uamilton, Michaelson Rr: Hitty,

LLP, shall immediately, upon entry of this Order, serve the same upon Defendants pursuant to

the requirements of Rule 11(b)(3) of the lclaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and that said attorney
shall file an affidavit with this court setting forth the steps taken to give such notice.

M3/04

DATED this - (q*dny

o f March. 2008.

Diatrict Judge

CLERK'S CERmFICATE: OF SERVICE

1 1 ~ l)?aYi/?

1hereby certify that on the
day of
2008,1 caused a true copy of the
foregoing ORDER ALLOWmG WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL to be served by the method
indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Kevin E. Diai~rs
SheIli I).Stewart
W I T I E PETERSON. P.A.
5700 E. Franklin Road, Ste. 200
Nampa, Idaho 83687

I.f

(
U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( )

Facsimile

( ) Other

/

Kon R. Shepherd
HNLIILTON, MICHAELSON 62

( ' ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Certified MailReturn Receipt

I-IILTY, LLP

( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Facsimile
( ) Other

1301 1 2th Avenue Road

PO Box 65
Narnpa. ID 83653-0065

CHARLOTTE SHERBURN
O ~ h e Cuutjty
e
Clcrk

By:

~eputf~lerk

'&gp&
>-&*
e
"
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Kevin E. Dinius

Shell! L3. Stewart

D E ? P UClerk
?~

WHITE PETERSON,P.A.
5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901
Telrpfnonr:
(208) 466-9272?
Facsimile:
(208) 466-4405

r s NO.
~

5974,7359

ked@tvhireperer.ron.corn
,s.sleruarf(~whrfepe~ersa~z.
corn
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
XN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TWRn TC_IDICIALDlSTlRlCT OF

TI IE STATE OF IDA1 10, IN AND FOR TI IG COUNTY OF OWYlIEE

HENRY OGDEN, an unmarried man; and,

MICHELLE HWRST, an unmarried wornan,

)

)
)

CASE NO. GV 2006-5807"M

Plaintiffs,
)

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

-vs-

)
)

T3ENNTS (3. GRli'FFliTH, an unmarried man;

JUDGMENTMOTION TO
ENFORCE SETTLEmNT

)

and, BONNIE M. PORTER, an unmarried

)

woman,

AGREEMENT

)

Defendants.

)

1

COME NOW, Plaintiffs HENRY OGDEN and MICHELLE WRST, by and through
their counsel of record. the law firm of White Peterson, P.A., and hereby file this Morion for
S1,mmar)~-h~dgmenrlMoiionf n Enforce .Setrlernenr Agreement seeking an order rqitiring the

Dcfcndants to comply with the scttlcmcnt agrccrncnt entered into by and between the pmie3 on

MOTION FOR SUMMARY YUDCMENTIMOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT AGREEMPNT -

21 20

2
%
%*
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Plaintiffs agreed to release all clain~sagainst Defendants in exchange for $40,000.00. See
Ron Shepherd March 5, 2008 letter, attached ss Exhibit A t o the Affidavit of Kevin E. Dinirrs in

Support of Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreernent ("Urnius Aff."). Defendants agreed to

execute a promissory note arid deed of trust against the subject real property to secure the
$40,000.00 obligation. Id
After some revisions by both parties, on March 26, 2008, Uefendanrs' couxlsel
transmitted the final proposed deed of trust and promissory note to Plaintiffs' counsel in which

Defendants agreed to pay the $40,000.00, plus 6% interest per annum, on October 1, 2008. See
Iton Shcpherd March 26, 200S ernail, Exhibit B to the Dinius Aff. Plaintiffs' counsel appmved

the final proposed promissory note and deed of trust. See Kevin Dinius March 26, 2008 email,

Exhibit C to the Dinius Aff.
IIowcvcr, to date, Defendants have failed and refused to execute the promissory note and

deed of trust.

Plaintiff respectfully moves this Court for an Order as follows:
1

For enforcement of the Settlement Agreement; and,

2.

For Plaintiffs' costs and attorney fees expended in pursuing this motion.

ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED.

DATED this 1 7 ' ~day of April, 2008.
WHITE PETERSON, P.A.

f T G -

BY:
Kev' E. Dinius
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 17"' day o f Aprrl, 2008, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below to the following:

Dennis Griffith
Bonnie Porter
25 1 7 Succor Creek Rd.

Hornedale, Idaho 83628

Mail
aUS
Cwiifiecl
- Rctuni Rcccipt Rcqucsted
Delivery
aHand
Facsimile - No.
Pvislil

/"

for

HSl'E PE'I'EKSON, P.A.

cm/W:\Work\O\Ogden, Fienry 7779RNon-~~ucovery\MSfMoti~n
ro Enforce Scttlcmcnt Arrrccmznt.doc

:* ;
L

MOTlON FOR SUMMARY JUDGh4ENTIMOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT - 3

r<9$c
FfiX :1i?;,~
.A4405

@w7

f-

1t E fb.273 04i17 " 3 16 :31'1

*@

WHI TE

PEIEPSON

PkGE

FILED

Kevin E, Dinius
Shelli D. Stewart

W H R E PETERSON, P.A.
5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901

(208) 466-9372
Facsimile:
(208) 466-4405
ISB No.
5974,7459
ked@whitepeterson.corn
ssrewarl@whitepeter.~on.corn
'Tclcphonc:

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 'THIRD J1 Jl3lCTAf, DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, lT-4 AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE

I-IENRY OGDCN, an unmarried man; and,
MICHELLE HURST, an unmarried woman,

1
)
CASE NO. CV 2006-5807*M

)

Plaintiffs,

)
)

APFIDAVLT OF KEVIN E. DlMUS

-VS-

)
)

DENNIS C . GRIFFZTH, an unmarried man;

)

and, BONNIE M. PORTER, an unmarried

)

IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
SUMMARY IUDGMENTIMOTION
TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT

WU111~1,

Defendants.

1
)

STATE OF IDAHO }
: SS.

Cntlnty of Canyon

)

KEVIN E. DINIUS, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows:
1.

I a n oilc of the anorncys of record for the Plaintiffs in the above-entitled ~ c t i a n ,

AFFIDAVIT OF KEVIN E. DINIWS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY WDGMENTIMOTION TO
ENFORCE SETTLEMENT

AGREEMENT - 1

,>

t

,

%

51 20

and make this Affidavit. on the basis of my own personal howledge and/or belief.
2,

Attached hereto as Exhtbit "A" is a [rue and correct copy of Ron Shepherd's

March 5, 2008, letter setting forth the terms of the agreement entered into by the parties and their
respective anorneys.
3

Attached hereto as Exhibit ‘%" is a true and correct copy of Ron Shepherd's

hlarch 26,2008, amail with the attached final proposed deed o f rnxr and promissory note.
4.

Altacl~cdlrercto a Exhibit "C" i s a truc and correct copy of my March 26, 2008

email approving the final proposed deed of trust and promissory nore.

5.

To date, Defendants have failed and refused to execute the promissory note and

deed of trust.

FURTHER, YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
DATED this I 7thday of April, 2008.

CI

--R

SIJBSCNBED AND SWORN to before me this 17" day of April, 3M8.

AFFIDAVIT OF KEVIN E. DINlUS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT/MOTION TO
ENFORCE SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT - 2

-*'/,

FILE hlo .27? 04/17 '08 16 : 1

k s J i ~ I T t FETERsflH

I hereby certify rhar nn rhi.; 17' day of April. 2008, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy o f the foregoing dncurnenr by the method indicated below to the following:

Donnic Porter

a
Mail
aUS
Ccl-tified Mail - Rcturn Receipt Requested

25 17 Succor Creek Rd.
Homedale, Idaho 133628

[ZS Facsimile - No.

Dennis Griffith

Hand Delivery

crn/W:\\hiork\O\Ogden, Hcnry 22396iNan-Discovcry\riffidavif of KED re MSJMotion to Enforce Senlemcnr Agreement.doc

AFFlR AVIT OF KEVIN E. DlNI1.f.C:1N St 1PPC)RTOF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENTlMOTION TO

ENFORCE SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT - 3
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TON, m C m T X O N & K&W, LIZ
AL-lUmEyS AT LAW
1303 12' AVl3lT.E ROAD
P 0.SOX 65

-

NRMP& IDAHO 8653-0065

U M X OLSON

BRYAN T

A m

KBIRY E
L
mMICWrnLSON
COf.l(fEIKAM-vO3'r

Re:

Ogdew%fur&v. GrBfWPorter

Tlsis. letter will

O

C

)

out
~ orat

settlement s g r m t rreacbed today in the above-rekmd

IImwx.

ID settle tbis matter for payment from my clients to your clicnn ia thc amount of
which amount c o m i s ~of repayment of rhe $10,000.00 earnest money, plus
$3OP000.00toward your clients' cosb and fees h~~nrgd
in the abuvs-referencedtitigadon.
We agrreeKf
yu).OOO.OO,

Payment will be made by my clients executing a promissory note m e d by a deed of mrsr
qph%the subjeot rcol prop-.
The terar of the promissory n m are fhat my clients will be
obligated to pay $afi00.00 m your cjients, plus sh percent (6%) himest thmon, within six (6)
months fiam nhe dsrtrs .Clu: documcnt3 atg W i z a d .
Upon exwuxfon of su& promissory note sad deed o f rmsr your clie~tswill d i m b s the
above-mferaced mmr with prejudhe and with all partics bearing their own oosts and
aaomeys' fees. Additionally, rhis law firm has a p e d to subordinate its attorney fee lien on the
subject property so as to put your *ientsYdeed oftrusr ahead of this law A m ' s lien All panis
understand tha? there is a fust mortgage on the subJect pn-,pt:rty, and thnt suoh frrst mortgage will
remain in place &-=.ad of yow olients' deed of trust.
Thc relesse of lis pendens is crucial because my cliez1~necd to obtain a loan, secured by
subject propsly, in arder to pay your cliits off. My clients camor obtain such lo- witb the
lb p&s
o f record,

81 20

Finafly, implied in the
and i m e n t s m s

mi-tm
t%ss=dd
dkxh of fx-U&

settlement age~metzt X wiU prepare a
week urltoss f hau;
ape~nea
WtIh
you prepare a release of lis pendens and pmvido that to me,as well a4 a sdputatim and pmposed
ader for dismksd-

P h e coatact me with any qw~iLi~~,
YOU may bvo.

SON a;mm,LLP

PAGE

From:
'ent:
,0:

Cc:
Subject:
Attd~lt~~~ettts.

Ron Shepherd [RonE;@NAMPAMW COM]
Wednesday, March 26,2008 9:59 AM
k v t n E. Oinius
Aaron Seable
OgdenlMurst v Grifiith and Potter
PROMNOTE finsl.docx; Deed of l r u s - final.dacx

Kevin:
Attached are the DOT and Prom. Note we discussed. If the meet with your approvat I will get my citents'

thereon.
Thanks,
Ron

stgnarure

lo/ 20

&g@a
FAX : 1&&&y1664.405

DEED OF TRUST

day of April, 2008, between DEWIS C.
THIS DEED OF TRUST, d e this
CHFFITH, an unmanied man, and BUmE
C. t"ORTER, an w a n i e d woman,
hereinafter collectiveZ referred to as G W T O R , whose address is of 25 17 Succor Creek
Road, Homedale, uryhee County, Idaho;
hereinaner
called
TRUSTEE,
whose
addresi
is
and HENRY OGDEN, an unmarried man, and MICmLLE HURST, an unmanikd
Woman, ot Atlanta, Fulton County, Georgia, hercii~tsn~rczlllcctivcly rcfcrrcd to as
BENEFICIARY, whose address is c/o White Peterson, PA, 5700 Franklin Road, Ste. 200,

B

Nampa, Idaho 83687.

WITNESSETH:

"Iliat

Clmtor does hcrcby irrevocably GRANT, BARGAIN,

SELL AND CONVEY TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST, WITH POWER OF SALE, that

prupcrty iu thc County of Owyhcc, State of Idaho, deccribed as follows, and containing nnt
more than forty (40) acres:

See Exhibit "A," attached hereto and made a part
hersof by this reference.

Together with all s p p u ~ n a n c e sand water rights. For the purposes of this

Agreement, the term "water rights" means any and all rights to use ground or surface water

on the Property, whether evidenced by any permit, license, transfer, order, exchange,
cfaim, decree or otherwise, or pk~rslranttn any lease or other agreement.. For the Pupase
of Securing payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a promissory note, of even date
herewith, expc.11tp.dby Grantor in the sum of FORTY THOUSAND DOLLARS AND
NO/! 00 DOLLARS ($40,000.00), Einal payment due October 1,2008.

To protect the security of this Deed of Tntst, Grantor agrees:

A.

1. To keep said property in good condition and repair; not to remove or
demolish any building thereon; to complete or restore promptly and in good and
workmanlike manner any building which may be constructed, damaged or destroyed
thereon and to pa when due all claims for labor performed and materials fiunished
therefore; to comp y with all laws affecting said property or requiring any allcrx~iorlsor
irn rovements to be made thereon; not to commit or permit waste thereof; not to commit,
su fer or permit any act upon said propeny in violat3on of law, to cultivate, irrigate,
fertilize, fumigate, prune and do all other acts which from the character or use of said

P

r
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propeay may be reasonably necessary, the specific enwerations herezn not excluding the
general.
2.
To appear in arid defend any action or proceeding purporting to afEect
the security hereof or the nghts or powas of Beneficiary or Trustee; and to pay all costs
and expenses, including cost of evidence of title and aL.tomey1sfees in a reasonable sum, in
any such action or proceeding in which Beneficiary or Tmstee may appear

To pay, at least ten days before delinquency all l i u c z ; ~arid sl;isessllrcl-rts
3
affecting said property, when due, all encwnbraslces, charges and liens, with interest, on
said property or any part thereof, which appr=ariu bt;ptiul or suptlior hereto; all costs, fccs
and expenses of this Trust.

4. Should Grantor fail ta make any payment or to do any act as herein
pi ovided, then Bcncficiary or Trustcc, but without obligation so to do and without notice .lo
or demand upon Grantor and without releasing Grantor from any obligation hereof, may:
rnakc or do thc same in suoh manner and to such extent as either may deem necessary to
pmtect the security hereof, Beneficiary or Trustee being authorized to enter upon said
property for such purposes; appear in and defend m y action or proc-eeding pt~rpnrfine;tn
affect the security hereof or the rights or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; pay, purchase,
contest o r compr~mise.any encnmhrance, charge or lien which in the judment of either
appears to be prior or superior hereto; and, in exercising any such powers, or in enforcing
this Deed o f T n ~ hy
t judicial foreclosure. pay necessary expenses. employ counsel .and
pay his reasonable fees.

B. IT IS MUTUALLY AGWED THAT:
1. By accepting payment of any sum secured hereby after its due date,
Beneficiary does not waive the right either to require prompt payment when due of all
other sums so secured or to declare default for failure so to pay.

2. At any time or l'rom tune to time, wsEhout liability therefore and
without notice, upon written request of Beneficiary and presentation of this Deed and said
note for endorsement, and wthout affecting the personal liability of any person for
payment of the indebtedness secured hereby, Trustee may: reconvey all or any part of said
property; consent to the making of any map or plat rherwf;join in graliki~~g
i f t ~ ytseinci~t
thereon; or join in any extension agreement or any agreement subordinating the lien or
change hereof.
3.
Upoil ,wiittt;n I-cqucst of Dcneficiary stating that all 3ums secured
hereby have been paid, and upon surrender of this Deed and said note to Trustee for
ceu~cclttirionand rctcntion nnd upon payment of its fees, Trustee shall reconvey, without
warriinty, the property then held hereunder. The recitals in any reconveyance executed
undcr this deed of trust of any matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of the tnlthfi11ne.s~

-
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thereof. 'i'he grantee in such reconveyance may be described as "the person or persons
legally entitled thereto."
4.
Upon default by Grantor in payment of any indtbtcllacs~secured
hereby or in pedomance of any agreement hereunder, all sums secured hereby shall
Immediately become due and payable at the option oC ht; Bcrieficiaxy. h the cvcnt of
default, Retieficiary shall execute or cause the Trustee to execute a written notice of such
default and of his election to wusc to br: suId die liercin dcs~ribcdproperty to satisfy thc
obligations hereof, and shall cause such notice to be recorded in the office of the recorder
of each county whcrcin stiid real pcupckty or sonic part thereof is situated.

Nuticl: of s d c having been given as thcn rcquircd by law, and not less than the time then

required by law having elapsed, Trustee, without demand on Grantor, sMI sell said

property at the time and plnoe fixed by it in aid notice o f sate, either as a whole or in

separate parcels and in such order as it may determine, at public auction to the highest
bidder for cash in fa& money of the United States, payable at time o f csle Trimtee shall
deliver to the purchaser its deed conveying the property so sold, but without any covenant
o r warranty express or implied The: recitalc in such deed of any matters or facts shall be
concittsive proof o f the truthfulness thereof. Any person, including Grantor, Trustee, or
Beneficiary, may purchase at such 'sale.
After deducting all costs, fees and expenses of Trustee and of this Tmst, including cost of
evidence of title and reasonable counsel fees in connection with sale, Trustee shall apply
the proceeds of sale to payment of all sums expended under the terms hereof, not then
repaid, with accrued interest ar eight per cent per annum; all other sums then secured
hereby; and the remainder, if any, to the person or persons legally entitled thereto.

5.
This Deed applies to, inures to the benefit of, and binds all parties
hereto, their heirs, legatees, devisees, admnlstrators, executors, successors and assigns.
T h e term Beneficiary shall mean the holder and owner of the note secured hereby; or, if the
note has been pledged, the pledgee thereof. In this Deed, whenever the conbxi so rcyuir~s,
the masculine gender includes the feminine andlor neuter, and the singular number
includes the plural.
6 . If all or miv utir 1 uf t l i ~property sccw-u-cdhereby is sold or transfcmd by
Grantor without Beneficiary's prior written consent, Beneficiary may, at Beneficiary's
option, dcdiirc all tlte sulr~sduc mdcr the promissory notc sccurcd by this Deed of T m t to
be immediately due and payable. If Beneficiary exercises the option to accelerate,
Beileficiary shall mail Grantor notice of acceleration which shall provide a period o f not
less than 30 days from the date the notice is mailed within which Grantor n a y pay the
sums dcclnrcd due. I f Grmtor fails to pay such sums prior to the expiration of such period,
Beneficiary may, without W e r notice or demand on Grantor, invoke any remedies
permitted by this Deed of Trust, the Promissory Note, and by 1 ~ w .8
Tnvxfe~, is not
obligated to notif'y any party hereto of pending sale under any other Deed of Trust or of

-
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any action or proceeding in which Grmtor, Beneficiq or 'I'rustee shall be a party unless
brought by Trustee.
7.
In the event of dissolution or resignation of the Trustee, the Beneficiay
rnay substitute a trustee or trustees to execute the ~ u s hereby
t
created and when any such
substiturion has been filed for record in the oftice of the Recorder of the county in which
the property. herein described is situated, it shall be conclusive evidence of dlc tippuitlh~~e~~t
of such trustee or trustees, and such new trustee or trustees shall succeed to all of the
powers and duties of the rwree or uzrsrees named hcrci~i.

Requesr. Is hereby made Lhat a ~ u p yof a t ~ yNoticc of Default and a copy of any Norice
Sale hereunder be mailed to the Crantor at his address hereinbefore set forth.

BONNIE M. PORTER
25 17 Succor Creek Rd.
Homedale- Idaho 83628

S T A T E Ok'IDAHO

of

DENNIS C. GRIFFITH
25 17 Succor Creek Kd.
Hornedale, Idaho 83628

)

) ss.

.I

County of

On this .
day of March, 2008, before me the undersigned, a Notary Public in
and for said State personally appeared DENNIS C. GRIFFITH, known or identified to me
to be the person whnne name is subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to
me that he executed the same.

IN WI'INESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand

and &xed my official

seid tl~cday and ycar in this certifionte first above written.

NOTARY PUBLIC FOR IDAHO

Residence:
My Commission Expires:

"SEAL

-

DEED OF TRUST Page 4 of 5

Succor Crcek Road - Grif'tith/Pnmr rn r)gdcnlfIurst

F 1 1-E No ,279 0411'7 ' 08 16:33

@&

I TE PETERSON

~ ~ ~ $ j L j ~ j
*e

FQX:13i
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STATE OF ~ D A W O
County of

)
') ss.
)

On this
day of March, 2008, before me tbe undersigned, a Notary Public in
and for said State personally appeared 230WIE N. PORTER, known or identified to me
to be the person whose n m e is subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to
me that he executed the same.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have heremto set my hand and aftixed my official
seal the day and year in this certificate first above written.

NOTARY PUBLIC FOR IDAHO
R~sidonoo:

My Commission Expires:
"SEAL
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mMISSORY

NOTE

FOR VALUE WCEI-VED, DEWIS G.GRIFFITH, m unmarried man, and BONNIE C.

PORTER, an umarried woman, d o s e address is of 2517 Succor Creek Road, Homedafe,
Owyhee County, Idaho, promise to pay to the order of HENRY OGDEN, an unmarried man, md

MICHELLE NflRST, an unmarried wnman, of Atlanta, Fulton County. Georgia, the principal
sum of FORTY THOUSAND AND NOllOO DOLLARS ($40,000.00), with interest thereon at
slx pcrccnt (6.0%) pcr a n n u from April 1,2008, until paid in full.

Principal and inrerest ro be paid as litllows:
All remaining principal and accrued interest shafl be due and payable in full on Oclobcr

1, 2008.

If however, the maker of this Note does not pay on or before said maturity date, the
~ o l d h rmay charge interest at the above mentioned rate for so long as the balance remains

unpaid.

In the event of default hereunder, andor in the performance of Grantor's obligations
under Deed of Trust given to secure payment of this Note, time being of the essence hereof, the
holder of this Note may without notice or demand declare the entire principal sum then unpaid,
together with accrued interest thereon, immediately due and.payable.
Tn the event of commencement of suit to enforce payment of this Note, the undersigned
agrees to pay such additional sum as attorney's fees as the Ccrttrt in s~rcbactinn may adjudge

rcasoaablc.

This Note shall bc guvt=i.iledas to validity, interpretation, construction, effect and in all
other respects by the laws and decisions of the State of Idaho.

PROMISSORY NOTE - Page 1
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Principal and interest on this Note are payabl'e m such cunency of the United Sates ot'
Arnenca as at the time of payment 1s kgal tender for the payment of public and private debts.
Advance or other additional payments may be made on &is Note at any rime. Each

payment shall be applied firsr to the pawent of accrued interest, and second to the payment of
princtpal.
T h ~Nutc
s
i s sccurcd by a Dccd of Tlust of cvcn d a t ha-cwitl~.
~

Should the propcrty dcscribcd in thc Dccd of Trust securing this Notc bc sold or
con~eyedby the Maltsr herein, their heirs or assigns, prior to the maturity of this Note, then the
entire sum of principal and interess shall become immediately due and payable.

DUE: October 1 , 2008

PAGE
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Kevln E Otnrus

From:

?O 36 AM
'Ron Shepherd'
Ctndy Mackey
RE OgdenlHurst v. GriRth#andPorter

Wednesday. March 26.2008

'.snt:

,'0:

Cc:
Subject:

Ron: These wilt work Once your clients' execute the note and deed of trust, please get me copies. Also, please provide
me the origlnal subord~natiorlayreerr~etil
Thanks,

Kevin E Dinius

WHITE PETERSON, P.A.
5700 E. Franktin Rd . Ste. #200
Nampa, tD 83687-7901
208.466.9272 (Telephone)
208.466.4405 (Facwmile)
Confidentiality Notice: This email message may contain confidential and priviieged Information exempt from disclosure
under applicable law. If you have received this message by mistake, please notify us immediatety by replying to this
message or telephoning us, and do not review, disclose, copy, or distribute this message. Thank you.
. . .-

-. .

From: Ron Shepherd [mailto:RonS@NAMPAUW,COM]
Sent: Wednesday, March 26, 2008 lO:22 AM
Ta: Kevin E, Dinius
Subject: RE: OadenlHur~tv. Grlfflth and Porter
They a r e in word, you just need to update yoor soft war^

"- .--

-.-.--.--A

----....-.

0 Hprp they are in the aid Word format.

----

...,.-----

-----.-------

From: Kevin E. Dinius [mailto:ked@WH~PflERSON.~m]
Sent: Wednesday, March 26, 2008 10:18 AM
To: Ron Shepherd
Subject: RE: OgdenjHurst v. GrifTith and Porter
Please send them to me in word - I cannot open the attachments.
Kevin E. Oinius
WHITE PETERSON, P.A.

5700 E. Franktin Rd., Ste. #200
Nampa, ID 83687-7'301
208.466.9272 (Telephone)
208.466.4405(Facsimile)
Confidentiality Notice: Thir email message may contain confidential and privileged information exempt from disclosure
under applicable law. If you have received this message by mistake, please notify us immediately by replying t o this
message ur talephoning us, and do not review, disclose, copy, or distribute this message. Thank you.
......-..,.-.-.,.,.,,.+---~....---

. ."*..--,--" .-....-.----------------..-

From: KOn shepherd [mallKO:ROnS@NAMPAUtW.COM]
Sent; Wednesday, March 26, 2008 9:59 AM
To: Kevln E. Oinlus

"

"-

-

"-~-.--.--.

- .....

*@%ks

**.-s

&$%@

Fl LED

R. Wade Curtis
BELNAP, CURTIS & WILLIAMS, PLI ,G
1401 Shoreline Drive, Suite 2
Post Office Box 7685
Boise, Idaho 83707
Telephone:
Fax No. :
ISB kf 1485

(208) 345-3333
(208) 345-4461

Attorneys for Defendants
IN TIIE DISTRZCT COURT OF TlPE TIIIRD DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
HENRY OGDEN, an unmarried man; and )
MICHELLE BURST, an unmarried woman, )
Plaintiff,

)

1

)
)
)
DENNIS C. GRIFFITH, an unmarried man; )
and BONNIE M. PORTER, an unmarried )
woman,
)
)

-VS-

Defendant.

Case No. CV 2006 5807 M
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE
FOLLOWING WITHDRAWAL
OFCOUNSEL

1

'I

TO: m V 1 N E. DINIUS:
COMES NOW, the undersigned attorney, R. Wade Curtis of the firm of Belnap, Curtis
& Williams, PLLC, and enters an appearance on behalf of the Defendants, Dennis C. Griffith

and Bonnie M. Porter, in the above captioned case.
This Notice of Appearance is conducted upon the Court continuing the hearing
currently set for May 30, 2008. It is counsel's daughter's wedding on Friday, May 30, 2008.
If this Court does not continue the hearing, then the Defendants file this Notice of Appearance
Pro-Se.

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE FOLLOWING WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL -- Page 1
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nRPIZlAlA I

Defendants request that the Court reset the hearing with regard to this matter to the next
available date convenient to the Court and counsel. Mr. Curtis' unavailable dates are attached.

fL

b

DATED This - day of May, 2008.

B$NAP,/C

WILLIAMS, PLLC

Attorney for Defendants

NOTICE O F APPEARANCE FOLLOWING WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL -- Page 2

10:'

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attomey in the state of Idaho, resident of and
with my office in Boise, Idaho, that I served a copy of the following described pleading or

document on the attomey(s) and/or individual(s) listed below by hand de
with the correct postage thereon, a true and correct copy thereof, the
Document Served:

or by mailing,

h day of May, 2008.

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE

MAILED
FAXED (208) 466-4405
HAND DELIVERED
[ ] OVERNIGHT DELIVERY
Attorney(s) and/or Individuals Served:
Kevin E. Dinius
White Peterson, P.A.
5700 East Franklin Road, Ste. 200
Narnpa, Idaho 83687

R W A D E CURTIS

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE FOLLOWING WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL -- Page 3
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Kevin F ninitts

RIOmOW D W S
5680 E.Frddin Rd., Suite 220
N m p q Idaho 83687-7901
Telephone: (208) 475-2200
Facsimile:
(208) 475-220 1
ISB No.
5974
Attorneys for Plaintiff

M THE DISTRICT COURT OF TEE THIRD .lUDICIAL UISTKTC"2 Ok'

nKE STAm OF IDAHO, ln\T AND FOR 'RE C O m Y OF OWYHEE

E N R Y OGDEN, an m a r r i e d man; and,
MICHELLE HURST, azz unrnded woman,

1
)

)

Plaintiffs,

)
)

)

-vs-

DENNIS C, GWFITH, an unmarried man;
an4 BONNIE M. PORTER, an unmarried
woman,

CASE NO. CV06-580m
NOTICE OF S U B S m m I O N OF
COUNSEL

)
)

)

1
)

Defendants,

1

TO THUE MOVE-ENTITLED COURT AND TO COUNSEL OF RECOm:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GWEN, pursuant to Rule 1 l@) of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure that Morrow Ljinius hereby substitutes as counsel of record for the plaintiffs in the
above-entitled action in the place of White Peterson, P.A., and hereby enters its notice of

appearance on behalf of the plaintiffs in all matters set forth above.

-

NOLTCE OF SUBSRTUTION OF COUNSEL I

1

Kevin E. Diaius

MOmOW D m S

5680 E. F-in
Rd., Sujte 220
N m p h ID 83687-7901
208-475-2200 @hone)
208-1.75-220 1 (facsimile)
kdinius@morrow~us.com
DATED this

day of May 2008.

WWITE PETERSON, P.A.

By:
Todd A. ~ossmanf/
Wi&&awing Attorneys

DATED this

do

5 6 4

day o f May 2008.
L

By:
~ e y E,
6 Dinius
~ubstiolte
Attorney

-

NOtcrCE OF SUBSTITUTlON OF COUNSEL 2

I20

CERTXFlGAm OF SERVICE
1, rhe undersigned, hereby cestfi b t on &the

of May, 2008, a true and correct;

copy of the above and foregokg document was sewed upon the following by:

R Wade Cwtis

PIP BELNAP CURTIS

EL3

P.O. Box 7685
Boise, ID E13707

U
•

US MaiI
Overni&t Mail
~ i m Delivery
d

FacshiIe No. 345461

ROW DLNIUS

-

NOITCE OF SUBSTfTUTlON OF COUNSEL 3

R. Wade Curtis
BELNAP, CURTIS & WILLIAMS, PLLC
1401 Shoreline Drive, Suite 2
Posr Office Box 7685
Boise, Idaho 83707
Telephone:
Fax No. :
ISR # 1485

MAY 2 3 20M

(208) 345-3333
(208) 345-4461

Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE

HENRY OGDEN, an unmarried man; and )
MICHELLE HURST, an unmarried woman,)
)

Plaint iff,

1

)
)
)
DENNIS C. GRIFFITH, an unmarried man; )

-vs-

and BONNIE M. PORTER, an unmarried
woman,

Case No. CV 2006 5807 M
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT

)
)

Defendant.

COME NOW the Defendants Dennis C. Griffith and Bonnie M. Porter, by and through
their attorney of record, R. Wade Curtis, of the firm of Belnap, Curtis & Williams, PLLC,
pursuant to Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and hereby submits their
Memorandum in opposition to the Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement.
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I 12

n~~lit~arnr

Defe~ldants'opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement is based
on all of the records and files of this case, to include the Affidavits of Dennis C . Criffith and
Bonnie M . Porter, contemporaneously filed herewith.
Defendants request oral argument on their opposition to the Motion.

STANDARD FOR REVIEW
Generally, a motion to enforce a settlement agreement is treated by the Court as a
motion for summary judgment, and it is proper only when there are no genuine issues of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure. When considering a motion for summary judgment, all facts must be
liberally construed in favor of the party opposing the motion, and all reasonable inferences
from the record must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Anderson v. Ethington, 103
Idaho 658, 651 P.2d 923 (1982). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court
must look to the "totality of the motions, affidavits, depositions, pleadings and attached
exhibits," not merely portions of the record in isolation. Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal
Co., 92 Idaho 865, 452 P.2d 362 (1969). A mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as
to the facts is not sufficient to withstand summary judgment. Corbridge v. Clark Equipment
Co., 112 Idaho 89, 730 P.2d 1005 (1986). If the record contains conflicting iderences or
reasonable minds might reach separate conclusions, summary judgment is denied. G&M
Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 808 P.2d 851 (1991).
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In McCvrkle v. The Northwestern Mutual Life -Ins.
-- Co., 2005 Slip - 30251, 112 P.3d
838 (2005) the Supreme Court stated:
We first note that s u m a r q . judgment under I.R.C.P. 56(c) is proper only
wher~there is nu genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. . . . When assessing a motion for summary
judgment, all controverted facts are to be liberally construed in favor of the
nomoving party. Furthermore, the trial court must draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the narty
resisting rhe motion. G & M Farms v . Funk
--- -Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 517,
P.2d 851. 854 (1991); Sanders v . Kuna
Joint School Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 874, 876 P.2d 154, 156 (Ct. App. 1994).
1

~OR

The party moving for summary judgment initially carries the burden to
establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he or she is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Eliopulos v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400, 404,
848 P.2d 984, 988 (Ct. App. 1992). The burden may be met by establishing the
absence of evidence on an element that the nonmoving party will be required to
prove at trial. Dunnick v. Elder, 126 Idaho 308, 3 11, 882 P.2d 475, 478 (Ct.
App. 1994). Such an absence of evidence may be established either by an
affirmative showing with the moving party's own evidence or by a review of all
the normloving party's evidence and the contention that such proof of an element
is lacking. Heath v. Honker's Mini-Mart, Inc., 134 Idaho 71 1, 712, 8 P.3d
1254, 1255 (Ct. App. 2000). Once such an absence of evidence has been
established, the burden then shifts to the party opposing the motion to show via
further depositions, discovery responses or affidavits, that there is indeed a
genuine issue for trial or to offer a valid justification for the failure to do so
under I.R.C.P. 56(f). Sanders, 125 Idaho at 874, 876 P.2d at 156.
The United States Supreme Court, in interpreting Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56(c), which is identical in all relevant aspects to I.R.C.P. 56(c),
stated:
In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of
summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against
a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the
burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be "no genuine issue as to
any material fact," since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential
element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts
immaterial. The moving party is "entitled to judgment as a matter of law"
because the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an
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esser~tialelement of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.
C
, 477 U.S. 3 17, 322-23 (1986) (citations omitted). The
language and reasoning of Ceiotex has been adopted in Idaho. Dunnick, 126
Idaho at 312, 882 P.2d ar 479.

STATUS OF THE CASE:
On the eve of the parties' trial, counsel for the Plaintiffs and counsel for the Defendants
entered into a settlement agreement. This agreement is evidenced solely by the exchange of
letters attached as exhibits to the Affidavit of Kevin Dinius, attorney for the Plaintiffs. There
is no document signed by either of the Defendants indicating their agreement with the
settlement proposed by their attorney, Ron Shepherd.

FACTS OF W E CASE:
The Plaintiffs' Motion is supported only by the self serving statement of Ron Shepherd
that he had authority to propose and enter into a settlement agreement.
The Defendants in their Affidavits deny ever giving Ron Shepherd any authority to
make any settlement on their behalf.
There is no evidence before the Court by which the Court can assert what, if any,
authority Ron Shepherd had with regard to proposing, negotiating or entering into any
settlement with the Plaintiffs.

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO
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LEGAL ANALYSIS:
Before the Court may enforce the settlement agreement, the Court must first assert
what, if any, authority Ron Shepherd possessed. Second, the Court rnust then determine if the
settlement recited in the exchange of comunication comported with Ron Shepherd's authority.

The matter of an attorney's authority to settle a clients lawsuit is expressly set forth in

the case of Caballero v. Wikse, 140 Idaho 329, 92 P.3d 1075 (2003).
In that case, David Wikse was an employee with the Idaho Department of Health and
Welfare. The State terminated Wikse's employment on August 15, 1996. As a classified
employee, he was terminable only for cause. The parties agreed to have D. Duff McKee
mediate. During the mediation the parties reached a global settlement.
As the Court set forth the facts:
Jim Jones (Jones), Wikse's attorney, the attorneys for the State and the
individual defendants met with McKee on November 9, 1998, to go over the
"ground rules" for the mediation. One rule was that each party would have
someone with settlement authority in attendance throughout the mediation.
The mediation session began at 9:00 a.m. on December 4, 1998. The
attendees included: McKee; Wikse; Jones; Jean Goodenough (Goodenough), a
deputy attorney general for the Department of Human Services; Merlyn Clark
(Clark), a special deputy attorney general retained by the State to handle the
Wikse-related litigation; Dean Christian, a deputy attorney general specializing
in employment litigation; and Linda Caballero (Caballero), director of the
Department of Health and Welfare. The attendees met to begin the mediation
process and McKee went over the ground rules again. After preliminary
discussions to identify the issues, Wikse and Jones went to a separate room.
McKee shuttled back and forth between the rooms with proposals and
counter-proposals.
By noon the parties had reached an accord regarding the non-monetary
issues: (1) Wikse would not be reinstated; instead, the State would pay money
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damages; (2) the State wouId write a letter of exoneration for Wikse; (3) the
State would credit Wikse with sufficient additional service to vest in the Public
Employee Retirement System of Idaho (PERSI). The parties then began
negotiating a financial settlement. Wikse and Jones had discussed a minimum
setttement of $227,000, of which Wikse would receive $170,000 and Jones
would take $57,000 in attorney fees. Jones told McKee that their opening offer
for a monetary settlement was $450,000. McKee transmitted the offer to the
State which returned a counter proposal of $150,000.

The parties continued bargaining throughout the afternoon. Sometime
after 4:00 p.m. the parties neared a monetary settlement. Their positions were
between $10,000 and $20,000 apart. During this time, Wikse left the room
where he and Jones were discussing proposals. Wikse entered the room in which
the State's attorneys and Caballero sat, the same room in which the parties met
at 9:00 a.m. Wikse picked up his briefcase and, possibly, a coat and left the
room. Thereafter, the State proposed a monetary settlement of $205,000, and
Jones countered with an offer of $210,000. The State agreed to split the
difference and offered $208,000. Jones told the State, through McKee, that
$208,000 was an agreeable figure. Jones then looked for Wikse but could not
find him.
Jones and the State's attorneys met in a courtroom. The State's attorneys
expressed concern over Wikse's absence. Nonetheless, the discussion of the
specifics of the settlement continued, e.g., how many checks the State would cut
to pay the settlement and to whom the checks would be payable, how PERSI
contributions would be allocated between Wikse and the State, and who would
draft the settlement agreement and stipulations to dismiss the three suits at issue.
Jones and the State's attorneys agreed that Clark would draft the paperwork.
Clark drafted the documentation and had the State cut the checks
necessary to complete the settlement agreement. Shortly after December 4,
1998, Jones advised Wikse of the terms at which the State and Jones had
arrived. Wikse wanted an accountant and another attorney to review the terms.
Jones called Clark and indicated that Wikse was concerned about the terms. On
December 17, 1998, Clark forwarded the settlement documents to Jones. On
January 5, 1999, Jones wrote Clark. The letter stated in part, "[Wikse] now tells
me that he is unable to settle on the mediation session terms. He wishes to
proceed with the ongoing litigation . . . . [He] tells me that he does wish to be
reinstated by the [State] and regrets any inconvenience caused by the delay while
he considered the terms of the settlement. "
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The State took the position that a valid oral settlement agreement had
been reached on December 4, 1998. Consequently, the State and individual
officials, CabalIero, Gary Harr, Dana Thorne, and Tom Klum (collectively
respondents), filed this action against Wikse seeking specific perfomance of the
alleged oral settlement agreement.
. . . [TJhe court found that when Wikse left, he said to Jones "words to
the effect 'I'm leaving, Jim, you handle it.'" The court concluded that Wikse's
departure and words granted actual authority, both express and implied, to Jones
to compromise the cases. The court further found that, even if Jones lacked
actual authority to settle the cases on Wikse's behalf, Wikse vested Jones with
apparent authority. The district court also found that there was sufficient
agreement and consideration to give rise to a valid settlement agreement.
Therefore, the court ordered specific performance of the agreement on the terms
reached by Jones and the State's attorneys at the mediation.

An Attorney Must Have Expressed Or Implied Actual Authority To
Cornpromise A Client's Claim; Apparent Authority Is Insufficient.
"The relationship between an attorney and client is one of agency" in
which the client is the principal and the attorney is the agent. Muncey v.
Children's Home Finding and Aid Soc. of Lewiston, 84 Idaho 147, 151, 369
P.2d 586, 588 (1962). An agent may bind a principal if the agent has actual
authority. Actual authority is that authority a principal expressly
grants to an
- agent or impliedly confers on an agent because it is usual, necessary, and proper
to achieve the object of the express authority granted to the agent. Bailey v.
Ness, 109 Idaho 495, 497, 708 P.2d 900, 902 (1985) (citing Clark v. Gneiting,
95 Idaho 10, 12, 501 P.2d 278, 280 (1972)). Even in the absence of actual
authority, an agent generally may bind a principal if the agent is cloaked with
apparent authority. Apparent authority arises when "the principal 'voluntarily
places an agent in such a position that a person of ordinary prudence, conversant
with the business usages and the nature of a particular business, is justified in
believing that the agent is acting pursuant to existing authoriry.'" 12. (quoting
Clark, 95 Idaho at 12, 501 P.2d at 280). However, the doctrine of apparent
authority is inapplicable if the action taken by the agent is compromising the
principal's claim. Rather, an agent needs actual authority, express or implied
actual authority, to compromise a principal's claim. See Muniz v. Schrader, 115
Idaho 497, 500, 767 P.2d 1272, 1275 (Ct. App. 1989) (citing Cameron Sales,
Inc. v. Klemish, 93 Idaho 45 1, 463 P.2d 287 (1970)); see also Storey v. U.S.
Fidelity & Guar. Co. of Baltimore, Maryland, 32 Idaho 388, 392, 183 P. 990,
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991 (1919). Jones could only bind Wikse to a settlement agreement if faacts
support the legal conclusion that Jones had actual authority to do so.
Whether express or implied authority exists generafly presents a question
of fact. Muniz, 115 Idaho at 500, 767 P.2d at 1275 (citing Bevercombe v.
Demey & Go., 40 Idaho 34, 42, 231 P. 427, 430 (1924)).

In Muniz, the Idaho Court of Appeals described express authority and
evidence necessary to prove express authority:
Express authority refers to that authority which the principal has
explicitly granted the agent to act in the principal's name. The declarations of an
alleged agent, standing alone, are insufficient to prove that the principal has
conferred such authority. However, the authority of the agent to act for and on
behalf of his principal does not have to be established by direct or positive
proof, but may be inferred from dealings, circumstances, acts and conduct.
Furthermore, in a case where the evidence is conflicting, or different reasonable
interpretations may be drawn from the evidence, the question of the nature and
extent of the authority of an agent is one of fact to be determined by the trier of
fact. Id.

The representations of the agent, Jones, alone are insufficient to prove
that Wikse expressly granted Jones actual authority. See id. However, the
representations made by Jones and McKee, in combination with inferences
"from dealings, circumstances, acts and conduct, " constitute substantial,
competent evidence supporting a finding of express actual authority.
In the present case there is no evidence of any express or implied actual authority
except the self serving statement of Rob Shepherd in the letter which the Plaintiffs claim is the
settlement agreement. Ron Shepherd merely recites in the claimed settlement letter that the
letter embodies the agreement that he and opposing counsel had negotiated. There is no
statement in the letter that implies that Ron Shepherd had the authority, express or implied, to
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agree to the negotiated agreement. The letter in and of itself contemplates that the parties
needed to reach an agreement as to the senlement documents and execute those documents.
A settlement agreement cannot be established by the agents own clairn of authority.

The Defendants deny that they gave Ron Shepherd any authority whatsoever, or if he did have
authority, the settlement exceeded his express authority.

CONCLUSION:
Therefore, this Court ought to deny the Plaintiffs' motion to enforce any settlement
agreement.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF:
The Defendants pray this Court deny the Motion and set the matter for trial and award
to the Defendants attorney fees and costs.

S

b

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this
& WILLIAMS, PLLC

Attorneys for Defendants

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION T O PLAINTIFFS' MOTION T O
ENFORCE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT -- Page 9

CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
and correct copy of the above and foregoi
addressed to the following:

[
[

1
1

OF SERVICE
of May, 2008, I caused to be served a true
by the method indicated below, and

MAILED
FAXED -- (208) 475-2201
HAND DELIVERED
OVERNIGICIT DELIVERY

Attorney(s) and/or Individual(s) Sewed:
Kevin E. Dinius
Morrow Dinius
5680 East FranWin Road, Sre. 220
Nampa, Idaho 83687
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FILED

/I&.;

MAY 2 3 21308

R . Wade Curtis
BELNAP, CURTIS & WILLIAMS, PLLC
1401 Shoreline Drive, Suite 2
Post Ofice: Box 7685
Boise, Idaho 83707
Telephone:
Fax No. :
ISB # 1485

id. J?".

De7uty C,k;k

(208) 345 3333
(208) 345-4461

Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE

HENRY OGDEN, an unmarried man; and )
MICHELLE MURST, an unmarried woman,)
Plaintiff,
-VS-

)
)

Case No. CV 2006 5807 M

1

AFFIDAVIT OF BONNIE M. PORTER

)

1
DENNIS C. GRIFFITH, an unmarried man; )
and BONNIE M. PORTER, an unmarried )
woman,
Defendant.

STATE O F IDAHO
County of Ada

) ss.
)

I, Bonnie M. Porter, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states:
I.

I am a Defendant in the above captioned case.

AFFIDAVIT O F BONNIE M. PORTER

--

PAGE 1

2.

I am over the age of twenty-one (21) years and I am competent to testify as to the

matters contained in this Affidavit which is made of my own personal knowledge and belief.

3.

During the course of the litigation of this case on three (3) different occasions,

Dennis and I , had offered to return the buyers' their $10,000 earnest money or in the
alternative, that they could purchase the property on the terms as set in their offer.
4.

A Strategy Meeting was scheduled by Ron Shepherd for March 4, 2008.

5.

Dennis Griffith and I arrived at Ron's office around 10:OO a.m. on that date.

6. Present at this meeting were Ron Shepherd, his paralegal Bruce, Dennis and
myself.
7 . Ron stated to us that he had a telephone conference the previous day with Judge

Ryan. Ron told us that Judge Ryan told him that he, Judge Ryan, was going to rule against us
on the issue of waiver because we had signed Addendum #3. Ron stated that he believed
Judge Ryan was wrong and that it was a very appealable issue.

8.

Dennis was angry and questioned Ron about the fact that he had told us all along

that we were going to easily prevail in a jury trial, now he says we are going to lose. Dennis
angrily wanted to know how we got blind-sided by this waiver issue? Ron's paralegal then
inquired of Ron why we didn't go ahead with the duress argument. Dennis also argued that
because of the terms contained in Addendum # I we signed after the November 30th date. Ron
dismissed both Bruce's and Dennis' pleadings as unimportant and ineffective.

AFFIDAVIT O F BONNIE M. PORTER
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9. Ron then stated that this was the time to make a settlement offer. Ron insisted that
we (Dennts and I) make art offer of settlement.
10. Dennis responded by stated to Ron, "what happerled to Dinius' reply in open court
to Judge Ryan request of what remedy they were seeking, that they wanted specific

performance. We understood that the Plaintiffs wanted to buy the property.
1 I.

Dennis and I told Ron that we were willing to sell the property to the Plaintiffs as

per the original contract and that we would give them fifteen (15) days to fund the original
purchase price.
12. At that point, Ron replied that if we wanted to hang onto the place that you might

want to offer them a cash offer if we wanted to keep the property.

13. I told Ron that I did not want to make the Plaintiff's a cash offer. I wanted the
Plaintiffs to stick with their original offer to pay us $500,000 for the property, less the
$20,000 earnest money.
14. Dennis asked Ron how much money did they want. Ron stated that he, being

Dinius, had mentioned $35,000.
15. Dennis then commented that in order for us to pay them $35,000.00, we would
have to refinance the farm or take out a second mortgage on the farm.

16. Ron stated he would discuss offers with opposing counsel and, if in agreement, Ron
would put a letter together for our approval or signatures.
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17. We understand that Ron prepared a letter dated March 5 , 2008, by which he

communicated with Mr. Dinius the subject of his and Mr. Dinius negotiations.
18. Ron did not show me that lerrer. Ron had not discussed with me the contents of the

letter, I never gave Ron any authority to enter into any agreement as set forth in the letter.
19. Ron in the letter merely recites that he and Mr. Dinius had negotiated certain terms,

but that a final agreement was to be created and executed by the parties.
20.

The afternoon of the Strategy Meeting Dennis telephoned me and told me that Ron

wanted to offer $48,000.00 as a settlement. I rejected that offer. Dennis and I discussed the
fact that we would go to trial the next day.
21.

At approximately 5:00 p.m. that evening, I received a phone call from Ron, which

I believed also had Ron's paralegal listening in on the conversation. During this call, Ron told

m e that Dennis had agreed to the settlement offer of $40,000.00. I explained to Ron that I was
not happy offering $35,000.00 or $40,000.00, and that I would prefer to just let the Plaintiffs
purchase the property. Ron then advised me that I should retain my own attorney due to my
conflict of interest, in that I wanted to sell the property, and Dennis wanted to keep it. I told
Ron that if Dennis had approved payment to the Plaintiffs of $40,000 that I would have to go
along if we could get a loan.
22.

I explained that I was not interested, nor could I afford, to hire my own attorney.

23. Ron told me at that point that he would prepare papers for Dennis' and my
signatures of Approval on the Settlement.
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24.

At no time, did I authorize Ron Shepherd to offer $40,000.00 payment in

settlement.

FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
DATED this

day of May, 2008.

Bonnie M. Porter

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me the undersigned Notary this 3 \ day of
L

May, 2008.
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at h i s e , Idaho
My Commission Expires: (, - q - ) a,
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I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing
documents to be served by the method indicated below on the attorney(s) and/or individual(s)
listed below. the

at

day of May, 2008.

Document Served:

AFFIDAVIT OF BONNIE PORTER

%

MAILED
[
FAXED -- 475-2201
[ j HAND DELIVERED
[ j OVERNIGHT DELIVERY
Attomey(s) andlor Individuals Served:
Kevin E. Dinius
Morrow Dinius
5680 East Franklin Road, Ste. 220
Nampa, Idaho 83687

R. Wade Curtis
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ED
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It. Wade Curtis
BELNAP, CURTIS & WILLIAMS, PLLG
1401 Shoreline Drive, Suite 2
Post Office Box 7685
Boise, Idaho 83707

Telephone:
Fax No.:
ISB # 1485

(208) 345-3333
(208) 345-4461

Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
HENRY OGDEN, an unmarried man; and )
MICHELLE HURST, an unmarried woman,)
)

Case No. CV 2006 5807 M

1

Plaintiff,

)

-vs-

AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS GRIFFITH

1
1

DENNIS C. GRIFFITH, an unmarried man; )
and BONNIE M. PORTER, an unmarried )
woman,
)
Defendant.

STATE O F IDAHO )
County of Ada

) ss.
)

I, Dennis Griffith, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states:
1.

I am a Defendant in the above captioned case.
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2. I arn over the age of twenty-one (21) years artd I am competent to testify as to the
matters contamed in this Affidavit which is made of my own personal knowledge and belief.

3 . A Strategy Meeting was requested, or even deinanded, by Ron Shepherd and was
set for March 4, 2008.
4.

Bonnie Porter and myself arrived at Ron's office at about 9:30 to 10:00 a.m. on the

date the meeting was set for.

5. Present at this meeting was Ron Shepherd, his paralegal whose name I believe is
Bruce, Bonnie and myself.

6 . Ron stated that Judge Ryan had told him on a telephone conference the previous day
that he was going to rule against us on the issue of waiver because we had signed Addendum

#3.
7.

Ron then stated and demanded for us ( b n n i e and I) to make an offer of settlement.

W e agreed, and decided to offer to let them buy the property as per the contract and agreed to
give them fifteen ( 2 5 ) days to fund the original offer.

8.

At that point, Ron requested a second cash offer if we wanted to keep the property.

Bonnie stated that she would prefer that they perform on their original offer. I then asked what
had happened to the Plaintiffs telling Judge Ryan when asked what remedy they were seeking,
and why Mr. Dinius replied in open court that the Plaintiff's want "specific performance
only". Ron stated that it would be beneficial to make a cash offer as an alternative.
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9. I asked Ron what amount they wanted, and Ron said that they would accept
$35,000.00
10. 1 then commented that in order to give $35,000.00, that we would have to

refinance or take our a second mortgage on the farm.
11. Ron had told us all along that we were going to easily prevail in a jury trial, now he

says we are going to lose. I angrily wanted to know how we got blind-sided by this waiver
issue? Ron's paralegal then inquired of Ron why we didn't go ahead with the duress argument.

I also argued that the Addendum # 1 was why we signed after the November 30th date. Ron
dismissed both Bruce's and my pleadings as unimportant and ineffective.
12. Ron stated he would discuss offers with opposing counsel and, if in agreement,
wouid put a letter together for our approval or signatures.

13. The Strategy Meeting concluded at about 11:30 a.m. and I went to work and
Bonnie went home as it was her day off.
14.

At 4:00 p.m. that same day, Ron called me at work and said that the Plaintiffs had

accepted the $35,000 offer, but wanted more money. I responded by asking Ron if he meant
that the Plaintiffs did not want the property, and he replied that the Plaintiffs wanted
$50,000.00. I quickly denied the counter offer, by saying no.
15. Ron asked me if I wanted to bump my $35,000 offer and I replied that if I could
borrow $35,000 that I could borrow $40,000. I said it is all contingent upon us getting a loan
against the farm. Ron hung up the phone at that time.
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16.

A few mlnutes later, Ron called back, stating that the Plaintiffs would accept

f3R.000.00. I told Ron no again. Ron then hung up the phone again.
17. At this time I called Bonnie and d~scussedwith her my conversations with Ron. I

told her that they wouId settle for $48,000.00- She said no. I told her that I had said no.
18. Again, a few minutes later, Ron called back and explained to me that the Plaintiffs
would take and accept $40,000.00. I reiterated to Run that we would have to get a loan on the

farm before we could agree to any amount. Ron then hung up.
19. It is my understanding that Ron then called Bonnie.

20. At no time, did I authorize Ron Shepherd to offer to the Plaintiffs that Bonnie and I
would pay $40,000.00 in settlement.
21.

Sometime after March 5, 1 received a copy of Ron's March 5th letter. Two days

later Brenda, one of Ron's paralegals called me and wanted to know when I was going to come

in and slgn the agreements. 1 told her that I was not about to agree to the offer as Ron wrote it

in the letter and that we were in the process of applying for a loan on the property. Several
days later Bruce called. I told Bruce that we felt like we had been hit by a train. That our
payment, if any, was contingent upon us getting a loan. We had been turned down for a loan.

22. It was never mentioned to me that the Plaintiffs would provide a loan to us. I would
never agree to the Plaintiffs providing a loan. 1 would only accept a loan from a mortgage
company or bank.
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1 "(:

CERTIRCATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing
documents to be served by the method indicated below on the attorney(s) and/or individual(s)

listed below, the

a1S1/

day of May, 2008.

Document Served:

AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS GRIFFITH

111-2201
[ ] WAND DELIVERED
[ ] OVERNIGHT DELIVERY
-

Attomey(s) and/or Individuals Served:
Kevin E. Dinius
Morrow Dinius
5680 East Franklin Road, Ste. 220
Nampa, Idaho 83687
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, EN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYI-IEE

HENRY OGDEN, an unmarried man; and )
MICHELLE WURST, an unmarried woman, )
)
Plaintiff,
)

)

Case No. CV-2006-05807-M

FINDINGS OF FACT &
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW UPON
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO
ENFORCE SETTLEMENT

-vs)

DENNIS C. GRIFFITH, an m a r r i e d ;
)
and, BONNIE M. PORTER, an unmarried )
woman,
1
Defendants.

This matter came on for evidentiary hearing upon the Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce
Settlement Agreement on June 26,2008. The defendants were present for the evidentiary hearing,
the plaintiffs were not present.. Appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs, Henry Ogden and Michelle
Hurst, were Kevin Dinius and Shelli Stewart Stuart, attorneys at law. Appearing on behalf of the
defendants, Dennis Griffith and Bonnie Porter was Wade Curtis, attorney at law.

FINDINGS OF FACT & CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
UPON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT

STANDARD OF MVIE\V
In G o o h a n v. Lothrop, 143 Idaho 622, 15 1 P.3d 8 18 (2007), the Idaho Supreme Court
held that when a district court considers a motion to enforce a settlemeclt agreement, and it
considers material outside of the pleadings, it must treat the motion as one for summary
judgment. In taking testimony at the evidentiary hearing, this Court ctearly considers material
outside of the pleadings.

S m a r y judgment is approptiate where the pleadings,
depositions, admissions and affidavits on file show that there are
no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c). "All
disputed facts are to be construed liberally in favor of the nonmoving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from
the record are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party."
Sprinkler Irrigation Co. v. J o h ~Deere Ins., 139 Idaho 691, at. P.
695-696, 85 P.3d 667 (2004). S m a r y judgment is inappropriate
where "reasonable people could reach different conclusions or
draw conflicting inferences from the evidence" regarding a
genuine issue of material fact. tYalange v. Renchar, 136 Idaho 192,
195, 30 P.3d 970,973 (2001).
Goodman, supra at p. 626.

FIMDINGS OF FACT
1.

Prior to the trial of this matter the Plaintiffs filed a Motion -For Summary Judgment

and the Court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order on February 25, 2008. Immediately
thereafter, the Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Reconsider the Court's decision. The Court received
and reviewed the briefing submitted in connection to the motion to reconsider.
On or about March 3, 2008, the Court conducted a telephone status conference with
Kevin Dinius and Ron Shepherd, attorneys for the parties. During that telephone conference,
which was conducted in chambers and not made a part of the record, the Gourt clarified its ruling
in the memorandum decision.

That clarification was later documented in this Court's

Memorandum Decision Regarding Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider filed on April 17, 2008.
Therein, the Court made the determination that by signing Addendum Number 3 to the Purchase
and Sale Agreement, the Defendants waived their right to claim that the Plaintiffs breached the
contract by failing to make the h d s available on November 30'.

In order for the Defendants to

be successfbl at the trial, they would have to prove they signed Addendum 3 under duress.
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2.

In the morning hours of Mach 5, 2008, atrorney Ron Shepherd contacted his

clients and requested that they meet with him to review this most recent decision of the Court.
At this strategy meeting Mr. Shepherd, his clients and Mr. Hendricks, the paralegal assigned to
the case, discussed the prospects of prevailing at trial and the prospects of settlement.
Eventually two possible settlement alternatives were reached. The first alternative was to
simply go forward with the sale of the property to the Plaintiffs. The terms of that proposal are
as set forth in Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 5 to the June 26, 2008 evidentiary hearing. The second
alternative would allow the Defendants to keep the property by paying a sum certain to the
Plaintiffs and that said payment would be fitnded by a loan collateralized by the property.
Defend-

Griffith felt that such a loan would be easily obtainable within a six month period.

The mount agreed upon at the morning meeting of March 5,2008, was $35,000 to be paid to the
plaintiffs.

4.

Mr. Shepherd made these alternative offers to the Plaintiffs following the

meeting. The alternative offers, as set forth in Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 5 to the June 26, 2008
evidentiary hearing, reflect the issues discussed by the parties attending the meeting on March 5,
2008. The terms set forth in paragraphs two through six of alternative number two were
communicated, at least as to their essential elements, to the Defendants. Specifically, that the
Defendants would not be required to pay for a period of six months, and that there would need to
be a release of the lis pendens in order to accomplish the goal of the Defendants obtaining a loan
in the amount agreed upon. At least one witness, Mr. Hendricks, indicated that the issue of an
interest amount was discussed. In addition, it appears that the issue of a deed of trust being
executed by the Defendants was discussed. This Court finds as a matter of fact that actually
incorporating, as a term and condition of settlement, the idea of a deed of trust further protected
the defendants and was an appropriate term and condition of the settlement.

7.

Later in the day on March 5, 2008, attorney Ron Shepherd communicated with

both Dennis Griffith and Bonnie Porter in separate telephone calls. There was a witness to those
telephone calls who testified that Mr. Griffith agreed to a settlement amount of $40,000, up
$5,000 from the previously offered $35,000. The witness, Mr. Wendricks, prepared a written
memorandum of that discussion which is contained in Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 13 to the June 26,
FINDINGS OF FACT & CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
UPON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT

2008 evidelrtiary heming. Exhibit 13 states that defendants Griffith and Porter agreed to pay
$40,000, within six months of the agreement, at an interest rate of six percent, the payment to be
secured by a deed of trust. The law firm of Hamilton, Michaelson & Hilty, LLP agreed to
subordinate its lien on the properry to the deed of trust. Plaintiffs Ogden and Wurst agreed to
dismiss the suit with prejudice. It was understood that Griffith and Porter would be obtaining a
loan to pay the $40,000 and the lis pe~derlswas to be released sirnultmeously with closing on

the loan.
8.

Mr. Griffith recalled that at the meeting held on the morning of March 5,2008, he

was confident he would be able to obtain a loan of $35,000 within a six month period. Bonnie
Porter remembered Griffith's confidence. When attorney Shepard contacted Griffith later in the
day about a counteroffer to settle for $40,000, Griffith replied '"hat if 1 could borrow $35,000
that I could borrow $40,000." See paragraph 15 to Affidavit of Dennis Griffith filed May 23,
2008. It was this statement to Shepard that caused him to assume that he had been granted
authority to settle the case for the $40,000 amount. It was not until several weeks later when
Dennis Griffith evidently lost his employment that concern arose as to ability to obtain a loan.
9.

Both Mr. Griffith and Ms. Porter understood when they left the meeting March 5

that they had agreed to make an alternative offer of $35,000 to keep the property and that they
would have a six month period in which to obtain a loan.

FINDINGS OF LAW
1.

The Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this action.

2.

The matter of an attorney's authority to settle a client's lawsuit is expressly set

forth in the case of Caballero v. Wike, 140 Idaho 329 (2003). In Caballero, the Idaho Supreme
Court noted that an attorney must have express or implied actual authority to compromise a
client's claim and that apparent authority is insufficient. Id at 332. "'The relationship between
an attorney and client is one of agency' in which the client is the principal and the attorney is the
agent." Id (quoting Muncey v. Children 's Home Finding and A i d Soc. Of Lewiston, 84 Idaho
147, 151, 369 P.2d 586, 588 (1962)). The issue of apparent authority is not applicable in this
case so the Court will not discuss it. The direct issue is whether or not the principal, Dennis
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aiffith and Ronnie Porter, expressly granted or impliedly conferred upon Ron Shepherd, their
attorney, actual authority to settle this case.
3.

The amount of evidence required to prove the actual authority needed to settle a

case is directly discussed by the Idaho Court of Appeals in Muniz v. Schr~der,115 Idaho 497,
767 P.2d 1272 ( 1 989). The Muniz, the Court explained:

The declarations of an alleged agent, standing alone, are
insufficient to prove that the principal has conferred such authority.
Clark v. Gneiting, 95 Idaho 10,501 P.2d 278 (1972). However, the
autfiority of the agent to act for and on behalf of his principal does
not have to be established by direct or positive proof, but may be
inferred from deaIings, circumstances, acts and conduct. White v.
Donex 82 Idaho 217,221,35 1 P.2d 380,382 (1960). Furthermore,
in a case where the evidence is conflicting, or different reasonable
interpretations may be drawn from the evidence, the question of
the nature and extent of the authority of an agent is one of fact to
be determined by the trier of fact. 3 AM.JUR.2D, Agency 5 373
(1986).
115 Idaho at 500-0 1.

ANALYSIS
This Court finds that when Griffith and Porter left the meeting on March 5, 2008, they
had expressly granted actual authority to Shepard to make two alternative offers of settlement to
the plaintiff. Those offers are documented in Plaintiffs Exhibit 5 to the evidentiary hearing.
One of the alternatives was to pay $35,000 within six months of the date of the agreement in
return for dismissal of the case. Later that same day, Dennis Griffith granted an extension to that
authority allowing Mr. Shepherd to offer $40,000 to effectuate the settlement. This offer was
conveyed by Mr. Shepherd to the plaintiffs through their counsel and it was accepted.
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Criffith and Porter, the Court finds that
Griffith's own affidavit in opposition to the motion to enforce the settlement agreement states
that when informed that the plaintiffs' counter offered to dismiss their claims for a payment of
$40,000 he told Shepard, "if I could borrow $35,000 that I could borrow $40,000." The only
reasonable interpretation to be drawn from this evidence is that Shepherd had at least implied
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actual authority to settle this matter for $40,000 which he communicated in his scco~ldletter of
March 5,2008, marked as Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 6 to the June 26,2008 evidentiary hearing.

Therefore,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, and this does ORDER, that Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce
the Settlement Agreement is GRANTED.

DATED:

1/25/08

-r

Thomas J. Ryan
District Judge

FINDINGS OF FACT & CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
UPON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT

I

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HERt;BY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed or
delivered to the following persons on this

Kevin E. Dinius
Monrow Dinius
5680 East Franklin Road, Ste. 220
Nampa, Idaho 83687

R. Wade Curtis
Belnap, Curtis & Willims, PLLC
1401 Shoreline Drive, Suite 2
P.O. Box 7685
Boise, Idaho 83702

Deputy clerk-
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AI'LEN B. ELLIS
ELLIS, BROWN & SI-IEILS, CI1AR'I 1<ICEL9
Attumeys-at-l-aw
707 North 8th Street
P.O. Box 385
Boise, Idaho 8370 1 -0358
(208) 345-7832 (Telephone)
(208) 345-9564 (Facsimile)
ISB No. 1626
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Deputy Clerk

Attomeys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISl'RIC-T COlJRT 01: I'HE T1IIKD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAIfO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
Henry Ogden, an uilrnarried man; and
Michelle t-Iurst, an unmarried woman,

)
)

Plaintiff,

Case No. CV 2006-5807*M

1

V.

Dennis C. Griffith, an unmarried man;
and, Bonnie M. Porter, an unmarried
woman,
Defendant.

TO:

SUBSTITUTION OF ATTORNEY

)

1
)

1
1
)

The clerk of the above-entitled court and to the attorney of the plaintiffs, Kevin
Dinius:

YOU AND EACH OF YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED That Wade Curtis, Belnap Curtis,
hereby withdraws as attorney of record for the plaintiff Dennis C. Criffith, in the above-entitled
action, and that Allen B. Ellis, Ellis, Brown & Sheils, Chtd., 707 North 8" Street, P.O. Box 388.
Boise, Idaho is hereby substituted therefor and by
DATED this

r")

day of August, 200
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tice appears herein.

CERII IFICA7 F 01 SIIRVICE

A dity of August. 2008. 1 caused to be served a true

I HEREBY C.FR711FY that on the tl_?--

arid correct copy of the ihrcgoing by the mctliod indicated beion. and addressed to the following

Mr. Kevin E. Dinius
Monow, Dinius
5680 E. Franklin Road, Suite 220
Narnpa, Idaho 83687
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U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
X
Facsimile
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Kevin E. Drnius
Shelli D. Stewart
MORROW DNIUS
5680 East Iyriurklin Road, Sultc 220
Mampa, Idaho 83687-7901
Telephone: (208) 475-2200
Facsimile:
(208) 475-2201
ISE3 Nos.
5974,7459
Minius@mor~owdinJus. corn
ss~ewarf@mor~nwdin~u.r
corn

Altorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 'TI-IF, TI-TIRD JlJDTCIAL DISTRlCT OF
TI-lC STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR I'X-IE COUNTY OF OWYHEE

HENRY OGDEN, an unmamed man;and,
MICEIET,J-,E HURST,an unmarried woman,

Plaintiffs,
-VS-

)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV 2006-5807"M

)

JUDGMENT

)

T)F;NNIS C. CRIFFI'I'H, an unmarried man;
and, BONNIE M. PORTER, an unmarried
woman,

Defendants.

1
)

1
)

1

TI-11s MATTER HAVING COME before the Court lbr hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for

Summary ludgmentnVfotion to Enforce Settlement Agreement on June 26, 2008, and the

--

Couvt

havi.ng entered its Findings of Fact & Conclusions of taw Upon PlaintiEs' Motion to Enforce

Settlement Agreeinei~ton July 25,2008:
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IT IS H E S U Y ORDERED AND TI-XIS DOES O W E R that Judgmetlt is entered in
in accordance with Rule 56 of the Idaho Rulcs of
favor of Plaintiffs and against tlze Defc~~dmts
Civil Procedure and pursuant to tllc Court's !:indings of Fact & Conclusions of Law Upon
PlaintiEss'Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement entered on July 25,2008.
WHEREFORE, by virtuc of the law and by reason of the premises aforesaid. IT IS

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that said Plaintiffs do have and recovcr from said
Defendattts ( I ) thc sum of $40,000.00, plus accrued interest on said sum at the rate

or 6% pcr

anilum from March 26, 2008, to be paid on or beforc October I , 2008; (2) Dcfcndants shall
execute a promissory note and deed of trust to secure payment; (3) Plaintiffs shall dismiss thc
suit with prejudice; and (4) Plaintiffs shall releaseatheir lis pendens on the Property.
1

5&t#t**br

MADE AND E N E R E D t h i s q6d a y of Aupwt. 2008.

4-

4 ~ 7

Judge Thorn&?~~an
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hcrcby cenjfy h a t on this

qf6 day of August. 2008,I caused to bc sc~vcda truc and

correct copy of Lhc foregoing document by thc rncthod indicated below to thc followii~g:

Kevin E. Dinius

M O ~ O W
DnurrJs
5680 E. Franklin Rd., Suite 220
Nampa, ID 836137

c??I

US Nail
Overnight M a i l
Flilnd Delivcry
Facsimile No. 475-220 1

Ill

-

T"i

R. Wade Curtis

US Mail
Overnight Mail

B,EI,NAP, CURTIS & W I L L J A M S
P.O. Box 7685

Hand Delivcry
Facsimile - No 345-446 1

.Boise, ID 83702

:2

34i&i

ilmv1

Deputy Clerk
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FILED

AL,l,EN H. EI,I,IS
ELIAS, UItOWN & SHEILS, CHARTERIZD
Attorney s-at-Law
707 North 8th Street
P.O. Box 388
Boise. Iclaho 8370 1-0388
(208) 145-7832 ('l'elephonc)
(208) 345-9564 (Facsimile)

SEP t 5 2008
CHA.RLOJ~EWERBURN, CLERK

(-q

&im(,L\q&-----Deputy Clerk

ISB No. 1626
Attorneys for Defendants

IN TI IE DISTRICT COURT OF TI-IE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
Iienry Ogden, an unmarried man; and
Michelle Hurst, an unmarried woman,
Plaintiffs.

Dennis C. Criffith, an unmarried man;
and, Bonnie M. Porter, an unmarried
woman,
Defendants.

1
)
)
J'

Case No. CV 2006-5807*M

)
)
)

MO'TION TO DISALI,OW
COSTS AND FEES

1
1
j

1

Come now defendants, through their attorney of record, and move the Court for an order
disallowing plaintiffs claimed costs and attorney fees set forth in their Motion for Attorney Fees and
Costs with supporting memoranda and affidavit of Kevin Dinius. This motion is made upon the
following grounds: (1) plaintiffs are not prevailing parties; (2) plaintiffs are not entitled to attorney
fees under Idaho Code section 12-120(3) because there was no commercial transaction; (3)
defendants' opposition to enforcement of the oral settlement agreement was not frivolous, and
MOTION T O DISALLOW COSTS AND FEES - 1

plaintiffs arc not entitled to attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-12]; (4) plaintiffs'
claimed attorney fees are excessive; and ( 5 ) plaintiffs have failed to adequately document their
claimed costs. both of right and discretionary.
I'his motion is based upon the Memorandum in Support of Motions to Vacate Judgment and

Disallow Attorney FeesiCosts, the pleading and records in this action. and sucli other oral and
documentary evidence which may be presented at hear~ng.

DATED this I I L h day of Scptcrnber, 2008.

Attorney for defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1 lthday of September, 2008, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Mr. Kevin E. Dinius
Morrow, Dinius
5680 E. Franklin Road, Suite 220
Nampa, Idaho 83687

-X-

Allen B. ~ l l i s '
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w

li S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
475-220 1

ALL,EN E3. ELLIS
EL,121S, B R O W Cit: SHEII.,S, C'HARTEIZEU
Attorneys-at-l,aw
707 North 8th Street
P.O. Box 388
Boise. Ida110 8370 1-0388
(208) 345-7832 (Telephone)
(208) 345-9564 (Facsimile)
ISB No. 1626
Attorneys for Defendants

1N 'I'HE UIS'I'RICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY O F OWYHEE
Henry Ogden, an unmanied man; and
Michelle Hurst, an unmarried woman,
Plaintiffs.

1
1
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)

1
Dennis C. Griftitl~,an unmarried man;
and, Bonnie M. Porter, an ~ ~ n m a n i e d
woman,

)
)

1

MEMORANDI IM IN SUPPORT
C)F MOTIONS r0 VACATEJ1JDC;MENT A N D DISALLOW
AI'TORNtlY FlSESICOS'TS

)

)

Defendants.

1

Preliminary note: As the Court is aware, this litigation arises out of the prospective sale to
plaintiffs of defendants' residence and the forty acres on which it is located. As a result of a series
of transactional and litigative events, defendants are now required, by judgment, to pay plaintiffs
$40,000 to release plaintiffs' claim that they are entitled to specific performance of an expired real
estate contract..
Event No. 1: It is undisputed that plaintiffs were unable to fund the transaction by the closing

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS TO VACATE JUDGMENT
AND DISALLOW ATTORNEY FEESICOSTS - 1

date of November 30,2006, and the contract expired on its own terms (Memorandum Decision, p.

6, February 15,2008). However, defendants signed the closing documents on December 1,2006,
and December 4,2006, igtiorant that the transaction had not yet funded by the closing deadline.' At
the time defci~dai~ts
signed the closing documents at the title company, they also signed,
unkilcl\vit~gly,air extension agreement, extending the closing date to December 7,2006, which had
beeti forwarded to the title company by their own agent Pete McArthur, However, this extensron
agreement was never signed by plaintiff buyers, aid "it never became a part of the contract"
(Memorandum Decision, supra, p. 7). This Court ultimately ruled that defendants' signing the
extension agreement (Addendum No. 3) constituted a waiver of the original closing date

(Memorandum Decision filed April 7, 2008,).~ The Court also ruled that there was a factual
cluestion whether defendants signed the extension under duress. Impact of event: Through
unsophistication and a lack of professional oversight, defendants signed the closing documents to
a transaction which had not funded by the deadline and signed the extension agreement without
reading it.

Event No. 2: Plaintiffs sought to enforce an alleged settleme~~t
agreement between plaintiffs
and defendants. In opposition to a motion for summary judgment filed by plaintiffs, defendants'

h he record does not explain why the title company required the defendants to execute the
closing documents subsequent to the closing deadline at a point when the transaction had not yet funded.

he Court's finding of waiver is not completely understood. The closing date of the transaction
was November 30th. Plaintiffs argue that based upon their reliance on the extension (Addendum No. 3)
they obtained additional funding. However, when defendants signed the extension (December 1 and
December 4), the deadline for closing had already passed. In order for waiver to exist, the party asserting
waiver inust have acted in reliance on the waiver. At the point defendants signed the so-called waiver
(Addendum No. 3), "the contract expired on its own terms" (Memorandum Decision, February 25,2008,
p. 6). Additionally, plaintiffs did not sign the extension agreement, further evidencing lack of reliance.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS TO VACATE JUDGMENT
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co~inselsrtbmitred defendants' affidavits recitlng conversatrons M hich occurred between defendarrrs

and their predecessor attorney Ron Shepherd. Perceiving this to be a waiver of the attorneyiclient
privilege. plaintiffs' attorney met with and marshaled the testimony of Mr. Shepherd against his
clients, the defendants. Rased, in large part, on the testimony oftheir attorney (Shepherd), this Court
ordered that there was a settlement agreement which required defendants to pay plaintiffs $40,000
and execute a deed of trust on their residence. Impact of event: Defendants' counsel was aware
that Shcpilerci withdrew because of defendants' refusal to execute a settlement agreement. See

affidavit ofDennis Griffith. Notwithstanding that knowledge, he jettisoned whatever protection the
attorneyIclient relationship affbrded by filing defendants' nilidavits, which waived the attorneyiclient
privilege.
Event No. 3: As this Court is aware, an agreement to convey an interest in real property,

including an agreement to execute deed of trust, must be in writing to be enforceable. (See Idaho
Code section 9-503 and Memorandum Decision filed August 10,2007, p. 5j. In opposing Plaintiffs'
Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement, defendants' counsel cited this point of law. (Defendants
[proposed] Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, pp. 8,9j.
In the Court's Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law upon Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce
Settlement ("FFICL"), he found that a deed of tnlst was "discussed" and "was an appropriate term
and condition of the settlement" to unwind the real estate transaction. Id. p. 3. That is, the Court
found that the deed of trust was a material term of the settlement agreement. In opposing the
settlement, defendants' then counsel based his clients' opposition, in part, upon a well-recognized
principle of real estate law which is statutorily set in Idaho by Idaho Code section 9-503. That is,
assuming, arguendo, defendants agreed to execute a deed of trust, the oral settlement agreement is
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS TO VACATE JUDGMENT
AND DISALLOW ATTORNEY FEESiCOSTS - 3

not enforceable, because it involves the cotlveyance of an interest in real property. Impact of event:
ilckndtlnts opposed errforcement of the oral agreernrnt bascd tiport the stature ut' fraitds

M

hie11

oppitsttior~was well groitndtld In fact and warranreti by eulstlng iitw, I e . dekndants Bere not acting

The above factual backdrop is relevant to defendants' motion to set aside the judgment (Rule
59(e). I.R.G.P.) as well as plaintifi' claim for attorney fees based upon Idaho Code section 12-12 1
(allegedly frivolous defense).

T I E JUDGMENT IS AGAINST THE LAW AND SHOULD BE SET ASIDE BECAUSE
THE ORAL SETTLEMENT' AGREEMENT IS SUBJECT T O THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
P~irposeof Rule 59(e): This Rule authorizes a party to file a motion to alter or amend a
jrtdgment. A motion made pursuant to Rule 59(e) provides the trial court with the opportunity to
correct errors of law or fact. The Rule constitutes a safety net for Court and counsel to catch
errors without having to engage in an expensive, protracted appeal. Lowe v. Lym , 103 Idaho 259,
263, 646 P.2d 1030 (Ct App. 1982); First Sec. Bank v. Neibaur, 98 Idaho 598,603, 570 P.2d 276

The oral settlement agreement contemplates the transfer of an interest in real ~ r o p e r t vand
is unenforceable as within the Statute of Frauds: At its base, the settlement agreement contemplates
the (1) unwinding of a real estate transaction and (2) the execution of a deed of trust. As such, the
agreement must be in writing in order to be enforceable. Section 9-503 states in pertinent part:
No estate or interest in real property, other than for leases for a term
not exceeding one ( I ) year, nor any trust or power over or concerning
it, or in any manner relating thereto, can be created, granted, assigned.
surrendered, or declared, otherwise than by operation of law, or a
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS TO VACATE JUDGMENT
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cotlveyance or other instrument in writing, subscribed by the party
creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or
by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.
'I'he Court found tflat the settlement agreement b e t ~ e e nthe parties "incorporat[ed] as a term
and cnnciiticrn of settlement, the idea of ;t deed of trust . . ." (FFiGL, p. 3). That is, as a security

device, the agreement required defendants to execute a deed oftrust in plainrii?;' favor. According
to Black's Law Dicttonary. Seventh Ediilon, p 423, a deed of trust is ciefir~edas .'A deed conve)Ing
title lo real property to st trustee as security untii the grantor repays the loan". Because the settlement
conternplated the transfer of interest in real property, the settlement agreement must be in writing
to be enforceable.
Also, an indispensable provision in any settlement between plaintiffs and defendants, whether
oral or written, would be that plaintiffs grant to defendants any interest plaintiffs claim in the subject
real property, arising from the earnest money agreement. This term is also within the statute of
frauds and unenforceable absent a writing. Even without the deed of trust issue, the settlement
agreement contemplates the unwinding of a real estate transaction and is subject to the statute of
frauds.
The statute of frauds pertains to all agreements concerning the conveyance of an interest in
real property, including settlement agreements. Idaho law is clear that when the subject of a
settlement agreement falls within the proscription of the statute of frauds that agreement must be in
writing. Olson v. Dep 't of Water Resources, 105 Idaho 98,666 P.2d 188 ( 1 983).
Thus, if the oral stipulation entered into in this case was an executory
contract establishing and declaring water rights, it is a contract falling
within the statue of frauds and is unenforceable in the absence of a
writing. See Sims v. Purcelf, 74 Idaho 109,257 P.2d 242 (1953) (oral
compromise agreements within the statute of frauds unless taken out
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS TO VACATE JUDGMENT
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by part perfortnancc); ficrncrs v Green, 7 Idaho 668, 65 I). 362
( 1 90 1 ) (oral settlement contract to convey water rights within statute
of frauds unless taken out by part performance).
105 Idaho at 101
When the parties to a real estate contract attempt to include a security ~rovision,that
provision becomes an essential term of the contract. Oral evidence is not admissible to establish an
essential term of such an agreemmt. Lowjrence v Junes, 124 Idaho 748,75 I , 864 P.2d 194 (App.
1C193) In Lrrwrence, the Court held that a failed atteillpt to include a security provision renders the

security pl.ovision an "essential term of the agree~nent.Llkewise herc the deed of trust prov~sion
is essential. Absent a writing respecting thls provisloll, an essential term is missing and the
settlement agreement is unenforceable.

EVEN HAD THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT BEEN IN WRITING, IT WOULD
NOT HAVE BEEN ENFORCEABLE BECAUSE THE AUTHORIZATION OF
DEFENDANTS' AGENT WAS NOT ITSELF REDUCED T O A WRITING
Paragraphs 2, 4 and 7 of the Findings of Fact describe the settlement negotiations which
occurred between plaintiffs, on the one hand, and defendants' attorney (Mr. Shepherd), on the other
There is n o writing which endows Mr. Shepherd with the authority to agree to execute a deed of trust
or otherwise unwind the reai property transaction on behalf of the defendants. Because the
settlement agreement was subject to the statute of frauds, Mr. Shepherd's authority to act can only
be conferred by a writing executed by the defendants. There is no evidence of such written authority
This principle of law is noted in the Restatement ofAgency, Second, section 28: "Except as
stated in Subsection (2), an instrument executed by an agent as a sealed instrument does not operate
as such unless authority or apparent authority to execute it has been conferred by an instrument under
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS TO VACATE JUDGMENT
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seal ."

In Arthzrr

11

k/~lp~(rzck
Brorhel-.s 47 Idaho 306, 274 Pac 800 ( 1929). a power of attorrlcy

contained no authority to convey real estate. The Court concluded that "the deed to Catherine .I.
Arthur was ineffective by reason of illsufficiency of the power of attorney to authorize conveyance
of real estate". Id. 47 Idaho at 3 1 I . See also Johnson v. ,Sage, 4 Idaho 758,764,44 Pac. 641 (1 896).
111.
THERE IS N O PREVAILNG PARTY IN THIS MATTER
Rule 54(d)(l)(B) sets forth the manner in which the trial court shall determine which party,
if any, is the prevailing party: " . .

.

the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final

judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties

. . ."

The plaintiffs did not prevail on any of the five counts alleged In the complaint: The
complaint alleges the following counts: ( 1 ) breach of contract; (2) inji~nction;(3) specific
performance; (4) declaratory judgment; and (5) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. None of these counts were litigated. Rather, the plaintiffs sought the assistance ofthe Court
in enforcing a settlement agreement. As part of that settlement, defendants retained ownership of
the real property, contrary to the allegations of the complaint. Further, the terms of the settlement
agreement did not include the payment of attorney fees in addition to the $40,000.
Stated differently, plaintiffs did not sue to enforce a settlement agreement. Rather than
adjudicate the five counts pleaded in the complaint, they settled those counts and then sought the
assistance of the Court in enforcing the settlement. Simply put, plaintiffs did not prevail on any of
the five counts contained in the complaint.
Because they are not prevailing parties, under Rule 54(d), I.R.C.P., plaintiffs are not entitled
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS TO VACATE JUDGMENT
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to costs or attorney fees.
IV.

THE TRANSACTION BE FWEt:N PLAWTIFFS AND DEFEND4NTS RESPECTIWC THE
SALE Of- UEFk:NDAN'TSYIIESlDENGF IS N_C)'TA COMMFIRCIilL TRANSACTION
W17%IllNI'IiE CON?'T:MPL2ATION Ok IDAHO CODE SI'("S1ON 12- 120(3)
Section 12-120(3) states:
In any civil action to recover or1 an open account, account stated, note
bill, negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the
purchase or sale of goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any
commercial transaction unless otherwise provided by law, the
prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be set
by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs.
The term "commercial tra~lsaction"is defined to mean all transactions
except transactions for personal or household purposes. The term
"party" is defined to mean any person, partnership, corporation,
association, private organization, the state of Idaho or political
subdivision thereof.
Clearly, the oral settlement agreement between the parties is not a "contract relating to the
purchase or sale of goods, wares, merchandise or services". By its language. this portion of the
statute does not apply to contracts dealing with real property. C'risio C'ienr Pe~tec~ostal
C'hurcbh rv
Pcrz, 144 Idaho 304, 160 P.3d 743 (2007).

Neither is the settlement agreement a "commercial transaction" as it involves the attempted
purchase of defendants' personal residence. The Idaho Supreme Court has consistently held that
disputes over real property do not constitute "commercial transactions" under Idaho Code section
12-120(3). This is particularly so in the case at bench where the real property in question is
defendants' personal residence:
In B a t e r v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 16 P.3d 263 (2000), the dispute involved a claim of
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ad~rersepossession. The Supreme Court stated that disputes over real propelty interests do not
entitie the prevailing party to section 12- 120(3) attorney fees "unless the commercial tmsaction is
irltegral to the c1aim". ld. 135 at 174:
The present case is analogous to others decided by this Court and the
Court of Appeals involving the determination of property rights. See
Jerry J. Joseph C L. U. Ins. Assoc. v. Vuughi, 1 17 Idaho 555,789 P.2d
1 146 (Gt. App. 1990) (denying attorney fees under I.C. 5 12- 120(3)
in an action where propeny owner sought a judgment compelling
adjoining prOpeMy owners to reimburse it for irrigation assessmerlts,
to record an instrument establishing an access easernent and to
remove a fence hindering Its use of the easement and where aftcr
settlement, adjo~ning property owners breached the settlen~e~lr
agreement); C'hevr v C'onwujj, 12 1 Idaho 1006, 1012,829 P.2d 1355.
1361 (Ct. App.), opinion on review, 12 1 Idaho 1000,829 P.2d 1349
(1 992) (determining that a quiet title action involving dispute over the
existence of aprescriptive easement was not a commercial transaction
under I.C. fj 12-120(3)); Durranf v. Christensen, 117 Idaho 70, 785
P.2d 634 (1990) (holding that an action in which landomers sought
adjudication of water rights and a permanent restraining order
prohibiting the defendant from interfering with their diversion and
use of water determined was not based on a commercial transaction
as defined in I.C. fj 12-120(3)); Sun Valley Hot Springs Ranch, Inc.
v. Kelsey, 13 1 Idaho 657,962 P.2d 1041 ( 1998) (concluding that an
action to determine ownership and easement rights did not f d l within
the meaning of a commercial transaction under I.C. 12-120(3) and
therefore attorney fees were properly denied). Like the above cases,
this action is primarily a dispute over property ownership and
easement rights and as such does not fall within the meaning of a
commercial transaction as defined in 1.C fj 12-120(3) and as applied
by the courts.
135 Idaho at 174, 175

DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION TO ENFORCE THE
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WAS NOT FRIVOLOUS
Defendants incorporate herein sections I and I1 above, pertaining to the statute of frauds,
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Ictaho Cock section 0-503 'I'hi. rnajcit t l ~ r t ~ofthe
sl
oral setrlement itgreement {\as to unwtnd a real
estate transaction and to uttlite a deed ot trust in the process Defcndziiits' asscrtlun that t h ~ oral
s

agreement. is subject to the statute of fiauds and, thus, unenforceable is not frivolous. Plaintiffs are
not entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12- 12 I .

PLAINTIFFS CLAIMED FEES ARE EXCESSIVE AND THEIR COSTS
HAVE NOT BEEN FULLY DOCUMENTED
Attornev fees: The following claimed fees are excessive: (1) Preparation of Findings of Fact
and Conciusions of Law: $1 521 .XO (12 hours); (2) Evidentiary hearing (one day): $2475.00 (14
hours/two attorneys),
Costs: (1) Plaintiffs' claimed costs 3s a matter of right are $570.50. I-fo~wver,plaintitt'has
failed to itemize these costs and whether they pertained to enforcement of the settlement agreement.

(2) The plaintiffs have failed to show the factual basis fbr claiming that the discretionary costs were
"necessary and exceptional" and in what manner they pertained to enforcement of the settlement
agreement.
CONCLUSION
The iudgment must be set aside because it seeks to enforce an oral settlement agreement
which contemplates the convevance of an interest in realproperty: First, because the agreement calls
for the unwinding of a real estate transaction and the utilization of a deed of trust to do so, it is
subject to the statute of frauds and unenforceable due to the agreement's oral status. Secondlj.
because the agreement was entered into by defendants' agent, who lacked written authority to convey
defendants' interests in real property, the settlement agreement negotiated by the agent is
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Plaintiffs are not entitled to attorney fees or costs:
( 1 ) Plaintiffs did not prevail on any of the five counts alleged

In

the complaint. Rather. the)

settled the case anit sougl~tthe assistance ofthe Court 1 0 enforc~nga scttIcrncnr agreement fur the^
the settlen~entagreenlerlt iacks an attorney fee provision.
(2) The settlement agreement is not a '"commercial transaction" as conten~platedby Idaho
Code section 12-120(3). Real property transactions are not considered commercial in nature,
particularly where they involve the sale of a personal residence.
(3) Defendants opposition to enforcement of the settlement agreement was not frivolous

based, as it was, upon a good faith assertion that the oral settlement agreement fell within the
parameters of the statute of frauds. Plaintiffs do not have an entitlement to attorney fees arising from
Ictaho Code section 12-12 1.
(4) As noted above, plaintiffs' claimed attorney fees are excecsive. and the claimed costs

have not been adequately documented.

DATED this 1 l I h day of Septen~ber,2008.

Attorney for defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I IIEREBY CERTIFY that on the 11'" day of September, 2008,I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
MI-.Kevin E. Dinius
Morrow, Dinius
5680 E. Frankl~nRoad, Suite 220
Narnpa, Idaho 83687

d; S Mail
-- - Hand Delivery
Ovcrtilght Mail
- X - 1-acslrnlle
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ALLEN B. ELLIS
ELLIS, BROWN & SFIEILS, GHARTERlZD
Attorneys-at-law
707 North 8th. Street
P.O. Box 388
Boise, Idaho 8370i-0388
(208) 345-7832 (Telephone)
(208) 345-9564 (Facsimile)
ISB No. 1626
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TEIf-: THIRD JUDICIAI, 1)IS'I'KIC' I' 01. THE

STATE OF IDAI-10, IN AND FOR TE-IE COLWTY 01: OWYl IE1:
Henry Ogden, an unmarried man; and
Michelle Hurst, an unmarried woman,
Plaintiffs,

Dennis C. Griffith, an unmarried man;
and, Bonnie M. Porter, an unmarried
woman,
Defendants.

)

1
1
1
1
1
)

Case No. CV 2006-5807*M
MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT
PURSUANT T O RULE 59(e), IDAHO
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

1
1
1

Come now the defendants, through their attorney of record, and move to vacate the judgment
in this matter entered September 9,2008. This motion is made upon the grounds that the judgment
is against the law, to wit: (1) it seeks to enforce an oral settlement agreement which is subject to the
statute of frauds and is unenforceable unless in writing, and (2) in entering into the agreement,
defendants' agent (their attorney Ronald R. Shepherd) lacked written authority to convey their
interests in real property; hence the agreement is unenforceable.
MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 59(e),
IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE - 1

'I his nlorioit is based ripon the Merllorandum in S~tppott oi'blotlons to Vacate Judgnlent and
Disallo~.Attorney f%es/Costs, the pleadings and records In t h ~ saction and s~ichother oral ltnci
doctirnentnry evidence which may be presented at the time of hearing.

DATED this 1 1 'h day of September, 2008.

Attolney for defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1 FIEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1 1'" day of September. 2008. I ca~lsedto be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Mr. Kevin E. Dinius
Morrow, Dinius
5680 E. Franklin Road, Suite 220
Nnmpa, Idaho 83687

-XR

Allen B. EKS

MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 53(e),
IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE - 2

"ti

1

lJ.S.
- - Mail
Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
475-2201
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STATE OF IDAHO, J
N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWWEE
HENRY OGDEN, an unmarried man; and )
MICHELLE HURST, an unmarried woman, )
)

Plaintiff,

1

Case No. 200645807*M

)
)

M E M O W D U M DECISION

) UPON RULE 59(e) NOTION
) TO VACATE SUDCMENT AND
DENNIS C. GRIFFITH, an unmarried man; ) MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS
and, BONNlE M. PORTER, an unmarried )
woman,
)
-VS-

Defendants.

1
)

On September 26, 2008, this matter came on for oral argument upon the Defendants'

Motion to Vacate Judgment and upon Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs related to
their motion to enforce the e l e m e n t agreement

Appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs, Henry

Ogden and Michelle Hurst, was Kevin Dinius, attorney at law. Appearing on behalf of the
defendants, Dennis GriEth and Bonnie Porter, was Allen Ellis, attorney at law.
During the course of oral argument? Mr. Ellis cited some further legal authority not

previously addressed in the written arguments of the parties. AccordingIy, the court asked for
further briefing. The court has now considered all the written and oral arguments presented by
the parties.
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MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT
This court prcviousty ganted the plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce Seniement Agreement as
IS

set forth in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law fifiled August 7, 2008. PlaiatiEsY

cowsef prepared and submined a written Judgment shortly thereafter. On August 27, 2008,

Defendants' counsel objected to the propsed Judgment on the basis that the Statue of Frauds
invalidates any requirement that the defendants execute a dced of trust. Two days latcr, a Notice
of Substitution of Counsel was filed with the court and attorney Allen Ellis replaced attorney
Wade Curtis as counsel of record for the defendants. After a telephonic confe~nccwas heId
involving the undersiped District Judge and anorneys Kevin Dinius and Allen Ellis, the Court
exccuted the proposed Judmcnt on September 9, 2008.

The defendants responded with a

Motion to Vacate thc Judgment and to OisalIow Costs and Fees filed September 12,2008.

In its Findings of Fact and Coi'1~1usionsof Law filed August 7,2008, the court found that
an oral settlement agreement had bmn reached between the parties to this lawsuit and that one of
the provisions of thc agreement was that the defendants agreed to pay a sum of $40,000 to the
plaintiffs. Payment was to be made within six months of the settlement with interest thereon at
the rate o f six percent. This court also found that the defendants agreed to provide the plaintiffs
with a deed of trust to secure payment. It is this last provision that defendants now argue make

the entirc settlement agreement unenforceable because it viofates the Statute of Frauds.
In support of their argument, the defendants cite the legal authority of Lawrence v. Jones,

124 Idaho 748, 864 P.2d 194 (Ct. App. 1.993). In Lawrence, the contract so~~ght
to be enforced
was an agreement for the purchase of land. Thc court of appeals stated:
Because the contract in tki,s case was subject to the statute of
kauds, I.C. $9-503, -505, gaps in essential terns cannot be filled
by paroi evidence. 'When a written note or memorandum. is
sought to be introduced as evidence of an oral agreement falling
within the statute of frauds, it m.ust be speci.fic and parol. (oral)
evidence is not admissible to establish essential prov.i&ionsof the
contract. Citations omitted. Lawrence, supra, at p. 75 1.
The Lawrence court dcterrnined that the security provision of the land sale contract was "central
to the contract". Howevcr, it was so vague that its meaning could not be determined from the
M E M O W D U M DECISION UPON RULE 59(e)
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writing. Since parol evidence could not be considered to assist in interpreting the contract, the
court could never dctemine the acts to be perform&. The court held that because the security
provision was an essential term o f the contract, the entire agreement was unenforcclable. See also

Chapin v. Linden, 144 Idaho 393, 162 P.3d 772 (2007) (also involving an unenforceabte oral
land sale ageernent).

In this case, the agreement or contract is for the se~lemcntof a lawsuit, not a land sale
contract. The issue decided by thc court was whether the defendantshaorney had authority to

bind them to the settlement ngrmment as set forth in thc court's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of l a w . This court found that the attorney was granted that authority. In Lawrence,
an essential term o f the agreement was vague and the Statute of Frauds prohibited the court fkom

using parof evidence to assist in interpreting the mming of the vague term. In this case, there
was nothing vague about the agreement. In t e t m for dismissal of the lawsuit against them, the

defendants agreed that they wouId pay $40,000 within six months, with interest, and execute a
deed of trust to secure the payment.

For that reason, this coM finds that Lmrence is

This c o w has had to find authority from other jurisdictions to assist in its analysis. The
case o f lialsfead v. Murray, 130 N.M.560,547 A.2d 202 (New Hampshire 1988) is helpful. 'In

that case, like this one, the plaintiff filed a motion to enforce a settlement agreement but the
defendant objected "contendi.ng that the Statute of Frauds . . . had not been satisfied"'. Ifatstead,

supra at p. 562. The case differs somewhat in that in Hulstead, the settlement agreement was a
contract for the sale of land.' The New Hampshire Supreme Court reviewed the history and

purpose of the Statute o f Frauds as foIlows:
The original Statute o f Frauds has an interesting history whj.ch is
worthy of a brief review. The Englisl-r Parliament first enacted the
statute in 1677 to prevent "any frauddent practices,, which are
commonly endeavored to be upheld by perjury and subornation of
perjury.' Note, The Doctrine of Eq'quifobleEstoppel and the Srortrfe
of Frau&* 66 Mi,ch.L.Rev. 170 (1967), At that time, under
't

In the interest of full and fair disclosure, the court also locatcd a case decided by the Supreme Court of Missouri,
Schmidt v. While, 43 S.W. 871 (2001), which reversed an order granting enforcement of a settlemcnt agreement on
the basis that the Missouri Statute of Frauds requires an arrorney, as his client's agent, to have written authonmtion
to enter into a settlement agreement for the sale of real estate in order to bind the client. This coittt finds that case is
distinguisrlabiebecnusc we do not have a land sale contract as a basis of the settlement ageement.
MEMORANDUM DECISION UPON RULE 59(e)
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English trial practice, partics to a lawsuit were deemed to be
incompetent witnesses and hence barred from ~stifjling. The
statute thus was aimed at making virtually all contracts of
significance unenforceable unless they had been reduced ro
writing. The statute, of course, some~mesproduced harsh results,
and the English cows soon developed cxceptians, such as the rule
that partial perfomanee of thc conlract took the ageemcnt out of
the wquirements of the statute. Sincc that tim, all of the States of
this country have adopted some portion of the original Stacute o f
Frauds. Id At f 70-71. However, they have done so with full
knowledge that the Statute of Frauds has ken judiciafly
inte'pretrsd in such a way as to attempt to prevent fsaud rather than
to promote it.
We have said that [the Stature of Frauds] 'is intended to promote
certainty and to protect from frauds and perjuries in land
transactions.' Further, we have said that 'a strtct enforcement of
the statute can produce h t r a t i o n on the one had, and unethical
conduct on the other Hence the law seeks to alleviate the
harshcss of the statute when some opemting facts, such as fraud,
part performance, or other equitable considerations, are present.'
Citation omifted
Ultimately, the New Hampshire Suprcme Court found that in those cases in which the
client has authorized the attorney to settle a pending case involving land by the sale of the land

vvhich is the subject of the suit, the Statute of Frauds does not require the authorization to be in
writing.

In has been heId by Idaho courts that "[t]he doctrine of part performance is best
undcrstood as a specific form of the more general principle of equitable estoppel." Letfuntch r
Key Bank Nut Ass 'n, 141 Idaho 362, 367, 109 P.3d 1 104 (2005); Sword v. Skeet, I40 Idaho

242,92 P.3d 492,499 (2004) (quoting Fram v. Parke, 111 Idaho 1005,1007-08,729 P.2d 1068,
1070-71 (Ct.App. 1986).

To be specifically enforced by operation of the doctrine of part performance, an oral
agreement "must be complete, definite and certain in all its material terms, or contain provisions
which are capable in themselves of bcing reduced to certainty." Bear bland WaferAss 'n,Inc. v.

Brown, 125 Idaho 7 17,723,874 P.2d 528,534 (1994).
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It is siwificant to notc that in this case, the plaintiffs, in reliance upon what they thou&t
was an agreement to settle thc lawsuit, instructed the court to vacate the trial that had been set for
many months. As pointed out in their brief, "[Pllaintiffs materially changed their position in
reIim~eon the scttlcment agreed bctween the parties and vacated the trial after litigating the

matter for over a year.

. Clearly, equity must enforce the settlement agreement in this matter

to prevent gross &iustice."
This court believes that it is appropriate to use its equitable powers to invokc the doctrine
of part perfomance or equitable estoppel to cnforce the settlement agreement. Were, the

settlement agreement is clear and compIete as to all *the material terms. There is nothing vague
or uncertain about tIte agreement. The only issue was whether the defendants' artomey had
authority to enter into the agreement. That issue has b m decided by the court in its earlier
Findings of Fact and ConcIusions of Law upon the plainti.ffs7motion to enforce the settlement.
Accordingly, this Court is of the opinion that the motion to vacate the judgment should be
denied.

MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS
The plaintiffs seek an award of attorneys' fees and costs for prevailing on its
Motion to Enforce Settlement. Plaintiffs' first claim they are entitled to the award of attorneys
fecs pursuant to I.G. 822-120 (3). I.C.$ 12-120(3) provides
(3) In any civil action to recover on an open account, account slated, notc, bill,
negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of
goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless
otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall. be allowed a reasonable
attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs.
The tcnn "commercial transaction" is defined to mean ail transactions
except transactions for personal or househ,old purposes. The term "party" is
defined to mean any person, partnership, co~&ration, association, private
organization, the state o f 1daho or political subdivision thereof.

This case arises out of a real estate purchase and safe agreement gone awry. The
plaintiffs filed suit in this case seeking specific performance of the land sale agreement. The
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plaintiffs argue that their conwact to puchasc the real property owned by the defendants formed

the g a v m a n of this lawsuit. (See page 4 of the Memorandum in Support of Motion for Fees
and Costs). Where thc basis fox a request for attorney fees is an action to quiet title in rcal
property, a ruling that attorney fees were not awardable under the provision covering commercial

transactions was affimcd by the Idaho Supreme C o w in Treasure Valley Concrete, h c . v. Statc,

132 Idaho 673, 938 P.2d 233 (1999) ( a f w n g that the term commercial traslsacfion is not
generally applied to real cmte trmsactions, or to issues involvil~gthe omership of property).
See d s a Merrill v. Gibson, 139 Idaho 840,87 P.3d 949 (2004). Therefore, the Court cannot find
that attorney fees are recoverable pursuant to 12- 120(3).

The court must then review the requcst for attorneys fees and costs pursuant to I.C. $1212 1 and I.R.G.P.
54 (d)(l)@). In this case, the plaintiffs were clearly the prevailing pnrty upon
their Motion to Enforce the Sertlement Agtectnent* However, to award attorneys fees, the court
must bc leA with an abiding belief that the defendants' opposition to the motion was frivolous.

Minich V. Gem State Developers, Tnc.. 99 ldaho 91 I , 591 P.2d I078 (1979). A misperception of
law or of one's interest under the taw is not, by itself, unreasonable conduct. The question to be

answered is whether the losing party was not only incorrect but so plainly fallacious that it coutd
be deemed frivolous. unreasonable or without foundation. King v. Amalgamared Sugar Co., 106

Idaho 905,684 P.2d 307 (Gt.App. t984), ovmruled on othcr grounds, N13C Leusing Co. v. R & T

Farms, Inc., 112 ldnho 500, 733 P.2d 721 (1987). T h s court cannot make that fmding. Mr.
Curtis, prior counsel for the defendants, opposed the Motion to Enforce the Settlement
&yee~nent by arguing that the entire grant of authority needed to be in writing to conform to the
Statute o f Fr~uds. The court docs not find this position so fallacious that it can be decmcd

frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation.

Indeed, the Court had to give carefbl

consideration to the argument as set Forth above.
Accordingly, an award of attorneys' fees pursuant to I.C. 12-121 is not warranted. Costs

as a Matter of Right totaI $570.50 and Discretionary Costs of $76.37 should be awarded to the
plaintiffs for a total award of $646.87.
Therefore,
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ORDER
I T IS WIEEBY OmERED.
1. The defendan&' hAbtion to Vacate the Judgment i s DENIED.

2. The plaintiffs Motion for an Award of Attorneys Fees is DEnIED.
3. The plaintiffs are awarded Costs as a Matter o f kght of $570.50 and Discretionary
Costs of $76.37 for a total cost award of $646.87.

DATED:

,l(&(06

Thomas J. Ryan
District judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a bue and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed or
delivered to the following persons on thts b h day of November, 2008.

Kevin E. Dinius
Morrow Dinius
5680 East Franklin Road, Ste. 220
Nampa, Idaho 83687
Allen B. Ellis
Ellis, Brown & Shiels, Chartered
707 North 8thStreet
P.O. Box 388
Boise, Idaho 8370 1-0388
,/i

By:
t, /l;1: d
Deputy Clerk
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ALLEN B. ELLIS
ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS, CHARTERED
Attorneys-at-Law
707 North 8th Street
P.O. Box 388
Boise, Idaho 83701-0388
(208) 345-7832 (Telephone)
(208) 345-9564 (Facsimile)
ISB No. 1626

FILED
DEC 1 1 2008
CHARLOT;rEi5;WERBltRN, CLERK

Attorneys for Defendants

IN '1 HE DISTRICT COlJRT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
Henry Ogden, an unmarried man; and
Michelle Hurst, an unmarried woman,
Plaintiffs,

Dennis C. Griffith, an unmarried man;
and Bonnie M. Porter, an unmarried
wornan,
Defendants.

TO:

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Case No. CV 2006-5807*M
NOTICE OF APPEAL

THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANTS, THEIR ATTORNEYS OF
RECORD, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED
COURT:

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named defendants, Dennis C. Griffith and Bonnie M. Porter, appeal

against the above-named plaintiffs to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Memorandum Decision re
Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider entered April 17,2008, from Judgment entered September 9,2008,
and from the Memorandum Decision denying defendants' motion to vacate judgment which decision
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1

was entered Novernber 6,2008, the f ionorable Thomas J. Ryan presiding.

2.

I h e appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Judgment

and Memorandusn Decision identified in paragraph I above are appealable under and pursuant to

Rule 1 l(a)(l), I.A.R.
3.

A preliminary statement of the issue on appeal which the appellants intend to assert

in the appeal is as follows: 1) Whether it was against the law for the district court to rule that
defendants had waived their right to enforce the closing date deadline in the subject real estate
transaction; (2) Whether the district court committed an error of law when it ruled that (a) the alleged
settlement agreement was not subject to the statute of frauds; and (b) that because defendants' agent
was an attorney, it was unnecessary that his agency authority to undertake a transaction subject to
the statute of frauds be in writing.
4.

There has been no order entered sealing all or any portion of the record.

5.

The appellants request the preparation of the following portions of the reporter's

transcript: those hearings held on April 17,2008 and June 26,2008.

6.

The appellants request those portions of the clerk's record automatically inciuded

under Rule 28, Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as the following:
a.

Complaint filed December 7,2006;

b.

Answer and Demand for Jury Trial filed January 4,2007

c.

Memorandum Decision and Order of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary filed February

25, 2008;
d.

Motion for Leave to Withdraw filed March 26, 2008;

e.

Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement filed April 3, 2008;

f.

Affidavit of Kevin E. Dinius in Support of Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2

filed April 3,2008;

g.

Memorandum Decision Re: Plaintifrs Motion to Reconsider;

h.

Order Allowing Withdrawal of Counsel;

I.

Motion for Summary JudgmcntiMotion to Enforce Settlement Agreen~entfiled April
18,2008;
Notice of Appeara~~ce;
Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce Settlement
Agreement filed May 23, 2008;
Affidavit of Bonnie M. Porter filed May 23,2008;
Affidavit of Dennis Griffitl-t filed May 23,2008;
Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law Upon Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce
Settlement filed August 7, 2008;
Judgment filed September 9,2008;
Motion to Disallow Costs and Fees filed September 12,2008;
Motion to Vacate Judgment filed September 15,2008;

7.

r.

Memorandum in Support of Motions to Vacate Judgment and Disallow Attorney
FeesiCosts filed September 15, 2008;

s.

Memorandum Decision Upon Rule 59(e) Motion to Vacate Judgment and Motion for
Fees and Costs filed November 6,2008.

I certify:
(a)

That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for preparation of

the reporter's transcript.
(b)

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid.

(c)

That the appellate filing fee has been paid.

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3

(d)

That the ~ 0 u t -reporter
t
has been served pursuant to Rule 17(k)(l), I.A.R.

(e)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule

20, I.A.R.

DATED This I lthday of December, 2008.

Attorney for Defendants

NOTTCE OF APPEAL - 4

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the I l ' v a y of December, 2008,I caused to be served a tme
and correct mpy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Mr. Kevin E. Di~zius
Morrow, Dinius
5680 E. Franklin Road, Suite 320
Nampa, Idaho 83687

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery

Overnight Mail
X- Facsimile
-

475-2201

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 5

FILED
ALLEN B. ELI,IS
ELLIS. BROWN & S1JEILS, CIiAlI?'ERE<D
Anorneys-at-Law
707 North 8th Street
P.O. Box 388
Boise, Idaho 83701-0388
(208) 345-7832 (Telephone)
(208) 345-9564 (Facsimile)
ISB No. 1626

,/

1 [--#;LA.M._P.M.

DEC 1 5 2008
CHARLOTIE SMERBURN, CLERK

j

( &,I&----Deputy Clerk

Attorneys for Defendants

1N '1'ElE DIS'T'RICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
Henry Ogdetl, an unmarried man; and
Michelle Hurst, an unmarried woman,
Plaintiffs,

1
1
Case No. CV 2006-5807*M

1
)

Dennis C. Griffith, an unmarried man;
and Bonnie M. Porter, an unmarried
woman,
Defendants.

TO:

1

AMENDED
NOTICE OF APPEAL

1
1
1

THE ABOVE-NAMED PLAINTIFFS, THEIR ATTORNEYS OF
RECORD, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED
COURT:

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:

1.

The above-named defendants, Dennis C. Griffith and Bonnie M. Porter, appeal

against the above-named plaintiffs to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Memorandum Decision re
Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider entered April 17,2008, from Judgment entered September 9,2008,
and from the Memorandum Decision denying defendants' motion to vacate judgment which decision
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - I

was entered November 6,2008, tfle f-lonorabfe Thotnas J. Ryan presiding.

2.

'The appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Judgment

and bfemorandum Decision identified

it1 paragraph

1 above are appealable under and pursuant to

Rule I 1 (a)(l), I.A.R.

3.

A preliminary statement of the issue on appeal which the appellants intend to assert

in the appeal is as follows: 1) Whether it was against the law for the district court to rule that
defendants had waived their right to enforce the closing date deadline in the subject real estate
transaction; (2) Whether the di'strict court committed an enor of law when it ruled that (a) the alleged
settlement agreement was not subject to the statute of frauds; and (b) that because defendants' agent
was an attorney, it was unnecessary that his agency authority to undertake a transaction subject to
the statute of frauds be in writing.
4.

There has been no order entered sealing all or any portion of the record.

5.

The appellants request the preparation of the following portions of the reporter's

transcript: those hearings held on April 17,2008 and June 26,2008.
6.

The appellants request those portions of the clerk's record automatically included

under Rule 28, Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as the following:
a.

Complaint filed December 7,2006;

b.

Answer and Demand for Jury Trial filed January 4,2007

C.

Memorandum Decision and Order of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary filed February

25, 2008;
d.

Motion for Leave to Withdraw filed March 26,2008;

e.

Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement filed April 3, 2008;

f.

Affidavit of Kevin E. Dinius in Support of Notion to Enforce Settlement Agreement

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2

filed April 3,2008;

7.

g.

Memoranduln Decision Re: Plaintifrs Motion to Reconsider;

h.

Order Allocving Withdrawal of Counsel;

I.

Motion for Summary JudglnentiMotion to Enforce Settlement Agreement filed April
18, 2008;

j.

Notice of Appearance;

k.

Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce Settlement
Agreement filed May 23,2008;

1.

Affidavit of Bonnie M. Porter filed May 23,2008;

m.

Affidavit of Dennis Griffith filed May 23,2008;

n.

Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law Upon Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce
Settlement filed August 7,2008;

o.

Judgment filed September 9,2008;

p.

Motion to Disallow Costs and Fees filed September 12,2008;

q.

Motion to Vacate Judgment filed September 15,2008;

r.

Memorandum in Support of Motions to Vacate Judgment and Disallow Attorney
Fees/Costs filed September 15,2008;

S.

Memorandum Decision Upon Rule 59(e) Motion to Vacate Judgment and Motion for
Fees and Costs filed November 6,2008.

I certify:
(a)

That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for preparation of

the reporter's transcript.

(b)

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid.

(c)

That the appellate filing fee has been paid.

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3

(d)

'I'hat the court repot-ter has been served pttrsuant to Rule 17(k)(l), I.A.R.

(e)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule

20. I.A.R.

DATED This 12Ih day of December, 2008.

I

I

~11&~,~flis
Attorney for Defendants

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4

CERTIFICATE Of: SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 12Ihday of December, 2008,I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

Mr. Kevin E. Dinius
Morrow, Dinius
5680 E. Franklin Road, Suite 220
Nampa, Idaho 83687

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 5

-X-

U.S. Mail
IHand Delivery
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
475-220 1

DEC 1 6 2008
Kev~nE. Dinius
Shelli D. Stewart
MORROW DINIl JS
5680 East Frankl~nRoad, Suite 220
Nampa. Idaho 83687-7901
'Telephone:
(208) 475-2200
Facarnile:
(208) 475-220 1
ISB Yos.
5974,7459
kdin us@morrov+~dinus
corn
~.sfettar.f@iizorro~\~~~'~~?iu.~
COM

Attorneys fur PIaintir'l's
IN 'THE DISTRICT COIJRT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAI, DISTRICT OF
TlIE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
IIENRY OCDEN, an unmarried man; and,
MICHELLE HUICST, an unmarried woman,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
-VS-

DENNIS C. CRIFFITH, an unmarried man;
dnd, BONNIE hd. PORTER, an unmarried
woman,

TO:

)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)

CASE NO. CV 2006-5807"M
NOTICE OF APPEAL
Fee Category: 'I'
Fee: $95.00

1

THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, DENNIS C. GRIFFITH and BONNIE M.
PORTER, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT NOTICE IS
HEREBY GIVEN THAT:

I.

The above-named Appellants, HENRY OGDEN and MICHELLE HURST,

appeal against the above-named Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the final order

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1

ORIGINAL

clltcrccl In the abo~c-entltledactlon on the 6"' day of November, 2008, llorrorahlc I.hotrlas J.

Ryan p r c s ~ d ~ r ~ g

2

I he party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court. and the judgment

described in Paragraph 1 above is appealable under and pursuant to ICufe I l(a)(l), of the Idaho
Appelate Itules.

3.

A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the Appellants then i n t e ~ ~ d

to assert in the appeal; provided any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent tl-rc Appellants

from asserting other issues on appeal;
3.1
4.

Whether the Court erred in denying Plaintiffs an award for attorney fees.

Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record? No. If so, what

portion? NlA
5.

(a)

Is a reporter's transcript requested?
No.

6.

The Appellants request those portions of the clerk's record automatically included

under Rule 28, I.A.R.
7.

1 certify:
7.1

That the appellate filing fee has been paid; and

7.2

'That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant

to Rule 20, I.A.R.
DATED this 1 5Ih day of December, 2008.
MORROW DINIUS

Shelli b. Stewart
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2

CEK7'1E'ICr-l'f'l;,OF SEKVIC'K
I hcrcby certify tl-tat otl this 15'" day ot I>ccen~ber,2008. 1 ca~iscdto bc served a t r i ~
and
~
correct cctpy of the hregoing document by the mcthocl indicated belotv to the fbllo\vxitng:
Allen £3. flllis
EIIJl,lS BROUrN & SIII<II,S
P . 0 Box 388
Ro~re.ID 83701

El
El

lJS Mail
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
I'acsirnile - No. 345-9564

ill

cmif \Cllents\O\Ogden, I ienry 22396\Seitlement L-'nforce~nenl\Kottceof Appedl doc
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF I D m O , IN AND

i

* * * * * * *
HENRY OGDEN, an unmarried man; and
MICHELLE WURST, an unmarried woman,
plaintiff (s)/ Respondent (s)/
Cross-Appellant,
VS .

SUPREME COURT
CASE NUMBER: 35964
CERTIFICATE
OF EXHIBITS

DENNIS C. GRIFFITH, an unmarried man; and
BONNIE M. PORTER, an unmarried woman,
Defendant(s) /Appellant(s)/
Cross-Respondents.

I, Charlotte Sherburn, Clerk of the District Court of the
Third Judicial District of the State of Idaho in and for the
County of Owyhee, do hereby certify that the following is a list
consisting of documents to be sent as exhibits and which will be
lodged with the Supreme Court:
June 26, 2008
Plaintiffs Exhibit 5

- Letter to Mr. Kevin Dinius from Mr. Ronald

Shepard - admitted
P l a i n t i f f F s E x h i b i t 6 - Letter to Mr. Kevin Dinius from Mr. Ronald

Shepherd - admitted
P - 3 > a".i n t i f f rs E x h i b i t 11 - Email from Mr. Ronald Shepherd to Ms.
B

Brenda Seeger and reply - admitted

V

L

1

(

In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho
HENRY OGDEN, an unmarried man; and
MICHELLE HIAXST, an unmarried woman,
Plaintiffs-Respondents-Cross Appellants,
v.

DENNIS C. GRIFFITH, an unmarried man;
and BONNIE M. PORTER, an unmarried
woman,

)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
AUGMENT THE RECORD
Supreme Court Docket No. 35964-2008
Owyhee County No. 2006-5807

)

Defendants-Appellants, Cross
Respondents
A STIPULATION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD AND STATEMENT IN SUPPORT
THEREOF was filed by counsel for Respondents on April 2, 2009.

Therefore, good cause

appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that the STIPULATION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD be,
and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation record shall include the documents listed below,
file stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion, as EXHIBITS:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Memorandum of Stipulated Facts, file stamped March 4,2008;
Ron Shepherd's handwritten notes;
Offer letter dated March 5,2008;
Letter Confirming Settling Agreement dated March 5,2008;
Email to Ron Shepherd dated March 27,2008;
Memorandum re: Pretrial Conference dated March 6,2008;
Memorandum to Ron Shepherd re: telephone conversations dated March 6,2008; and
Handwritten Memo dated March 26,2008 and March 27,2008.

DATED this

8 s of April 2009.

cc: Counsel of Record

Plaintiff's

Exhibit 12 - Memo to Mr. Ronald Shepherd from Mr.

Bruce Hendricks - admitted
Plaintiff's

Exhibit 13 - Memo to Mr. Ronald Shepherd from Mr.

Bruce Hendricks - admitted
Plaintiffrs Exhibit 14 - Note - admitted

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set b
the seal of the said Court this $/!
day of

affixed
3Chand
4 and
, 2009.

CHAROLOTTE SHERBURN
Clerk of the District Court
I

@!id$&<
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~h&l

aeputy Clerk
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ORDER GRANTING MOTIOK TO
AUGMENT THE RECORD
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DE?4'RTISC. CRIFFITH, an unmarried man;
and BONNIE M. PORTER, an unmarried
woman,

)
)
)

I
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Defendants-Appellants.

)
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A MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD AND STATEMENT IN SUPPORT
THEREOF was filed by counsel for Appellants on June 26, 2009. Therefore, good cause
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GRANTED and tlie augmentation record sliall include the document listed below,

I. Memorandum In Support of Motions to Vacate Judgment and Disallow Attorney
FeeslCosts, file-stamped September 12, 2008.
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I
I
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11
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho
HENRY OGDEN, an unmarried man; and
MICHELLE HURST, an unmarried woman,

1
)
)

Plaintiffs-Respondents,

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
AUGMENT THE RECORD

1
v.

)
)

DENNIS C. CRIFFITH, an unmarried man;
and BONNIE M. PORTER, an unmarried
woman,

1

Supreme Court Docket No. 35964-2008
Owyhee County No. 2006-5807

1
Defendants-Appellants.
A STIPULATION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD AND STATEMENT IN SUPPORT
THEREOF was filed by counsel for Respondents on May 28, 2009.

Therefore, good cause

appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that the STIPULATION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD be,
and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation record shall include the documents listed below,
file stamped copies of which accompanied this Stipulation, as EXHIBITS:
1. Exhibit 1 - Affidavit of Daniel Godoy in Support of Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum,

dated June 28,2007; and
2. Exhibit 2 - Affidavit of Carrie Redovian in Support of Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum,
dated June 29,2007.
DATED this \??of

June 2009.
For the Supreme Court

CC: Counsel of Record
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IN TEE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

* * * * * * * * * *
HENRY OGDEN, an unmarried man; and
MICHELLE HURST, an unmarried woman,
plaintiff (s)/ Respondent (s!/
Cross-Appellant,
vs .

)/SERVICE- 28-DAY NOTICE

I

DENNIS C. GRIFFITH, an unmarried man; and
BONNIE M. PORTER, an unmarried woman,
Defendant (s) /Appellant (s)/
Cross-Respondents.

2

a

2
, ,he
Notice is hereby given that on
Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript in the above referenced
appeal was lodged with the District Court Clerk.
The parties shall have twenty-eight (28) days from the
date of service of the appeal record to file any objections,
together with a Notice of Hearing, with the District Court. If no
objection is filed, the record will be deemed settled and will be
filed with the Supreme Court.
~f there are multiple (Appellants) (Respondents), 1

will serve the record, and any transcript, upon the parties upon
receipt of a stipulation of the parties, or court order stating
which party shall be served. If no stipulation or order is filed
in seven ( 7 ) days, I will serve the party whose name appears first
in the case title.
CHARLOTTE SHERBURN, CLERK
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

BY
c c : Clerk of the Court
Idaho Supreme Court
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Id 83720-0101
Allen B. Ellis
Attorney at Law
PO Box 388
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